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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SEARCH RANK FRAUD PREVENTION IN ONLINE SYSTEMS
by
Md Mizanur Rahman
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Bogdan Carbunar, Major Professor
The survival of products in online services such as Google Play, Yelp, Facebook and
Amazon, is contingent on their search rank. This, along with the social impact of such
services, has also turned them into a lucrative medium for fraudulently influencing
public opinion. Motivated by the need to aggressively promote products, commu-
nities that specialize in social network fraud (e.g., fake opinions and reviews, likes,
followers, app installs) have emerged, to create a black market for fraudulent search
optimization. Fraudulent product developers exploit these communities to hire teams
of workers willing and able to commit fraud collectively, emulating realistic, sponta-
neous activities from unrelated people. We call this behavior search rank fraud.
In this thesis, we introduce two novel approaches to discourage search rank fraud
in online systems. First, we detect fraud in real-time, when it is posted, and im-
pose resource consuming penalties on the devices that post activities. We introduce
and leverage several novel concepts that include (i) stateless, verifiable computational
puzzles that impose minimal performance overhead, but enable the efficient verifica-
tion of their authenticity, (ii) a real-time, graph based solution to assign fraud scores
to user activities, and (iii) mechanisms to dynamically adjust puzzle difficulty levels
based on fraud scores and the computational capabilities of devices.
In a second approach, we introduce the problem of fraud de-anonymization: reveal
the crowdsourcing site accounts of the people who post large amounts of fraud, thus
their bank accounts, and provide compelling evidence of fraud to the users of products
vii
that they promote. We investigate the ability of our solutions to ensure that fraud
does not pay off. We survey the assumptions made by the fraud detection research
community on the capabilities and behaviors of fraudsters, and study their relevance
to app search optimization fraud conducted for Google Play apps. For this, we
designed and conducted in-depth interviews with expert fraudsters recruited from
several freelancing sites.
Our idea that fraud needs to be proactively discouraged and prevented, instead of
only reactively detected and filtered, has the potential to evolutionize fraud detection
for online, peer-review systems. Our techniques will help provide counter-incentives
for fraud workers and the developers who hire them: Online systems will be able to
expose influential fraud workers through their bank accounts, and provide compelling
evidence of fraud to the users of products that they promote.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The social impact of online services built on information posted by their users[Goob,
Yel, Fac, Twi] has also turned them into a lucrative medium for fraudulently influenc-
ing public opinion. For example, search rank fraud on sites like Google Play[Goob],
Yelp[Yel] and Facebook[Fac]. People often assume the popularity of featured products
is generated by purchases, downloads and reviews of real patrons, who are sharing
their honest opinions about what they have experienced. Every day, people rely on
online information to make decisions on purchases, services, software and opinions.
Motivated by the need to aggressively promote disinformation, communities that
specialize in social network fraud (e.g., fake opinions and reviews, likes, followers, app
installs) have emerged. The survival of mobile apps in markets such as Google Play
is contingent on their search rank. Higher ranked apps are installed more frequently
and generate more revenue, through ads or direct payments.
Popular belief (e.g., Ank (2013)) holds that large numbers of positive reviews
help new apps achieve higher search rank. The commercial success of Android app
markets such as Google Play and the incentive model they offer to popular apps,
make them appealing targets for fraudulent and malicious behaviors. The resulting
need of developers to aggressively promote their apps has created a black market for
fraudulent app search optimization (ASO). Malicious developers use app markets as
a launch pad for their malware[Min14, Mlo14, Rob15, Gre14]. In addition, the efforts
of Android markets to identify and remove malware are not always successful. For
instance, Google Play uses the Bouncer system[OM12] to remove malware. However,
out of the 7, 756 Google Play apps we analyzed using VirusTotal[Vir15], 12% (948)
1
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: (a) An install job posting from Freelancer [Fre], asking for 2000 installs
within 3 days (in orange), in an organized way that includes expertise verifications
and provides secrecy assurances (in blue). Text enlarged for easier reading. (b)
Anonymized snapshots of profiles of search rank fraudsters from Upwork (top 2) and
Freelancer (bottom). Fraudsters control hundreds of user accounts and earn thou-
sands of dollars through hundreds of work hours. Our goal is to de-anonymize fraud,
i.e., attribute fraud detected for products in online systems, to the crowdsourcing site
accounts of the fraudsters (such as these) who posted it.
were flagged by at least one anti-virus tool and 2% (150) were identified as malware
by at least 10 tools.
Crowdsourcing sites (e.g.,Fiverr, Upwork, Freelancer)[Upw, Fiv, Fre]) play a cen-
tral role in this ecosystem. While general purpose crowdsourcing sites enable fraud-
sters to advertise their services and match them with interested clients, specialized,
fraud-as-a-service sites have emerged [TSM16, RR16, RL16, AV16, AS16, AR16] that
focus solely on fraud work. Fraudulent developers frequently exploit crowdsourcing
sites to hire teams of willing workers to commit fraud collectively, emulating realistic,
spontaneous activities from unrelated people (i.e., “crowdturfing”[WWZ+12]). We
call this behavior search rank fraud, see Figure 1.1(a) for an example. Fraudsters
create hundreds of user accounts, connect with product developers through crowd-
sourcing sites, then post fake activities for their products, from the accounts they
control, see Figure 1.1(b)
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Figure 1.2: (a) Co-activity graph of user accounts reviewing a popular horoscope app
in Google Play (name hidden for privacy). Nodes are accounts. 4 Upwork workers
revealed to control the accounts of the same color. Two accounts are connected
if they post activities for similar sets of apps. Node sizes are a function of the
account connectivity. (b) Price per review (minimum, average and maximum), for
crowdsourcing sites that focus on app market fraud. The sites offer “fraud packages”
and even discounts for bulk fake review purchases. A fake review costs between
$0.5-$3.
This vibrant black market for online fraud signals profitability for fraudsters. Fig-
ure 1.2(b) shows that the competition pushes prices down, as low as $1 per fake re-
view. This further suggests that existing techniques (e.g., [YA15a, MLG12, HSB+16b,
RRCC16b]) that flag fake reviews posted by surrogate accounts controlled by human
fraudsters may be insufficient in curbing organized fraud.
Attempts to detect and filter fraud, e.g., [SCM11, Cal16] are known to be ineffec-
tive [RRCC16b, Sin15, Sie14, Mlo14, Min14]. For instance, Figure 1.2(a) shows the
co-review graph of a Google Play Store app that received fake reviews from 4 workers
in Freelancer [Fre]. Nodes with the same color denote reviewer accounts controlled
by the same worker, while edges connect accounts with a history of review activities
targeting the same apps.
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1.2 System Model
1.2.1 Background: Operation of Online Services
The central component in our model is an online service (the service) that hosts the
system. The service stores information about user accounts and featured subjects.
Subjects can be mobile apps in stores such as Google Play [Goob], businesses in
geosocial networks such as Yelp [Yel] and product items in eBay [eBa].
Users register with the service, record profile information (e.g., name, gender,
home city) and receive initial service credentials, including a unique user id. Users
can query the online service for information concerning subjects and other users. In
popular social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, the subjects can also include
the user accounts and the information that they post.
Users are encouraged to act on existing subjects. The actions include posting
reviews, comments, or likes, installing mobile app subjects, and following or friending
user accounts. The online service associates statistics over the actions performed for
each supported subject. To facilitate the retrieval of relevant subjects upon user query,
the service ranks them according to their popularity. The action statistics maintained
by the service have a significant impact on the popularity and search rank of subjects.
Subjects that rank higher in search results tend to be more popular [Quo].
1.2.2 High Level Adversary Model
We consider that adversarial behaviors start with the subject owners. Adversarial
owners seek to fraudulently promote their subjects, that can be of inferior quality
and even malicious, or demote competitor subjects. The focus of this proposal will
be on the fraud workers hired to launch such concerted efforts, or “fraud campaigns”,
to bias the popularity and public opinion of specific subjects.
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Fraud campaigns can, for instance, make businesses and products more prof-
itable [AM12, Luc], and increase the “reachability” of malware developers: more
victims install their apps. Install campaigns seek to fraudulently increase the number
of installs of an app. Review campaigns (sanctioned by the law [Att]) aim to increase
the average rating of the subject.
While adversarial owners can be rational or purely malicious, fraud workers are
rational, financially motivated adversaries. The jobs they receive specify a payment
amount and a quota of fraud expected to be posted.
Fraud workers can specialize on specific online services and types of fraudulent
actions, e.g., posting fake reviews, ratings or likes, installing apps, and following or
friending other user accounts. In generic crowdsourcing sites like Upwork [Upw] and
Freelancer [Fre], employers post jobs to hire fraud workers to target specific subjects.
Workers can then bid on such jobs, and, following negotiation steps, be assigned, or
win the jobs. In sites like Fiverr [Fiv], workers advertise their ability to perform ASO
jobs; employers need to identify and hire workers with the required expertise.
In addition, numerous “fraud-as-a-service” (FAAS) sites exist, where clients buy
fraud packages without direct interaction with the workers [TSM16, RR16, RL16,
AV16, AS16, AR16]. Figure 1.2(b) shows the minimum, average and maximum cost
per fraudulent action, as advertised by several FAAS sites: a fake review for an app
can worth as low as $1, while a fake social networking “like” can be as low as $2.
1.3 Contributions
We observe that fraud detection, as proposed in academic work and implemented
in popular online systems, is unable to ensure access to truthful information [Gro,
Wei17, MEY17, TRU, BRO17, Sie14, Min14, Mlo14, Rob15, Gre14] In this thesis
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we propose that fraud needs to be proactively discouraged and prevented,
instead of only reactively detected and filtered.
We introduce two novel approaches to discourage search rank fraud in online sys-
tems. First, we seek to detect fraud in real-time, when it is posted, and to impose
resource consuming penalties for posting fraud. Second, we propose the problem of
fraud de-anonymization: reveal the crowdsourcing site accounts of the people who
post large amounts of fraud, thus their bank accounts, and provide compelling evi-
dence of fraud to users of products that they promote.
1.3.1 Longitudinal App Market Study
In preliminary work [PRC17], we performed a detailed longitudinal analysis on 87,223
newly released apps. We have developed GPCrawler, a tool to automatically collect
data published by Google Play for apps, users and reviews. We have monitored and
collected data about these apps over more than 6 months. Features extracted from
a longitudinal app analysis (e.g., permission, price, update, download count changes)
can provide insights into fraudulent app promotion and malware indicator behaviors.
We found that a high number of apps have not been updated over the monitoring
interval. Moreover, these apps were controlled by a few developers that dominate
the total number of app downloads. At most 50% of the apps in each category have
received an update within 35 days, while apps in the Social and Tools categories
received updates within 15 days.
1.3.2 Fraud and Malware Detection in Google Play
We have developed FairPlay [RRCC16a], a system that discovered and leveraged
traces left behind by fraudsters, to detect both malware and apps subjected to search
rank fraud. We have correlated review activities and uniquely combines detected
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review relations with linguistic and behavioral signals gleaned from Google Play app
data (87K apps, 2.9M reviews, and 2.4M reviewers, collected over half a year), in
order to identify suspicious apps.
FairPlay organized the analysis of longitudinal app data into the 4 modules. The
Co-Review Graph (CoReG) module identified apps reviewed in a contiguous time
window by groups of users with significantly overlapping review histories. The Re-
view Feedback (RF) module exploited feedback left by genuine reviewers, while the
Inter Review Relation (IRR) module leveraged relations between reviews, ratings and
install counts. The Jekyll-Hyde (JH) module monitored app permissions, with a focus
on dangerous ones. Each module generated several features that we used to train an
app classifier. FairPlay also used general features such as the apps average rating,
total number of reviews, ratings and installs, for a total of 28 features.
FairPlay achieved over 95% accuracy in classifying gold standard datasets of mal-
ware, fraudulent and legitimate apps. We show that 75% of the identified malware
apps engaged in search rank fraud. FairPlay discovered hundreds of fraudulent apps
that evaded Google Bouncers detection technology. FairPlay also enabled us to dis-
cover more than 1,000 reviews, reported for 193 apps, that reveal a new type of co-
ercive review campaign: users are harassed into writing positive reviews, and install
and review other apps.
1.3.3 Real-time Fraud Preemption System
We introduced the concept of fraud preemption systems, solutions deployed to defend
online systems such as social networks and app markets. We proposed a real-time
fraud preemption approach that imposes Bitcoin-inspired computational puzzles on
the devices that post online system activities, such as reviews and likes. We have
adapted computational puzzles to prevent online system fraud and to solve the addi-
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tional challenges of building puzzles whose difficulty is a function of the probability
that an activity is fraudulent while handling heterogeneous user devices (e.g., ranging
from smartphones to machines that specialize in such puzzles).
We have developed FraudSys [RRCL17], a real-time fraud preemption approach
by leveraging several novel concepts that include (i) stateless, veriable computational
puzzles, that impose minimal performance overhead, but enable the ecient verication
of their authenticity, (ii) a real-time, graph based solution to assign fraud scores to
user activities, and (iii) mechanisms to dynamically adjust puzzle diculty levels based
on fraud scores and the computational capabilities of devices.
To validate FraudSys, we: (1) quantified the computation penalty imposed on
fraudsters; (2) introduced upper bounds on the profitability of fraud and the amount
of fraud that can be created for a single subject, per time unit; (3) used two real
datasets Google Play (i.e., 23K fake reviews from 23 crowdsourced fraud workers,
and 1K honest reviews) and Facebook (i.e., 274K fake and 180K genuine Likes), to
demonstrate that FraudSys imposes daily penalties as high as 3,079 hours on a single
fraudster, and, for a properly equipped fraudster, makes fraud less productive than
Bitcoin mining.
1.3.4 Fraud De-anonymization
We introduce the fraud de-anonymization problem, that goes beyond fraud detection,
to unmask the human masterminds responsible for posting search rank fraud in online
systems. We collect and study search rank fraud data from Upwork, and survey the
capabilities and behaviors of 58 search rank fraudsters recruited from 6 crowdsourcing
sites. We propose Dolos, a fraud de-anonymization system that leverages traits and
behaviors extracted from these studies, to attribute detected fraud to crowdsourcing
site fraudsters, thus to real identities and bank accounts. We introduce MCDense,
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a min-cut dense component detection algorithm to uncover groups of user accounts
controlled by different fraudsters, and leverage stylometry and deep learning to at-
tribute them to crowdsourcing site profiles. Dolos correctly identified the owners of
95% of fraudster-controlled communities, and uncovered fraudsters who promoted as
many as 97.5% of fraud apps we collected from Google Play. When evaluated on
13,087 apps (820,760 reviews), which we monitored over more than 6 months, Dolos
identified 1,056 apps with suspicious reviewer groups. We report orthogonal evidence
of their fraud, including fraud duplicates and fraud re-posts.
1.3.5 Crowdsourced Review Fraud Survey
we study the search rank fraud ecosystem that targets peer-opinion sites, in par-
ticular, Google Play. The diversity, responsiveness and revealed profitability of this
ecosystem, suggest an inaccurate and incomplete understanding of the capabilities,
behaviors and strategies of fraud workers, including their strategies to avoid detection.
The goal is to determine which existing assumptions still hold, whether fraudsters have
developed fraud detection strategies to avoid being identified by the peer-opinion site,
to determine the capabilities, behaviors and strategies employed by fraudsters, and
identify weakness that can be exploited by online systems and researchers, to identify
and prevent fraud.
1.4 Fundamental Challenges
• Multiple fraudster strategies. We cannot assume that all the fraudsters
employ the same search rank fraud posting strategy. Our preliminary work
revealed that fraudsters have various resources and different levels of expertise,
and use different strategies to post fraud. The strategies evolve along with the
defense mechanisms implemented by online systems.
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• Lack of ground truth data. Fraud detection and de-anonymization requires
knowledge of at least a modicum of ground truth data, including not only
datasets of fraudulent and honest activities, but also of attributed fraudulent
activities: the crowdsourcing account id of the worker who posted a fraudulent
activity. Collecting such data is hard and raises ethical issues, while quality
data is practically inexistent in the literature.
• Real-time fraud detection. The real-time constraint of identifying fraud
implies that fraud detection needs to achieve high accuracy given only informa-
tion from the past, and no knowledge of the future. Once the binary decision
is taken, there is no going back.
• Penalty assignment accuracy. We propose to assign penalties to all user
activities in the online system. The penalty of an activity should be proportional
to the belief that the activity is fraudulent. Fraudsters may predict and exploit
errors in the computation of penalties, while errors may also alienate honest
users.
• Malicious behaviors. Penalties need to be a function also of the computa-
tional capabilities of the devices from which the online system activities are
performed. Fraudsters may obfuscate the computational capabilities of their
devices, while even honest users may use multiple devices to perform activities.
1.5 Outline of The Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized and summarized as follows: Chapter 2 pro-
vides an overview of the existing literature in the field of fraud detection and preven-
tion. It presents methods utilizing a variety of different techniques and algorithms
and then we describe the key difference between our work and the existing studies.
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Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 represent the main contribution of the thesis. In chapter
3, we present a longitudinal study of Google Play app metadata can provide unique
information that is not available through the standard approach of capturing a single
app snapshot. It provides insights into fraudulent app promotion and malware indica-
tor behaviors by extracting features from a longitudinal app analysis (e.g., permission,
price, update, download count changes).
In Chapter 4 we tackle the problem of identifying both malware and search rank
fraud subjects in Google Play. We uncover these nefarious acts by picking out fraudu-
lent and malicious behaviors leave behind telltale signs on app markets, unlike existing
solutions.
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of fraud preemption systems, solutions deployed
to defend online systems such as social networks and app markets. Earlier in this
chapter, we describe the system and adversarial model and potential challenges which
we need to address in the following sections. Following sections depict important
modules of our proposed fraud preemption system which leverage bitcoin inspired
computational puzzles to discourage fraud.
Chapter 6 introduces the fraud de-anonymization problem, a new approach to
address the limitations of status quo solutions, through disincentivizing search rank
fraud workers and their employers. We seeks to attribute detected search rank fraud to
the humans who posted it and thus provide counter-incentives both for crowdsourcing
workers to participate in fraud jobs, and for product developers to recruit fraudsters.
In Chapter 7 we survey the assumptions made by the fraud detection research
community on the capabilities and behaviors of fraudsters and study their relevance
to app search optimization fraud conducted for Google Play apps. For this, we
designed and conducted in-depth interviews with expert fraudsters recruited from
several freelancing sites. In addition, we have validated these interviews results with
direct empirical data collected from the social networking site, establishing ground
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truth for future research. Furthermore, we have identified novel assumptions that
seem critical to the detection and de-anonymization of the fraudulent communities
studied. We have similarly analyzed and validated these new assumptions which
provide novel insight into the techniques and methods used by fraudsters in the wild.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Survey
In this chapter, we survey related studies on search rank fraud. First, we survey
existing solutions and literature that analyze the data and show that online mar-
ketplace content dynamics. Then, existing solutions to detect malware and fraud
products in the online e-commerce site. Their limitations in capturing real-time
search rank fraud activities are analyzed. Secondly, in this chapter, we survey the
assumptions made in the literature about the fraudulent behaviors perpetrated in on-
line systems, in particular, related to search rank fraud. Thirdly, we study previous
solutions on computation based fraud preemption and also graph based fraud detec-
tion techniques which have been used extensively to model relationships and detect
fraudulent behaviors in online systems. Finally, we study fraud attribution problem
and different fraud detection solutions and their re-active behavior and limitations.
2.1 App Market Temporal Dynamics
Viennot et al. [VGN14] developed PlayDrone, a crawler to collect Google Play data.
Their main finding is that Google Play developers often include secret key information
in the released apps, making them vulnerable to attacks. They further analyze the
data and show that Google Play content evolves quickly in time, that 25% of apps
are clones, and that native experience correlates strongly to popularity. The analysis
is performed over data collected for 3 non-contiguous months (May/June 2013 and
November 2013). In contrast, our analysis is performed over apps monitored daily
over more than 6 months. Furthermore, our analysis includes orthogonal app market
dynamics dimensions, that include the frequency and cycles of app updates, the
developer impact and control on the app market, and the dynamics of top-k lists.
Zhong and Michahelles [ZM13] analyze a dataset of Google Play transactions, and
suggest that Google Play is more of a “Superstar” market (i.e., dominated by pop-
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ular hit products) than a “Long-tail” market (i.e., where unpopular niche products
contribute to a substantial portion of popularity). In addition, Zhong and Micha-
helles [ZM13] show that certain expensive professional apps attract disproportionately
large sales. This is consistent with our finding that a few developers are responsible
for the most popular apps.
Mo¨ller et al. [MMD+12] use an app they posted on Google Play to study the
correlation between published updates and their actual installations. They show that
7 days after a security update is published, almost half of the app’s users still use an
older, vulnerable version. Liu et al. [LAC12] use a dataset of 1,597 ranked mobile
apps to conclude that the “freemium” strategy is positively associated with increased
sales volume and revenue of the paid apps. Moreover, they show that free apps that
rate higher contribute to higher revenue for the paid version. We note that our work
studies a multitude of previously unanswered questions about Google Play, regarding
app update frequency and pricing appropriateness, and the evolution of top-k lists.
Petsas et al. [PPP+13] explored mobile app markets in the context of 4 providers,
that do not include Google Play. They show that the distribution of app popularity
deviates from Zipf, due in part to a strong temporal affinity of user downloads to
app categories. They show that on the markets they studied, paid apps follow a
different popularity distribution than free apps. In contrast, our work exclusively
analyzes Google Play, the most popular Android app market. In addition, we focus
on different dimensions: (i) app update frequency and its effect on app pricing and
resource consumption, (ii) the control of the market and the effect of developer actions
on the popularity of their apps and (iii) the evolution in time of top apps and top-k
app lists.
Xu et al. [XEG+11] use IP-level traces from a tier-1 cellular network provider
to understand the behavior of mobile apps. They provide an orthogonal analysis of
spatial and temporal locality, geographic coverage, and daily usage patterns.
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Security has been a theme in the large scale collection of mobile apps. Previ-
ous work includes malware detection [ZWZJ12], malware analysis [ZJ12], malicious
ad libraries [GZJS12], vulnerability assessment [EOMC11], overprivilege identica-
tion [FCH+11] and detection of privacy leaks [EGC+10]. While in this paper we
focus on the different problem of understanding the dynamics of Google Play, we also
introduce novel mobile app attacks.
2.2 Android Malware and Fraud Apps Detection
Zhou and Jiang [ZJ12] collected and characterized 1, 200 Android malware samples,
and reported the ability of malware to quickly evolve and bypass the detection mech-
anisms of anti-virus tools.
Burguera et al. [BZNT11] used crowdsourcing to collect system call traces from
real users, then used a “partitional” clustering algorithm to classify benign and ma-
licious apps. Shabtai et al. [SKE+12] extracted features from monitored apps (e.g.,
CPU consumption, packets sent, running processes) and used machine learning to
identify malicious apps. Grace et al. [GZZ+12] used static analysis to efficiently iden-
tify high and medium risk apps.
Previous work has also used app permissions to pinpoint malware [SLG+12, PGS+12,
YSM14]. Sarma et al. [SLG+12] use risk signals extracted from app permissions, e.g.,
rare critical permissions (RCP) and rare pairs of critical permissions (RPCP), to train
SVM and inform users of the risks vs. benefits tradeoffs of apps. FairPlay significantly
improves on the performance achieved by Sarma et al. [SLG+12].
Peng et al. [PGS+12] propose a score to measure the risk of apps, based on prob-
abilistic generative models such as Naive Bayes. Yerima et al. [YSM14] also use
features extracted from app permissions, API calls and commands extracted from
the app executables.
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Sahs and Khan [SK12] used features extracted from app permissions and control
flow graphs to train an SVM classifier on 2000 benign and less than 100 malicious
apps. Sanz et al. [SSL+13] rely strictly on permissions as sources of features for
several machine learning tools. They use a dataset of around 300 legitimate and 300
malware apps.
Google has deployed Bouncer, a framework that monitors published apps to detect
and remove malware. Oberheide and Miller [OM12] have analyzed and revealed
details of Bouncer (e.g., based in QEMU, using both static and dynamic analysis).
Bouncer is not sufficient - our results show that 948 apps out of 7,756 apps that we
downloaded from Google Play are detected as suspicious by at least 1 anti-virus tool.
In addition, FairPlay detected suspicious behavior for apps that were not removed by
Bouncer during a more than 6 months long interval.
Instead of analyzing app executables, FairPlay employs a relational, linguistic and
behavioral approach based on longitudinal app data. FairPlay’s use of app permis-
sions differs from existing work through its focus on the temporal dimension, e.g.,
changes in the number of requested permissions, in particular the “dangerous” ones.
We observe that FairPlay identifies and exploits a new relationship between malware
and search rank fraud.
Graph based approaches have been proposed to tackle opinion spam [YA15a,
ACF13a]. Ye and Akoglu [YA15a] quantify the chance of a product to be a spam
campaign target, then cluster spammers on a 2-hop subgraph induced by the prod-
ucts with the highest chance values. Akoglu et al. [ACF13a] frame fraud detection as
a signed network classification problem and classify users and products, that form a
bipartite network, using a propagation-based algorithm.
FairPlay’s relational approach differs as it identifies apps reviewed in a contiguous
time interval, by groups of users with a history of reviewing apps in common. FairPlay
combines the results of this approach with behavioral and linguistic clues, extracted
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from longitudinal app data, to detect both search rank fraud and malware apps. We
emphasize that search rank fraud goes beyond opinion spam, as it implies fabricating
not only reviews, but also user app install events and ratings.
2.3 Computation Based Fraud Preemption
Dwork and Naor [DN92] were the first to propose the use of computation to prevent
fraud, in particular spam, where the sender of an e-mail needs to include the solution
to a “moderately hard function” computed over a function of the e-mail. Juels and
Brainard [JB99] proposed to use puzzles to prevent denial of service attacks, while
Borisov [Bor06] introduced puzzles that deter Sybils in peer-to-peer networks. In
Borisov [Bor06], newly joined peers need to solve a puzzle to which all the other
peers have contributed.
FraudSys not only seeks to adapt computational puzzles to prevent online system
fraud, but also needs to solve the additional challenges of building puzzles whose
difficulty is a function of the probability that an activity is fraudulent, while han-
dling heterogeneous user devices (e.g., ranging from smartphones to machines that
specialize in such puzzles).
FraudSys also needs to minimally impact the experience of honest users.
Similarities to recaptcha. FraudSys is similar to Turing test to deter spam users in
recaptcha. In addition, legit users who pass a turing test can register a new account
in recaptcha while legit users who solves a bitcoin piece can post SN activities such
as reviews or Likes. Also, a recognized OCR by legit users in recaptcha rewards OCR
researchers, while a solved bitcoin block rewards the service providers.
Graphs have been used extensively to model relationships and detect fraudulent
behaviors in online systems. Ye and Akoglu [YA15a] quantified the chance of a sub-
ject to be a spam campaign target, then clustered spammers on a 2-hop subgraph
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induced by the subjects with the highest chance values. Lu et al. [LZXL13] proposed
a belief propagation approach implemented on a review-to-reviewer graph, that si-
multaneously detects fake reviews and spammers (fraudsters).
Mukherjee et al. [MLG12] proposed a suite of features to identify reviewer groups,
as users who review many subjects in common but not much else, post their reviews
within small time windows, and are among the first to review the subject. Hooi et
al. [HSB+16b] have recently shown that fraudsters have evolved to hide their traces,
by adding spurious reviews to popular items. To identify “camouflaged” fraud, Hooi
et al. [HSB+16b] introduced “suspiciousness” metrics that apply to bipartite user-
to-item graphs, and developed a greedy algorithm to find the subgraph with the
highest suspiciousness. Akoglu et al. [ATK15] survey graph based online fraud de-
tection. [FH16] provide a survey of community detection methods, evaluation scores
and techniques for general networks.
Zafarani and Liu [ZL15] attempt to detect malicious users using minimal informa-
tion (i.e., mostly the user’s name), in an effort to devise a solution that is applicable
to most social networks. This makes it suitable to detect malicious users at regis-
tration, as users need to provide at least their username. Instead of malicious users,
FraudSys seeks to detect fraudulent actions, then penalizes them according to their
likelihood of being fraudulent.
Unlike previous work, FraudSys assigns fraud scores to individual user activities
in real time, thus uses only partial information. To achieve this, FraudSys develops
and leverages features that quantify the connectivity of the user activity to other
groups of activities previously performed by other fraudsters on the same subject.
Further, FraudSys also imposes computation and temporal penalties to discourage
fraud creation.
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2.4 Online Social Fraud Detection
In 2011, Facebook revealed its use of an “immune system” (FIS) that employs adver-
sarial learning to combat fraud: lengthen the phases controlled by the defender and
shorten the phases controlled by the attackers [SCM11]. Google Play is likely to use
a similar immune system. For instance, unlike Yelp, Google Play does not reveal if
and which user activities are filtered, thus making it difficult to reverse engineer their
fraud detection features. However, by identifying 2,664 active, fraudster controlled
accounts, Dolos reveals significant fraud detection error rates in Google Play. Do-
los introduces a departure from existing solutions, as it identifies a ground truth seed
of fraud through interaction with active crowdsourcing fraudsters. In the following
we describe related work on community detection, and graph and linguistics based
fraud detection.
2.4.1 Community Based Fraud Detection
Yang et al. [YHZ+12] analyzed 2,000 “criminal” Twitter accounts and shown that
they tend to form small-world social network. Mukherjee et al. [MLG12, MKL+13a]
confirmed this finding and introduced features that identify reviewer groups, who
review many products in common but not much else, post their reviews within small
time windows, and are among the first to review the product.
Beutel et al. [BXG+13] proposed CopyCatch, a system that identifies lockstep
behaviors, i.e., groups of user accounts that act in a quasi-synchronized manner,
to detect fake page likes in Facebook. Cao et al. [CYYP14] also exploited lockstep
behaviors and insider information, to cluster user accounts based on similarity actions,
and uncover groups of malicious accounts in Facebook. Li et al. [LMC+16] extend
lockstep behavior identification with semi-supervised learning based on local spectral
graph diffusion, to detect YouTube fraud. In [MKL+13a], they further leverage model
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inference and the different behavioral distributions of review spammers vs. non-
spammers, to learn the population distributions of the two clusters.
Yang et al. [YHZ+12] also proposed a criminal account inference algorithm that
detects new criminal accounts by propagating malicious scores from a seed set of
known criminal accounts to their followers according to the closeness of social re-
lationships and the strength of semantic coordination. Dolos uses a supervised
learning based guilt-by-association process to expand the seed fraudster-controlled
account sets, which enables us to evaluate its accuracy. It further differs in its combi-
nation with a fraud attribution process: assign the newly discovered accounts to the
fraudster who controls them.
In LinkedIn, Xiao et al. [XFH15] use features extracted from user-generated text
(e.g., name, email, company or university) to train a supervised machine learning
pipeline and classify an entire cluster of accounts as malicious or legitimate. Rayana
and Akoglu [RA15a, RA16] propose a hybrid, semi-supervised framework that uses
graph data (neighborhood density, proximity to other uncertain nodes), relational
data (user-review-product graph), behavioral and text data, to spot opinion spam.
To differentiate spammers from legitimate users in social network Bhat et al. [BA13]
use community-based structural features by exploiting social network characteristics
of community formation. Fortunato and Hric [FH16] provide a survey of community
detection methods, evaluation scores and techniques for general networks.
In contrast to previous work, we show that search rank fraud (in Google Play)
is perpetrated by crowdsourcing site workers who often control hundreds of user
accounts. Then, Dolos goes beyond the simple detection of fraudulent account com-
munities, and instead seeks to de-anonymize the prolific crowdsourcing site workers
responsible for signi cant fraud in Google Play.
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2.4.2 Graph Based Fraud Detection
Graphs have been used extensively to model relationships and detect fraudulent be-
haviors e.g., [YA15a, SHY+17]. Ye and Akoglu [YA15a] quantified the chance of a
product to be a spam campaign target, then clustered spammers on a 2-hop sub-
graph induced by the products with the highest chance values. Wang et. al [WGF17]
leaveraged a novel Markov Random Field to detect fraudsters in social networks via
guilt-by-association on directed graphs. Shen et al [SHY+17] introduced “k-triangles”
to measure the tenuity of account groups and proposed algorithms to approximate
the Minimum k-Triangle Disconnected Group problem.
Wang et al. [WXLY11] introduced used “heterogeneous review graphs” that cap-
ture relations among reviewers, reviews and subjects, and develop an iterative model
to identify suspicious reviewers. Malliaros et al. [MMF12] exploit expansion proper-
ties of large social graphs to build an efficient algorithm for computing the robustness
property of time evolving graph to detect communities and anomalies. Faloutsos
et al. [Fal14] use static and temporal properties (e.g. eigenspokes) of time-evolving
graphs to spot suspicious activities and show the way to handle time-evolving graphs
as tensors and large tensors in map-reduce environments.
Hooi et al. [HSB+16b] have shown that fraudsters have evolved to hide their
traces, by adding spurious reviews to popular items. They introduced a class of
“suspiciousness” metrics that apply to bipartite user-to-item graphs, and developed
a greedy algorithm to find the subgraph with the highest suspiciousness metric.
Dolos builds on the empirical observation that search rank fraud is perpetrated
by many fraudsters who often control hundreds of user accounts. Dolos seeks to
not only detect fraud but also to de-anonymize the influential fraudsters. Instead of
heterogeneous or bipartite graphs, Dolos uses co-activity graphs whose nodes corre-
spond to user accounts and weighted edges capture co-activity activities of their end-
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point nodes. Thus, techniques such as dense subgraph detection [Cha00, Tso15] and
belief propagation [ACF13a] can be used to identify fraudster-controlled accounts. We
adapt (1) a dense subgraph detection (DSG) algorithm proposed by Tsourakis [Tso15]
to the fraud-component detection problem and (2) a belief propagation algorithm
(LBP) to the problem of detecting fraudster-controlled accounts. We show that Do-
los’ MCDense algorithm significantly outperforms DSG, discovering at least 90% of
the accounts controlled by at least 90% of their workers, for double the apps than
DSG. While LBP can accurately identify fraudulent accounts, it cannot attribute
them to their owners.
2.4.3 Linguistic Based Fraud Detection
Dolos fuses elements from computational linguistics, e.g., [OCCH11, LLK+11], and
author de-anonymization, e.g., [OG16]. Ott et al. [OCCH11] used computational
linguistics features to detect deceptive TripAdvisor reviews. Lau et al. [LLK+11]
proposed a text mining model integrated into a semantic language model to detect fake
Amazon reviews. Lappas et al. [LCT12] proposed an incremental greedy method to
find a small but diverse set of reviews that together preserve the statistical properties
of an entire review corpus. We posit that Dolos, that builds a corpus of fake reviews
for each detected fraudster, could benefit from this approach. For instance, Dolos
could attribute a new fake account to the fraudster whose “core” of fake reviews is
not changed by the addition of the new account’s reviews.
Hu et al. [HTGL14] proposed a matrix factorization based model to detect Twit-
ter spammers, that analyzed sentiment differences between spammers and normal
users. Sentiment and bias, e.g., [LCN15] may complement stylometry tools to help
attribute detected fraud. Overdorf and Greenstadt [OG16] proposed authorship at-
tribution methods that work across social networks. Abbasi and Chen [AC08] de-
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veloped Writeprints, a system for de-anonymizing e-mail, IM, reviews and program
code. Narayanan et al. [NPG+12] proposed author de-anonymization techniques that
handle huge number of classes (100, 000 authors).
Dolos is the first work to de-anonymize search rank fraud by linking it to crowd-
sourcing site worker accounts, and to break the anonymity barrier between crowd-
sourcing site workers and Google Play user accounts. Dolos overcomes limitations
that stem from malicious crowdsourcing behaviors, to break the anonymity barrier
between crowdsourcing site workers and Google Play user accounts. To achieve this,
Dolos leverages Google Play features, and traits we identified in fraudulent crowd-
sourcing behaviors, to introduce new techniques to collect ground truth fraud worker
profiles, detect clusters of related fraud, and attribute them to the workers who control
them.
Fraud data collection. Previous work, e.g., [GHP+12, OCCH11] used crowdsourc-
ing to collect gold standard review datasets, i.e., by asking workers to write reviews
for existing TripAdvisor venues. Rubin and Conroy [RC12] argue that one challenge
in building a quality fraud dataset is to incorporate motivation in the outsourced
tasks. We address this challenge by collecting existing fraudulent reviews, that were
written by expert fraudsters as part of real ASO jobs.
2.5 Crowdsourced Review Fraud Survey
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically organize as-
sumptions about fraud behaviors in online systems and validate them using recruited
fraud workers and ground truth data.
Previous research work illustrates several characteristics of incentivized reviews
which helps us to generate the assumptions and the questionnaire afterward. The
most important and commonly seen behavior is review burst where Groups of users
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acting together and reviews are posted within a very short burst [FML+13a, HTS16,
LFW+17a, HSB+15, BSLL+16a].
To build the reputation of the spamming accounts fraudsters often write genuine-
looking reviews to camouflage/mask their misactivities for adding camouflage edges
to random honest users [ACF13a, HSB+16b, RA15b]. Spammers are likely to copy
reviews across similar products and use a certain vocabulary to generate fake re-
views [MKL+13a, FML+13a]. The freshness of accounts and short-lived accounts
is another important characteristic usually seen for opinion spamming [MKL+13a,
YKA16]. Also to control the sentiment Spammers try to be the first reviewers for
products [MKL+13a, Xu13]. Spammers would change IP addresses frequently when
posting reviews to fool the fake review filtering system [LCM+15]. Also, fraudsters
develop automated programs or bot to control and create new spam accounts and
post reviews from those accounts [SMJ+15].
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CHAPTER 3
Longitudinal Study of Google Play
3.1 Motivation
The revolution in mobile device technology and the emergence of “app markets”, have
empowered regular users to evolve from technology consumers to enablers of novel
mobile experiences. App markets such as Google Play provide new mechanisms for
software distribution, collecting software written by developers and making it avail-
able to smartphone users. This centralized approach to software distribution contrasts
the desktop paradigm, where users obtain their software directly from developers.
Developers and users play key roles in determining the impact that market inter-
actions have on future technology. However, the lack of a clear understanding of the
inner workings and dynamics of popular app markets, impacts both developers and
users. For instance, app markets provide no information on the impact that devel-
oper actions will likely have on the success of their apps, or guidance to users when
choosing apps, e.g., among apps claiming similar functionality.
This situation is exploited however by fraudulent and malicious developers. The
success of Google Play and the incentive model it offers to popular apps 1, make it
an appealing target for fraudulent and malicious behaviors. Fraudulent developers
have been shown to attempt to engineer the search rank of their apps [Sie14], while
malicious developers have been shown to use app markets as a launch pad for their
malware [Min14, Mlo14, Rob15, Gre14].
Contributions. In this article we seek to shed light on the dynamics of Google
Play, the most popular Android app market. We report results from one of the first
characteristic studies on Google Play, using real-world time series data. To this end,
1Google offers financial incentives for contribution to app development, by making rev-
enue sharing transparent for developers (70-to-30 cut, where developers get 70% of the
revenue).
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we have developed GPCrawler, a prototype app market crawling system. We have
used GPCrawler to collect data from more than 470,000 Google Play apps, and daily
monitor more than 160,000 apps, over more than 6 months.
We use this data to study two key aspects of Google Play. First, we seek to
understand the dynamics of the market in general, from an application and developer
perspective. For this, we evaluate the frequency and characteristics of app updates
(e.g., their effects on bandwidth consumption), and use the results to determine if
developers price their apps appropriately. We show that only 24% of the 160,000 app
that we monitored have received an update within 6 months, and at most 50% of
the apps in any category have received an update within a year from our observation
period. We conclude that market inactivity has a significant impact on the price
distribution. Therefore, while pricing is an important and complex task, relying on
statistics computed on the entire population (as opposed to only active apps) may
mislead developers, e.g., to undersell their apps (§3.5.1). Also, we show that typical
app update cycles are bi-weekly or monthly. More frequently updated apps (under
beta-testing or unstable) can impose substantial bandwidth overhead and expose
themselves to negative reviews (§3.5.3).
To evaluate the developer impact, we first seek to verify our hypothesis that a
few developers control the app market supply. Our analysis reveals however that
developers that create many applications are not creating many popular applications.
Instead, we discovered that a few elite developers are responsible for applications that
dominate the total number of downloads (§3.6). Second, we evaluate the impact of
developer actions on the popularity of their apps. We show that few apps frequently
change prices, and with every subsequent software update, a developer is more likely
to decrease the price. However, changing the price does not show an observable
association with the app’s download count(§3.6).
Impact of the study. A longitudinal study of Google Play app metadata can
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provide unique information that is not available through the standard approach of
capturing a single app snapshot. Features extracted from a longitudinal app analysis
(e.g., permission, price, update, download count changes) can provide insights into
fraudulent app promotion and malware indicator behaviors. For instance, spikes in
the number of positive or negative reviews and the number of downloads received by
an app can indicate app search optimization campaigns launched by fraudsters re-
cruited through crowdsourcing sites. Frequent, substantial app updates may indicate
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, while permission changes can indicate benign apps
turning malicious see § 3.7.1. Features extracted from a longitudinal app monitoring
can be used to train supervised learning algorithms to detect such behaviors.
In addition, a detailed longitudinal study of Google Play apps can improve devel-
oper and user experiences. For instance, app development tools can help developers
optimize the success of their apps. Such tools can integrate predictions of the impact
that price, permissions and code changes will have on the app’s popularity, as well as
insights extracted from user reviews. In addition, visualizations of conclusions, and
analytics similar to the ones we perform in this paper, can help users choose among
apps with similar claimed functionality.
We include a detailed discussion of the applicability and future research directions
in app market analytics in §3.7.
3.2 Google Play Overview
App Distribution Channel: Google Play is the app distribution channel hosted
by Google. Each app submitted by a developer gets an entry on the market in the
form of a webpage, accessible to users through either the Google Play homepage or
the search interface. This webpage contains meta-information that keeps track of
information pertaining to the application (e.g., name, category, version, size, prices).
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In addition, Google Play lists apps according to several categories, ranging from
“Arcarde & Action” to “Weather”. Users download and install apps of interest,
which they can then review. A review has a rating ranging from 1 to 5. Each app has
an aggregate rating, an average over all the user ratings received. The app’s webpage
also includes its usage statistics (e.g., rating, number of installs, user reviews). This
information is used by users when they are deciding to install a new application.
App Development: In order to submit apps to Google Play, an Android developer
first needs to obtain a publisher account for a one-time fee of $25. The fee encourages
higher quality products and reduces spam [Goo12]. Google does not limit the number
of apps that can be submitted by developers. As a measure to reduce spam, Google
recently started the Bouncer [gooa] service, which provides automated scanning of
applications on Google Play for potential malware. Developers can sell their apps for
a price of their choice, or distribute them for free.
Permission Model: Android follows the Capability-based [Lev84] security model.
Each app must declare the list of capabilities (permissions) it requires in a manifest
file called Android-Manifest.xml. When a user downloads an app through the Google
Play website, the user is shown a screen that displays the permissions requested by
the application. Installing the application means granting the application all the
requested permissions i.e. an all-or-none approach.
3.3 Data Collection
We use snapshot to refer to the entire state of the market i.e., it contains meta
information of all apps. We first describe GPCrawler, our app market crawler, then
describe the datasets that we collected from Google Play.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of GPCrawler, the developed GooglePlay crawler. It consists
of a distributed crawler, processing engine and data management components.
3.3.1 The GPCrawler
GPCrawler, our prototype market crawling system (see Figure 3.1 for an overview)
consists of three main components. First, the Distributed Crawler component, which
is responsible for crawling the target market and collecting information on various
apps that are accessible from the current geographical location. We initially leveraged
hundreds of foreign proxies to address challenge 3 above. However, we later decided
to rely only on local US-based proxies for stability reasons. While this trades-off
completeness for consistency, having continuous information about a few apps im-
proves the accuracy of most statistical inference tasks compared to having discrete
information about hundreds of thousands of apps.
To seed our distributed crawler, we initially ran it using a list consisting of about
200 randomly hand-picked apps from different categories. To address Challenge 1, our
app discovery process is designed as follows: After retrieving each page, the “Similar
Apps” portion of the raw HTML page is parsed to obtain a new list of packages. These
packages are queued for crawling and simultaneously appended to the previous day’s
package list. We have also detected a ban detection engine in place that deactivates
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of free vs. paid apps, by category, for (a) dataset.2012 and
dataset.14-15. The number of free apps exceeds the number of paid ones especially
in dataset.14-15. We conjecture that this occurs due to user tendency to install more
free apps than paid apps. Since 2012, developers may have switched from a direct
payment model for paid apps, to an ad based revenue model for free apps.
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servers once it observes a threshold number of “404 Not Found” messages (Challenge
2) from the market provider.
The second component, the “Processing Engine” contains a Map-Reduce Parser
component that uses the map-reduce paradigm [DG08] to handle parsing of hundreds
of thousands of raw HTML app pages. In the “map” stage, a chunk of files (≈10K) are
mapped onto each of the 700 machines and a parser (written in Python) parses these
HTML and extracts the meta information. In the “reduce” stage, these individual
files are combined into a single file and de-duplicated to maintain data integrity. This
stage takes ≈1-1.5 hours. After constructing the aggregate file, we address Challenge
3 using the assertion checker that takes a best-effort approach to ensure that all
the information has been correctly parsed from the raw files. Note that despite our
best-effort approach, our dataset still contained some missing information due to
temporary unavailability/maintenance of servers.
The third, “Data Management” component, archives the raw HTML pages (≈14
GB compressed/day) in a cloud storage to support any ad hoc processing for other
tasks (e.g., analyzing HTML source code complexity) and subsequently removed
from the main servers. To address Challenge 4, the formatted daily snapshot (≈200
MB/day) is then inserted into a database to support data analytics. We setup the
relevant SQL Jobs to ensure that indexes are re-built every two days — this step
significantly speeds up SQL queries. Our six months of archived raw files consume
≈7 TB of storage and the database consumes ≈400 GB including index files.
3.4 Data
We used GPCrawler to collect two Google Play datasets, which we call dataset.2012
and dataset.14-15.
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Figure 3.3: Box and whiskers plot of the time distribution from the last update, by
app category, for (a) dataset.2012: at most 50% of the apps in each category have
received an update within a year and (b) dataset.14-15: at most 50% of the apps in
each category have received an update within 35 days. This may occur since new
apps are likely to have more bugs and receive more attention from developers.
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3.4.1 Dataset.2012
We have used a total of 700 machines 2 for a period of 7.5 months (February 2012 -
November 2012) to collect data from 470,000 apps. The first 1.5 months are the “warm
up” interval. We do not consider data collected during this period for subsequent
analysis. Instead, we focus on a subset of 160K apps for which we have collected the
following data:
GOOGPLAY-FULL: We used GPCrawler to take daily snapshots of Google Play store
from April - November, 2012. For each app, we have daily snapshots of application
meta-information consisting of the developer name, category, downloads (as a range
i.e., 10-100, 1K-5K etc.), ratings (on a 0-5 scale), ratings count (absolute number
of user ratings), last updated timestamp, software version, OS supported, file size,
price, url and the set of permissions that the app requests. Figure 3.2(a) shows the
distribution of apps by category. While overall, the number of free apps exceed the
number of paid apps, several popular categories such as “Personalization” and “Books
& References” are dominated by paid apps.
GOOGPLAY-TOPK: Google publishes several lists, e.g., Free (most popular apps), Paid
(most popular paid), New (Free) (newly released free apps), New (Paid) (newly re-
leased paid) and Gross (highly grossing apps). Each list is divided into ≈20 pages,
each page consisting of 24 apps. These lists are typically updated based on application
arrival and the schedule of Google’s ranking algorithms. Since we cannot be notified
when the list changes, we took hourly snapshots of the lists. Our GOOGPLAY-TOPK
consists of hourly snapshots of five top-k lists (≈ 3000 apps) from Jul-Nov, 2012
(≈2880 hours worth of data).
2We have used 700 machines, each with a different IP address and from a different
subnet, in order to avoid getting banned during the crawling process.
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3.4.2 Dataset.14-15
Further, we have used a dataset of more than 87,000 newly released apps that we
have monitored over more than 6 months [RRCC16b]. Specifically, we have collected
newly released apps once a week, from Google Play’s “New Release” links, to both
free and paid apps. We have validated each app based on the date of the app’s first
review: we have discarded apps whose first review was more than 40 days ago. We
have collected 87,223 new releases between July and October 2014, all having less
than 100 reviews.
We have then monitored and collected data from these 87,223 apps between Oc-
tober 24, 2014 and May 5, 2015. Specifically, for each app we captured “snapshots”
of its Google Play metadata, twice a week. An app snapshot consists of values for all
its time varying variables, e.g., the reviews, the rating and install counts, and the set
of requested permissions. For each of the 2, 850, 705 reviews we have collected from
the 87, 223 apps, we recorded the reviewer’s name and id, date of review, review title,
text, and rating.
Figure 3.2(b) shows the distribution of apps by category. With the exception
of the “Personalization” category, the number of free apps significantly exceeds the
number of paid apps. We have observed that consistently through our collection
effort, we identified fewer top paid than free new releases. One reason for this may be
that users tend to install more free apps than paid apps. Thus, not only developers
may develop fewer paid apps, but paid apps may find it hard to compete against free
versions. We note that free apps bring revenue through ads.
3.5 Popularity and Staleness
We first evaluate the fraction of apps that are active, and discuss the implications
this can have on app pricing. We then classify apps based on their popularity, and
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Figure 3.4: Per app category distribution of rating counts. (Top) Dataset.2012. The
distribution is almost symmetric in the case of unpopular apps. The distributions
for most of the categories are symmetric in the popular class and span roughly from
1, 000 to 100K ratings. The Business and Comics categories do not have any apps in
the most-popular class. (Bottom) Dataset.14-15. We observe smaller rating counts
compared with the apps in dataset.2012. This is natural, as these are new apps, thus
likely to receive fewer ratings. We also note that while a few Business, Libraries &
Demo and Medical categories are unpopular and popular, none are most popular.
study the distribution of per-app rating counts. Finally, we study the frequency of
app updates for apps from various classes and the implications they can have on end-
users. All the analysis presented in this section is performed using GOOGPLAY-FULL.
3.5.1 Market Staleness
An important property of a market is its “activity”, or how frequently are apps being
maintained. We say that an app is stale if it has not been updated within the last
year from the observation period, and active otherwise.
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The task of setting the app price is complex. However, relying on statistics com-
puted on the entire population, as opposed to only active apps, may mislead devel-
opers. For instance, given that the listing price of apps forms a key component of
its valuation and sale, this becomes an important factor for fresh developers trying
to enter the market. Specifically, the median price in our dataset is $0.99 when all
apps are considered and $1.31 when considering only active apps. This confirm our
intuition that developers that set their price based on the former value are likely to
sell their apps at lower profits.
Figure 3.3(a) shows the box and whiskers plot [Ben88] of the per-app time since
the last update, by app category, for dataset.2012. At most 50% of the apps in each
category have received an update within a year from our observation period. For
instance, most apps in Libraries & Demo have not been updated within the last 1.5
years. Some categories such as Arcade & Action, Casual, Entertainment, Books &
Reference, Tools contain apps that are older than three years.
Figure 3.3(b) plots this data for dataset.14-15. Many freshly uploaded apps were
uploaded more recently: 50% apps in each category receive an update within 35 days,
while apps in the “Social” and “Tools” categories received updates even within 15
days. This is natural, as new apps may have more bugs and receive more developer
attention.
Several reasons may explain the lack of updates received by many of the apps we
monitored. First, some apps are either stable or classic (time-insensitive apps, not
expected to change) and do not require an update. Other apps, e.g., e-books, wall-
papers, libraries, do not require an update. Finally, many of the apps we monitored
seemed to have been abandoned.
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Class # download % Dataset.2012 % Dataset.14-15
Unpopular 0 – 103 74.14 77.55
Popular 103 – 105 24.1 18.43
Most-Popular > 105 0.7 4.00
Table 3.1: Popularity classes of apps, along with their distribution. Dataset.14-15
has a higher percentage of most-popular apps.
3.5.2 App Popularity
We propose to use the download count to determine app popularity. Higher rating
counts mean higher popularity but not necessarily higher quality (e.g., an app could
attract many negative ratings). Including unpopular apps will likely affect statistics
such as update frequencies: including unpopular apps will lead to a seemingly counter-
intuitive finding, indicating that most apps do not receive any updates. Therefore, we
classify apps according to their popularity into three classes, “unpopular”, “popular”
and “most-popular”.
Table 3.1 shows the criteria for the 3 classes and the distribution of the apps
in dataset.2012 and dataset.14-15 in these classes. The newly released apps have a
higher percentage of unpopular apps, however, surprisingly, they also have a higher
percentage of “most-popular” apps. This may be due to the fact that the newly
released apps are more recent, coming at a time of higher popularity of mobile app
markets, and maturity of search rank fraud markets (see § 3.7.1).
Figure 3.4 (top) depicts the distribution of rating counts of apps from dataset.2012,
split by categories. We observe that the Business and Comics categories do not have
any apps in the Most-Popular class, likely because of narrow audiences. From our
data, we observed that the median price of apps ($1.99) in these categories is signif-
icantly higher than the population ($1.31) indicating lower competition. The popu-
lation in other categories is quite diverse with a number of outliers. For instance, as
expected, “Angry Birds” and “Facebook” are most popular among the Most-Popular
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class for Arcade & Action and Social categories, respectively. On the other hand, the
distribution is almost symmetric in case of Unpopular except Business and Medical
categories where there are a number of outliers that are significantly different from
the rest of the population. We found that these are trending apps — apps that are
gaining popularity. For instance, the free app “Lync 2010” from “Microsoft Corpo-
ration” in Business has 997 ratings. In case of Popular, the distributions for most
of the categories are symmetric and span roughly from 1, 000 to 100K ratings where
75% of apps have less than 10, 000 rating counts except Arcade & Action category.
Figure 3.4 (bottom) shows the same distribution for the apps in dataset.14-15.
We emphasize that the distribution is plotted over the ratings counts at the end of
the observation interval. Since these are newer apps than those in dataset.2012, it
is natural that they receive fewer ratings. We also observe that several categories
do not have apps that are in the “most popular” category, including the “Business”,
“Libraries & Demo” and “Medical” categories.
3.5.3 App Updates
Updates form a critical and often the last part of the software lifecycle [GJM02]. We
are interested in determining if mobile app developers prefer seamless updating i.e.,
if they push out releases within short time periods.
Fig. 3.5(a) shows the distribution of the number of updates received by the apps in
dataset.2012. Only 24% apps have received at least one update within our observation
period — nearly 76% have never been updated. In contrast, Fig. 3.5(b) shows that
35% of the “fresh” apps in dataset.14-15 have received at least one update within
our observation period. Several apps received more than 100 updates, with one app
receiving 146 updates in a 6 months interval. We conjecture that this occurs because
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Figure 3.5: (a) Histogram of app updates for dataset.2012. Only 24% apps have
received at least one update between April-November 2012. (b) Histogram of fresh
app updates for dataset.14-15. Unlike the dataset.2012, 35% of the fresh apps have
received at least one update, while 1 app received 146 updates! (c) Histogram of
app category changes. 1.9% apps have received at least one category change between
October 24, 2014 and May 5, 2015, while several have received 6 category changes.
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Figure 3.6: The distribution of update frequency, i.e., the update count for each app
per category. (Top) Dataset.2012. Unpopular apps receive few or no updates. Popular
apps however received more updates than most-popular apps. This may be due to
most-popular apps being more stable, created by developers with well established
development and testing processes. (Bottom) Dataset.14-15. We observe a similar
update count distribution among unpopular apps to dataset.2012. Further, in the
popular and most popular classes, most app categories tend to receive fewer updates
than the dataset.2012 apps.
these are newly released apps, thus more likely to have bugs, and to receive attention
from their developers.
Figure 3.6 (top) plots the distribution of the update frequency of the apps from
dataset.2012, across categories based on their popularity. As expected, Unpopular
apps receive few or no updates. We observed that this is due to the app being new
or abandoned by its developer. For instance, “RoboShock” from “DevWilliams” in
Arcade & Action with good reviews from 4 users has received only one update on
September 28, 2012 since its release in August 2011 (inferred from its first comment).
Another app “Shanju” from “sunjian” in Social has not been updated since May 27,
2012 even though it received negative reviews.
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Outliers (e.g., “Ctalk” in the Social category) push out large number of updates
(111). Popular apps are updated more frequently: 75% in each category receive 10 or
fewer updates, while some apps average around 10-60 updates during our observation
period. User comments associated with these apps indicate that the developer pushes
out an update when the app attracts a negative review (e.g., “not working on my
device!”). In the Most-Popular category, the population differs significantly. While
some apps seldom push any updates, apps like “Facebook” (Social) have been updated
17 times. The lower number of updates of most popular apps may be due to testing:
Companies that create very popular apps are more likely to enforce strict testing and
hence may not need as many updates as other apps.
To identify how frequently developers push these updates, we computed the aver-
age update interval (AUI) per app measured in days (figure not shown). In Popular
and Unpopular classes, 50% of apps receive at least one update within 100 days. The
most interesting set is a class of Unpopular apps that receive an update in less than a
week. For instance, the developer of “Ctalk” pushed, on average, one update per day
totaling 111 updates in six months indicating development stage (it had only 50-100
downloads) or instability of the app. On the other hand, Most-Popular apps receive
an update within 20 to 60 days.
Figure 3.6 (bottom) shows the update frequency for the newly released apps of
dataset.14-15. Compared to the apps in dataset.2012, new releases exhibit a similar
update frequency distribution, with slightly lower third quartiles. However, a few
newly released popular apps receive significantly more updates, some more than 100
updates.
Updates, bandwidth and reputation. A high update frequency is a likely indi-
cator of an on-going beta test of a feature or an unstable application. Such apps have
the potential to consume large amounts of bandwidth. For instance, a music player
“Player Dreams”, with 500K-1M downloads, pushed out 91 updates in the last six
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months as part of its beta testing phase (inferred from app description). With the
application size being around 1.8 MB, this app has pushed out ≈164 MB to each of
its users. Given its download count of 500K-1M, each update utilizes ≈0.87-1.71 TB
of bandwidth. We have observed that frequent updates, especially when the app is
unstable, may attract negative reviews. For instance, “Terremoti Italia” that pushed
out 34 updates in the observation interval, often received negative reviews of updates
disrupting the workflow.
Furthermore, app market providers can use these indicators to inform users about
seemingly unstable applications and also as part of the decision to garbage collect
abandoned apps.
3.5.4 App Category Changes
In the fresh app dataset.14-15 we found app category change events, e.g., “Social”
to “Communication”, “Photography” to “Entertainment”, between different game
subcategories. Such category changes may enable developers to better position their
apps and improve on their install and download count, as categories may overlap, and
apps may stretch over multiple categories. Fig. 3.5(c) shows the distribution of the
number of app category changes recorded over the 6 months in dataset.14-15. Only
1.9% of apps have received at least one category change.
3.6 Developer Impact
In this section, we are interested in understanding what fraction of popular apps
are being controlled by an elite set of developers and if there is a power-law effect
in-place. Next, we analyze the impact that developer actions (e.g., changing the
price, permissions etc.) can have on the app popularity. We use dataset.2012 for this
analysis.
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Figure 3.7: (a) Distribution of apps per developer. (b) Distribution of total reviews
per developer. (c) Scatter plot of downloads vs. ratings in Google Play. Both axes
are log-scaled. A linear curve was fitted with a slope of 0.00341 indicating that an
application is rated once for about every 300 downloads.
3.6.1 Market Control
To understand the impact that developers have on the market, we observe their
number of apps, downloads, and review count. Figure 3.7 plots these distributions,
all showing behavior consistent with a power-law distribution [Mit04]. We display the
maximum likelihood fit of a power-law distribution for each scatter plot as well [JW02,
CSN07]. Figure 3.7(a) shows that a few developers have a large number of apps
while many developers have few apps. However, the developers that post the most
apps do not have the most popular apps in terms of reviews and download counts.
Instead, Figure 3.7(b) shows that a few developers control apps that attract most
of the reviews. Since Figure 3.7(c) shows an almost linear relation between review
and download counts (1 review for each 300 downloads), we conclude that the apps
developed by the controlling developers are popular.
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Figure 3.8: The (square root) of the number of apps whose number of price changes
exceeds the value on the x axis. Only 5.14% of the apps had a price change, and
0.09% of the apps had more than 70 changes.
3.6.2 Price Dispersion
Menu costs (incurred by sellers when making price changes) are lower in electronic
markets as physical markets incur product re-labeling costs [LBDV97]. In app markets
menu costs are zero. We now investigate if developers leverage this advantage i.e., if
they adjust their prices more finely or frequently.
Figure 3.8 shows a variation of the complementary cumulative distribution fre-
quency (CCDF) of the number of price changes an app developer made during our
observation period. Instead of probabilities, the y axis shows the square root of the
number of apps with a number of price changes exceeding the value shown on the x
axis. We observe that 5.14% of the apps (≈4000) have changed their price at least
once. The tail (> 70 changes) is interesting — about 23 apps are frequently chang-
ing their prices. From our data, we observed that they are distributed as follows:
Travel & Local (11), Sports (5), Business (2), Brain & Puzzle (2) and one in each
of Education, Finance, and Medical. In this sample, “LogMeIn Ignition”, developed
by LogMeIn, has 10K-50K downloads and underwent 83 price changes (Min:$18.44,
Max:$27.80, Avg:$26.01, Stdev:$2.01). The rest were either recently removed or are
unpopular.
Price dispersion is the spread between the highest and lowest prices in the mar-
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Figure 3.9: Monthly trend for the average app price. Over the 6 month observation
interval, the average app price does not exhibit a monthly trend.
ket. In our dataset, we used the coefficient of variation (COV) [WSB04], the ratio
of standard deviation to the mean, to measure price dispersion. COV= 1 indicates a
dispersal consistent with a Poisson process i.e., uniformly at random; COV> 1 indi-
cates greater variability than would be expected with a Poisson process; and COV< 1
indicates less variation. In our dataset, we observed an average COV (computed for
all apps) to be 2.45 indicating a non-negligible price dispersion, in agreement with
results in the context of other electronic markets [BS00].
Figure 3.9 shows the STL decomposition [CCMT90] of the average price time
series in the observation interval, for a periodicity of one month. The gray-bar on
the “monthly panel” (see Figure 3.9) is only slightly larger than that on the “data”
panel indicating that the monthly signal is large relative to the variation in the data.
In the “trend” panel, the gray box is much larger than either of the ones on the
“data”/“monthly” panels, indicating the variation attributed to the trend is much
smaller than the monthly component and consequently only a small part of the vari-
ation in the data series. The variation attributed to the trend is considerably smaller
than the stochastic component (the remainders). We deduce that in our six month
observation period this data does not exhibit a trend.
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3.6.3 Impact of Developer Actions
Developers have control over several attributes they can leverage to increase the
popularity of their apps, e.g., pricing, the number of permissions requested from users
and the frequency of updates. In this section we investigate the relation between such
levers and their impact on app popularity. For instance, common-sense dictates that
a price reduction should increase the number of downloads an app receives.
We study the association between app attribute changes. We define a random
variable for increase or decrease of each attribute, and measure the association among
pairs of variables. For example, let X be a variable for price increase. For each 〈
day, app 〉 tuple, we let X be a set of all of the app and day tuples where the app
increased its price that day (relative to the previous day’s value). For this analysis
we consider 160K apps that have changed throughout our observation period, and
we discard the remaining apps. We use the Yule measure of association[War08] to
quantify the association between two attributes, A and B: |A∩B|∗|A∩B|−|A∩B|∗|A∩B|
|A∩B|∗|A∩B|+|A∩B|∗|A∩B|
.
A is the complement of A, i.e., each 〈 day, app 〉 tuple where the attribute does not
occur, and |A| denote the cardinality of a set (in this case A). This association measure
captures the association between the two attributes: zero indicates independence, +1
indicates perfectly positive association, and -1 perfectly negative association.
We observed that changing the price does not show significant association with the
download or review counts. We randomly sampled 50 apps where this is happening
and observe the following to be the main reasons. First, apps are initially promoted
as free and a paid version is released if they ever become popular. However, in some
cases, the feature additions are not significant (e.g., ads vs. no ads) and hence do not
cause enough motivation for users to switch to the paid version. Second, with app
markets offering paid apps for free as part of special offers (e.g., Thanksgiving deals),
users may expect the app to be given out for free rather than take a discount of a
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few cents.
3.7 Research Implications
We now discuss the implications of longitudinal monitoring on security and systems
research in Android app markets.
3.7.1 Fraud and Malware Detection
App markets play an essential role in the profitability of apps. Apps ranked higher in
the app market become more popular, thus make more money, either through direct
payments for paid apps, or through ads for free apps. This pressure to succeed leads
some app developers to tinker with app market statistics known to influence the app
ranking, e.g., reviews, average rating, installs [J1313]. Further, malicious developers
also attempt to use app markets as tools to widely distribute their malware apps.
We conjecture that a longitudinal analysis of apps can reveal both fraudulent and
malicious apps. In the following we provide supporting evidence.
Search rank fraud. We have contacted Freelancer workers specializing in Google
Play fraud, and have obtained the ids of 2,600 Google Play accounts that were used
to write fraudulent reviews for 201 unique apps. We have analyzed these apps and
found that fraudulent app search optimization attempts often produce suspicious
review patterns. A longitudinal analysis of an app’s reviews, which we call timeline,
can reveal such patterns. For instance, Figure 3.10(a) shows the review timeline of
“Daily Yoga- Yoga Fitness Plans”, one of the 201 apps targeted by the 15 fraudster-
controlled accounts. We observe several suspicious positive reviews spikes, some at
over 200 reviews per day, in contrast with long intervals of under 50 daily positive
reviews.
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Figure 3.10: Review timeline of fraud apps: x axis shows time with a day granularity, y
axis the number of daily positive reviews (red, positive direction) and negative reviews
(blue, negative direction). Apps can be targets of both positive and negative search
rank fraud campaigns: (a) The app Daily Yoga- Yoga Fitness Plans had days with
above 200 positive review spikes. (b) Real Caller received suspicious negative review
spikes from ground truth fraudster-controlled accounts. (c) Crownit - Cashback &
Prizes received both positive and negative reviews from fraudster-controlled accounts.
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We have observed that Google Play apps can also be the target of negative review
campaigns, receiving negative reviews from multiple fraudster-controlled accounts.
Figure 3.10(b) shows the timeline of such an app, “Real Caller”, where we observe
days with up to 25 negative reviews, but few positive reviews. While negative reviews
are often associated with poor quality apps, these particular spikes are generated
from the fraudster-controlled accounts mentioned above. We conjecture that negative
review campaigns are sponsored by competitors. Further, we identified apps that are
the target of both positive and negative reviews. Figure 3.10(c) shows the timeline
of such an app, “Crownit - Cashback & Prizes”. While the app has received more
positive reviews with higher spikes, its negative reviews and spikes thereof are also
significant.
App markets can monitor timelines and notify developers and their users when
such suspicious spikes occur.
In addition, our analysis has shown that several developers upload many unpop-
ular apps (see §3.6), while others tend to push frequent updates (§3.5). We describe
here vulnerabilities related to such behaviors.
Scam Apps. We have identified several “productive” developers, that upload many
similar apps. Among them, we have observed several thousands of premium applica-
tions (priced around $1.99) that are slight variations of each other and have almost
no observable functionality. Such apps rely on their names and description to scam
users into paying for them, then fail to deliver. Each such app receives ≈500-1000
downloads, bringing its developer a profit of $1000-2000.
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Figure 3.11: Permission timeline of 3 VirusTotal flagged apps, (a) Hidden Object
Blackstone, (b) Top Race Manager, and (c) Cash Yourself. The x axis shows the date
when the permission changes occurred; the y axis shows the number of permissions
that were newly requested (positive direction) or removed (negative direction). The
red bars show dangerous permissions, blue bars regular permissions. We observe
significant permission changes, even within days.
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Malware. While updates enable developers to fix bugs and push new functionality
in a seamless manner, attack vectors can also leverage them. Such attack vectors can
be exploited both by malicious developers and by attackers that infiltrate developer
accounts. We posit that a motivated attacker can develop and upload a benign app,
and once it gains popularity, push malware as an update.
On the iOS platform, Wang et al. [WLL+13] proposed to make the app remotely
exploitable, then introduce malicious control flows by rearranging already signed code.
We propose an Android variant where the attacker ramps up the permissions required
by the app, exploiting the observation that a user is more likely to accept them, then
to uninstall the app.
To provide an intuition behind our conjecture, we introduce the concept of app
permission timeline, the evolution in time of an app’s requests for new permissions,
or decisions to remove permissions. We have used VirusTotal [Vir15] to test the apks
of 7,756 randomly selected apps from the dataset.14-15. We have selected apps for
which VirusTotal raised at least 3 flags and that have at least 10 reviews. Figure 3.11
shows the permission timeline of 3 of these apps, for both dangerous (red bars) and
regular permissions (blue bars).
For instance, the “Hidden Object Blackstone” app (Figure 3.11(a)) has a quick
succession of permission requests and releases at only a few days apart. While the
app releases 2 dangerous permissions on November 14, 2014, it requests them again
1 day later, and requests 2 more a month and a half later. Similarly, the “Top Race
Manager” app (Figure 3.11(b)) has very frequent permission changes, daily for the
last 3. The “Cash Yourself” app (Figure 3.11(c)) requests 3 dangerous permissions
on November 10 2014, followed by 1 dangerous permission in both December and
January, then releases 1 dangerous permission 4 days later.
Permission changes imply significant app changes. Frequent and significant per-
mission changes, especially the dangerous ones may signal malware, or unstable apps.
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Market owners can decide to carefully scan the updates of such apps for malware, and
notify developers that something went wrong with their updates, indicating potential
account infiltration.
3.7.2 App Market Ecosystem
Analytics-driven Application Development. We envision a development model
where insights derived from raw market-level data is integrated into the application
development. Such a model is already adopted by websites such as Priceline [pri]
through their “Name Your Own Price” scheme where the interface provides users
with hints on setting an optimal price towards a successful bid. We propose the
extension of development tools like Google’s Android Studio [and] with market-level
analytics, including:
• Median price: In §3.5.1, we showed that developers may be settling down for
lower profits. The development tools could provide developers them with hints
on the optimal price for their app based on, e.g., the number of features, the
price of active apps in the same category etc.
• Application risk: Provide predictions on the impact of permissions and up-
dates on reviews and download count.
• App insights: Present actionable insights extracted from user reviews (e.g.,
using solutions like NetSieve [PJNR13]), including most requested feature, list
of buggy features, features that crash the app.
Enriching User Experience. We believe data-driven insights will be indispensable
to enhance the end user experience:
• Analytics based app choice: Visualize app price, update overhead, required
permissions, reviewer sentiment to enhance the user experience when choosing
among apps with similar claimed functionality. For instance, develop scores for
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individual features, and even an overall “sorting” score based on user prefer-
ences. Scam apps (see §3.7.1) should appear at the bottom of the score based
sorted app list.
• Analytics based app quarantine: We envision a quarantine based approach
to defend against “update” attacks. An update installation is postponed until
analytics of variation in app features indicates the update is stable and benign.
To avoid a situation where all users defer installation, we propose a probabilistic
quarantine. Each user can update the app after a personalized random interval
after its release.
3.8 Limitations
This paper seeks to shed light on the dynamics of the Google app market and also
provide evidence that a longitudinal monitoring of apps is beneficial for users, app
developers and the market owners. However, our datasets were collected in 2012 and
2014-2015, and may not reflect the current trends of Google Play.
In addition, while we believe that the Google Play market, the applications it hosts
and developers we examined represent a large body of other third-party markets and
their environments, we do not intend to generalize our results to all the smartphone
markets. The characteristics and findings obtained in this study are associated with
the Google Play market and its developers. Therefore, the results should be taken
with the market and our data collection methodology in mind.
The goal of our discussion of permission and review timelines was to provide early
evidence that a longitudinal monitoring and analysis of apps in app markets can
be used to identify suspicious apps. We leave for future work a detailed study of
permission changes to confirm their statistical significance in detecting search rank
fraud and malware.
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3.10 Summary
This article studies temporal patterns in Google Play, an influential app market. We
use data we collected from more than 160,000 apps daily over a six month period,
to examine market trends, application characteristics and developer behavior in real-
world market settings. Our work provides insights into the impact of developer levers
(e.g., price, permissions requested, update frequency) on app popularity. We proposed
future directions for integrating analytics insights into developer and user experiences.
We introduced novel attack vectors on app markets and discussed future detection
directions.
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CHAPTER 4
Search Rank Fraud and Malware Detection
4.1 Motivation
The commercial success of Android app markets such as Google Play [Goob] and the
incentive model they offer to popular apps, make them appealing targets for fraud-
ulent and malicious behaviors. Some fraudulent developers deceptively boost the
search rank and popularity of their apps (e.g., through fake reviews and bogus instal-
lation counts) [Sie14], while malicious developers use app markets as a launch pad for
their malware [Min14, Mlo14, Rob15, Gre14]. The motivation for such behaviors is
impact: app popularity surges translate into financial benefits and expedited malware
proliferation.
Fraudulent developers frequently exploit crowdsourcing sites (e.g., Freelancer [Fre],
Fiverr [Fiv], BestAppPromotion [Bes]) to hire teams of willing workers to commit
fraud collectively, emulating realistic, spontaneous activities from unrelated people
(i.e., “crowdturfing” [WWZ+12]).
In addition, the efforts of Android markets to identify and remove malware are
not always successful. For instance, Google Play uses the Bouncer system [OM12]
to remove malware. However, out of the 7, 756 Google Play apps we analyzed using
VirusTotal [Vir15], 12% (948) were flagged by at least one anti-virus tool and 2%
(150) were identified as malware by at least 10 tools (see Figure 4.5).
Previous mobile malware detection work has focused on dynamic analysis of app
executables [BZNT11, SKE+12, GZZ+12] as well as static analysis of code and per-
missions [SLG+12, PGS+12, YSM14]. However, recent Android malware analysis
revealed that malware evolves quickly to bypass anti-virus tools [ZJ12].
55
In this paper, we seek to identify both malware and search rank fraud subjects in
Google Play. This combination is not arbitrary: we posit that malicious developers
resort to search rank fraud to boost the impact of their malware.
Unlike existing solutions, we build this work on the observation that fraudulent
and malicious behaviors leave behind telltale signs on app markets. We uncover these
nefarious acts by picking out such trails. For instance, the high cost of setting up
valid Google Play accounts forces fraudsters to reuse their accounts across review
writing jobs, making them likely to review more apps in common than regular users.
Resource constraints can compel fraudsters to post reviews within short time intervals.
Legitimate users affected by malware may report unpleasant experiences in their
reviews. Increases in the number of requested permissions from one version to the
next, which we will call “permission ramps”, may indicate benign to malware (Jekyll-
Hyde) transitions.
4.1.1 Contributions
We propose FairPlay, a system that leverages the above observations to efficiently
detect Google Play fraud and malware (see Figure 4.6). Our major contributions are:
A fraud and malware detection approach. To detect fraud and malware, we
propose and generate 28 relational, behavioral and linguistic features, that we use to
train supervised learning algorithms [§ 4.4]:
• We formulate the notion of co-review graphs to model reviewing relations be-
tween users. We develop PCF, an efficient algorithm to identify temporally
constrained, co-review pseudo-cliques — formed by reviewers with substantially
overlapping co-reviewing activities across short time windows.
• We use temporal dimensions of review post times to identify suspicious review
spikes received by apps; we show that to compensate for a negative review, for
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an app that has rating R, a fraudster needs to post at least R−1
5−R
positive reviews.
We also identify apps with “unbalanced” review, rating and install counts, as
well as apps with permission request ramps.
• We use linguistic and behavioral information to (i) detect genuine reviews from
which we then (ii) extract user-identified fraud and malware indicators.
Tools to collect and process Google Play data. We have developed GPCrawler,
a tool to automatically collect data published by Google Play for apps, users and
reviews, as well as GPad, a tool to download apks of free apps and scan them for
malware using VirusTotal.
Novel longitudinal and gold standard datasets. We contributed a longitudinal
dataset of 87, 223 freshly posted Google Play apps (along with their 2.9M reviews,
from 2.3M reviewers) collected between October 2014 and May 2015. We have lever-
aged search rank fraud expert contacts in Freelancer [Fre], anti-virus tools and manual
verifications to collect gold standard datasets of hundreds of fraudulent, malware and
benign apps [§ 5.6.1]. We have published these datasets on the project website [Soc].
4.1.2 Results
FairPlay has high accuracy and real-world impact:
High Accuracy. FairPlay achieves over 97% accuracy in classifying fraudulent and
benign apps, and over 95% accuracy in classifying malware and benign apps. FairPlay
significantly outperforms the malware indicators of Sarma et al. [SLG+12]. Further-
more, we show that malware often engages in search rank fraud as well: When trained
on fraudulent and benign apps, FairPlay flagged as fraudulent more than 75% of the
gold standard malware apps [§ 4.5.3].
Real-world Impact: Uncover Fraud & Attacks. FairPlay discovers hundreds
of fraudulent apps. We show that these apps are indeed suspicious: the reviewers of
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Figure 4.1: Google Play components and relations. Google Play’s functionality cen-
ters on apps, shown as red disks. Developers, shown as orange disks upload apps. A
developer may upload multiple apps. Users, shown as blue squares, can install and
review apps. A user can only review an app that he previously installed.
93.3% of them form at least 1 pseudo-clique, 55% of these apps have at least 33% of
their reviewers involved in a pseudo-clique, and the reviews of around 75% of these
apps contain at least 20 words indicative of fraud.
FairPlay also enabled us to discover a novel, coercive review campaign attack type,
where app users are harassed into writing a positive review for the app, and install and
review other apps. We have discovered 1, 024 coerced reviews, from users complaining
about 193 such apps [§ 4.5.4 & § 4.5.5].
4.2 Background, Related Work,
and Our Differences
System model. We focus on the Android app market ecosystem of Google Play. The
participants, consisting of users and developers, have Google accounts. Developers
create and upload apps, that consist of executables (i.e., “apks”), a set of required
permissions, and a description. The app market publishes this information, along with
the app’s received reviews, ratings, aggregate rating (over both reviews and ratings),
install count range (predefined buckets, e.g., 50-100, 100-500), size, version number,
price, time of last update, and a list of “similar” apps. Each review consists of a star
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rating ranging between 1-5 stars, and some text. The text is optional and consists
of a title and a description. Google Play limits the number of reviews displayed for
an app to 4, 000. Figure 4.1 illustrates the participants in Google Play and their
relations.
Adversarial model. We consider not only malicious developers, who upload mal-
ware, but also rational fraudulent developers. Fraudulent developers attempt to tam-
per with the search rank of their apps, e.g., by recruiting fraud experts in crowd-
sourcing sites to write reviews, post ratings, and create bogus installs. While Google
keeps secret the criteria used to rank apps, the reviews, ratings and install counts are
known to play a fundamental part (see e.g., [Ank13]).
To review or rate an app, a user needs to have a Google account, register a mobile
device with that account, and install the app on the device. This process complicates
the job of fraudsters, who are thus more likely to reuse accounts across jobs. The
reason for search rank fraud attacks is impact. Apps that rank higher in search results,
tend to receive more installs. This is beneficial both for fraudulent developers, who
increase their revenue, and malicious developers, who increase the impact of their
malware.
4.3 The Data
We have collected longitudinal data from 87K+ newly released apps over more than
6 months, and identified gold standard data. In the following, we briefly describe the
tools we developed, then detail the data collection effort and the resulting datasets.
Data collection tools. We have developed the Google Play Crawler (GPCrawler)
tool, to automatically collect data published by Google Play for apps, users and
reviews. Google Play prevents scripts from scrolling down a user page. Thus, to
collect the ids of more than 20 apps reviewed by a user. To overcome this limitation,
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we developed a Python script and a Firefox add-on. Given a user id, the script opens
the user page in Firefox. When the script loads the page, the add-on becomes active.
The add-on interacts with Google Play pages using content scripts (Browser specific
components that let us access the browsers native API) and port objects for message
communication. The add-on displays a “scroll down” button that enables the script to
scroll down to the bottom of the page. The script then uses a DOMParser to extract
the content displayed in various formats by Google Play. It then sends this content
over IPC to the add-on. The add-on stores it, using Mozilla XPCOM components,
in a sand-boxed environment of local storage in a temporary file. The script then
extracts the list of apps rated or reviewed by the user.
We have also developed the Google Play App Downloader (GPad), a Java tool to
automatically download apks of free apps on a PC, using the open-source Android
Market API [And11]. GPad takes as input a list of free app ids, a Gmail account and
password, and a GSF id. GPad creates a new market session for the “androidsecure”
service and logs in. GPad sets parameters for the session context (e.g., mobile device
Android SDK version, mobile operator, country), then issues a GetAssetRequest for
each app identifier in the input list. GPad introduces a 10s delay between requests.
The result contains the url for the app; GPad uses this url to retrieve and store
the app’s binary stream into a local file. After collecting the binaries of the apps
on the list, GPad scans each app apk using VirusTotal [Vir15], an online malware
detector provider, to find out the number of anti-malware tools (out of 57: AVG,
McAfee, Symantec, Kaspersky, Malwarebytes, F-Secure, etc.) that identify the apk
as suspicious. We used 4 servers (PowerEdge R620, Intel Xeon E-26XX v2 CPUs) to
collect our datasets, which we describe next.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of app types for the 87, 223 fresh app set. With the slight
exception of Personalization and Sports type spikes, we have achieved an almost
uniform distribution across all app types, as desirable.
4.3.1 Longitudinal App Data
In order to detect suspicious changes that occur early in the lifetime of apps, we
used the “New Releases” link to identify apps with a short history on Google Play.
Our interest in newly released apps stems from our analysis of search rank fraud
jobs posted on crowdsourcing sites, that revealed that app developers often recruit
fraudsters early after uploading their apps on Google Play. Their intent is likely to
create the illusion of an up-and-coming app, that may then snowball with interest
from real users. By monitoring new apps, we aim to capture in real-time the moments
when such search rank fraud campaigns begin.
We approximate the first upload date of an app using the day of its first review.
We have started collecting new releases in July 2014 and by October 2014 we had
a set of 87, 223 apps, whose first upload time was under 40 days prior to our first
collection time, when they had at most 100 reviews.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the fresh app categories. We have collected
app from each category supported by Google Play, with at least 500 apps per category
(Music & Audio) and more than 4, 500 for the most popular category (Personaliza-
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Figure 4.3: Average rating distribution for the 87, 223 fresh app set. Most apps have
more than 3.5 stars, few have between 1 and 2.5 stars, but more than 8, 000 apps
have less than 1.
tion). Figure 4.3 shows the average rating distribution of the fresh apps. Most apps
have at least a 3.5 rating aggregate rating, with few apps between 1 and 2.5 stars.
However, we observe a spike at more than 8, 000 apps with less than 1 star.
We have collected longitudinal data from these 87, 223 apps between October 24,
2014 and May 5, 2015. Specifically, for each app we captured “snapshots” of its
Google Play metadata, twice a week. An app snapshot consists of values for all its
time varying variables, e.g., the reviews, the rating and install counts, and the set
of requested permissions (see § 4.2 for the complete list). For each of the 2, 850, 705
reviews we have collected from the 87, 223 apps, we recorded the reviewer’s name and
id (2, 380, 708 unique ids), date of review, review title, text, and rating.
This app monitoring process enables us to extract a suite of unique features,
that include review, install and permission changes. In particular, we note that this
approach enables us to overcome the Google Play limit of 4000 displayed reviews per
app: each snapshot will capture only the reviews posted after the previous snapshot.
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Figure 4.4: Co-review graph of 15 seed fraud accounts (red nodes) and the 188 GbA
accounts (orange nodes). Edges indicate reviews written in common by the accounts
corresponding to the endpoints. We only show edges having at least one seed fraud
account as an endpoint. The 15 seed fraud accounts form a suspicious clique with
edges weights that range between 60 and 217. The GbA accounts are also suspiciously
well connected to the seed fraud accounts: the weights of their edges to the seed fraud
accounts ranges between 30 and 302.
4.3.2 Gold Standard Data
Malware apps. We used GPad (see § 5.6.1) to collect the apks of 7, 756 randomly
selected apps from the longitudinal set (see § 4.3.1). Figure 4.5 shows the distribution
of flags raised by VirusTotal, for the 7, 756 apks. None of these apps had been filtered
by Bouncer [OM12]! From the 523 apps that were flagged by at least 3 tools, we
selected those that had at least 10 reviews, to form our “malware app” dataset, for a
total of 212 apps. We collected all the 8, 255 reviews of these apps.
Fraudulent apps. We used contacts established among Freelancer [Fre]’s search rank
fraud community, to obtain the identities of 15 Google Play accounts that were used
to write fraudulent reviews for 201 unique apps. We call the 15 accounts “seed fraud
accounts” and the 201 apps “seed fraud apps”. Figure 4.4 shows the graph formed
by the review habits of the 15 seed accounts: nodes are accounts, edges connect
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Figure 4.5: Apks detected as suspicious (y axis) by multiple anti-virus tools (x axis),
through VirusTotal [Vir15], from a set of 7, 756 downloaded apks.
accounts who reviewed apps in common, and edge weights represent the number of
such commonly reviewed apps. The 15 seed fraud accounts form a suspicious clique.
This shows that worker controlled accounts are used to review many apps in common:
the weights of the edges between the seed fraud accounts range between 60 and 217.
Fraudulent reviews. We have collected all the 53, 625 reviews received by the 201
seed fraud apps. The 15 seed fraud accounts were responsible for 1, 969 of these
reviews. We used the 53, 625 reviews to identify 188 accounts, such that each account
was used to review at least 10 of the 201 seed fraud apps (for a total of 6, 488 reviews).
We call these, guilt by association (GbA) accounts. Figure 4.4 shows the co-review
edges between these GbA accounts (in orange) and the seed fraud accounts: the GbA
accounts are suspiciously well connected to the seed fraud accounts, with the weights
of their edges to the seed accounts ranging between 30 and 302.
To reduce feature duplication, we have used the 1, 969 fraudulent reviews written
by the 15 seed accounts and the 6, 488 fraudulent reviews written by the 188 GbA
accounts for the 201 seed fraud apps, to extract a balanced set of fraudulent reviews.
Specifically, from this set of 8, 457 (= 1, 969 + 6, 488) reviews, we have collected 2
reviews from each of the 203 (= 188 + 15) suspicious user accounts. Thus, the gold
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Figure 4.6: FairPlay system architecture. The CoReG module identifies suspicious,
time related co-review behaviors. The RF module uses linguistic tools to detect
suspicious behaviors reported by genuine reviews. The IRR module uses behavioral
information to detect suspicious apps. The JH module identifies permission ramps to
pinpoint possible Jekyll-Hyde app transitions.
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Notation Definition
CoReG Module
nCliques number of pseudo-cliques with ρ ≥ θ
ρmax, ρmed, ρSD clique density: max, median, SD
CSmax, CSmed, CSSD pseudo-cliques size: max, median, SD
inCliqueCount % of nodes involved in pseudo-cliques
RF Module
malW % of reviews with malware indicators
fraudW , goodW % of reviews with fraud/benign words
FRI fraud review impact on app rating
IRR Module
spikeCount, spikeamp days with spikes & spike amplitude
I1/Rt1, I2/Rt2 install to rating ratios
I1/Rv1, I2/Rv2 install to review ratios
JH Module
permCt, dangerCount # of total and dangerous permissions
rampCt # of dangerous permission ramps
dangerRamp # of dangerous permissions added
Table 4.1: FairPlay’s most important features, organized by their extracting module.
§ 4.4.2 describes ρ and θ.
standard dataset of fraudulent reviews consists of 406 reviews.
The reason for collecting a small number of reviews from each fraudster is to reduce
feature duplication: many of the features we use to classify a review are extracted
from the user who wrote the review (see Table 4.2).
Benign apps. We have selected 925 candidate apps from the longitudinal app set,
that have been developed by Google designated “top developers”. We have used
GPad to filter out those flagged by VirusTotal. We have manually investigated 601 of
the remaining apps, and selected a set of 200 apps that (i) have more than 10 reviews
and (ii) were developed by reputable media outlets (e.g., NBC, PBS) or have an
associated business model (e.g., fitness trackers). We have also collected the 32, 022
reviews of these apps.
Genuine reviews. We have manually collected a gold standard set of 315 genuine
reviews, as follows. First, we have collected the reviews written for apps installed on
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the Android smartphones of the authors. We then used Google’s text and reverse
image search tools to identify and filter those that plagiarized other reviews or were
written from accounts with generic photos. We have then manually selected reviews
that mirror the authors’ experience, have at least 150 characters, and are informative
(e.g., provide information about bugs, crash scenario, version update impact, recent
changes).
4.4 FairPlay: Proposed Solution
We now introduce FairPlay, a system to automatically detect malicious and fraudulent
apps.
4.4.1 FairPlay Overview
FairPlay organizes the analysis of longitudinal app data into the following 4 modules,
illustrated in Figure 4.6. The Co-Review Graph (CoReG) module identifies apps
reviewed in a contiguous time window by groups of users with significantly overlapping
review histories. The Review Feedback (RF) module exploits feedback left by genuine
reviewers, while the Inter Review Relation (IRR) module leverages relations between
reviews, ratings and install counts. The Jekyll-Hyde (JH) module monitors app
permissions, with a focus on dangerous ones, to identify apps that convert from
benign to malware. Each module produces several features that are used to train an
app classifier. FairPlay also uses general features such as the app’s average rating,
total number of reviews, ratings and installs, for a total of 28 features. Table 4.1
summarizes the most important features. We now detail each module and the features
it extracts.
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Figure 4.7: Example pseudo-cliques and PCF output. Nodes are users and edge
weights denote the number of apps reviewed in common by the end users. Review
timestamps have a 1-day granularity. (a) The entire co-review graph, detected as
pseudo-clique by PCF when θ is 6. When θ is 7, PCF detects the subgraphs of (b)
the first two days and (c) the last two days. When θ=8, PCF detects only the clique
formed by the first day reviews (the red nodes).
4.4.2 The Co-Review Graph (CoReG) Module
This module exploits the observation that fraudsters who control many accounts will
re-use them across multiple jobs. Its goal is then to detect sub-sets of an app’s re-
viewers that have performed significant common review activities in the past. In the
following, we describe the co-review graph concept, formally present the weighted
maximal clique enumeration problem, then introduce an efficient heuristic that lever-
ages natural limitations in the behaviors of fraudsters.
Co-review graphs. Let the co-review graph of an app, see Figure 4.7, be a graph
where nodes correspond to user accounts who reviewed the app, and undirected edges
have a weight that indicates the number of apps reviewed in common by the edge’s
endpoint users. Figure 4.15(a) shows the co-review clique of one of the seed fraud
apps (see § 4.3.2). The co-review graph concept naturally identifies user accounts
with significant past review activities.
The weighted maximal clique enumeration problem. Let G = (V,E) be a
graph, where V denotes the sets of vertices of the graph, and E denotes the set of
edges. Let w be a weight function, w : E → R that assigns a weight to each edge of
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G. Given a vertex sub-set U ∈ V , we use G[U ] to denote the sub-graph of G induced
by U . A vertex sub-set U is called a clique if any two vertices in U are connected
by an edge in E. We say that U is a maximal clique if no other clique of G contains
U . The weighted maximal clique enumeration problem takes as input a graph G and
returns the set of maximal cliques of G.
Algorithm 1 PCF algorithm pseudo-code.
Input: days, an array of daily reviews, and
θ, the weighted threshold density
Output: allCliques, set of all detected pseudo-cliques
1. for d :=0 d < days.size(); d++
2. Graph PC := new Graph();
3. bestNearClique(PC, days[d]);
4. c := 1; n := PC.size();
5. for nd := d+1; d < days.size() & c = 1; d++
6. bestNearClique(PC, days[nd]);
7. c := (PC.size() > n); endfor
8. if (PC.size() > 2)
9. allCliques := allCliques.add(PC); fi endfor
10. return
11. function bestNearClique(Graph PC, Set revs)
12. if (PC.size() = 0)
13. for root := 0; root < revs.size(); root++
14. Graph candClique := new Graph ();
15. candClique.addNode (revs[root].getUser());
16. do candNode := getMaxDensityGain(revs);
17. if (density(candClique ∪ {candNode}) ≥ θ))
18. candClique.addNode(candNode); fi
19. while (candNode != null);
20. if (candClique.density() > maxRho)
21. maxRho := candClique.density();
22. PC := candClique; fi endfor
23. else if (PC.size() > 0)
24. do candNode := getMaxDensityGain(revs);
25. if (density(candClique ∪ candNode) ≥ θ))
26. PC.addNode(candNode); fi
27. while (candNode != null);
28. return
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Maximal clique enumeration algorithms such as [TTT06, MU04] applied to co-
review graphs are not ideal to solve the problem of identifying sub-sets of an app’s
reviewers with significant past common reviews. First, fraudsters may not consistently
use (or may even purposefully avoid using) all their accounts across all fraud jobs that
they perform. In addition, Google Play provides incomplete information (up to 4,000
reviews per app, may also detect and filter fraud). Since edge information may be
incomplete, original cliques may now also be incomplete. To address this problem,
we “relax” the clique requirement and focus instead of pseudo-cliques:
The weighted pseudo-clique enumeration problem. For a graph G = (V,E)
and a threshold value θ, we say that a vertex sub-set U (and its induced sub-graph
G[U ]) is a pseudo-clique of G if its weighted density ρ =
∑
e∈E w(e)
(n2)
[Uno07] exceeds θ;
n = |V | 1. U is a maximal pseudo-clique if in addition, no other pseudo-clique of G
contains U . The weighted pseudo-clique enumeration problem outputs all the vertex
sets of V whose induced subgraphs are weighted pseudo-cliques of G.
The Pseudo Clique Finder (PCF) algorithm. We propose PCF (Pseudo Clique
Finder), an algorithm that exploits the observation that fraudsters hired to review an
app are likely to post those reviews within relatively short time intervals (e.g., days).
PCF (see Algorithm 1), takes as input the set of the reviews of an app, organized by
days, and a threshold value θ. PCF outputs a set of identified pseudo-cliques with
ρ ≥ θ, that were formed during contiguous time frames. In Section 4.5.3 we discuss
the choice of θ.
For each day when the app has received a review (line 1), PCF finds the day’s
most promising pseudo-clique (lines 3 and 12 − 22): start with each review, then
greedily add other reviews to a candidate pseudo-clique; keep the pseudo clique (of
the day) with the highest density. With that “work-in-progress” pseudo-clique, move
1ρ is thus the average weight of the graph’s edges, normalized by the total number of
edges of a perfect clique of size n.
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on to the next day (line 5): greedily add other reviews while the weighted density of
the new pseudo-clique equals or exceeds θ (lines 6 and 23− 27). When no new nodes
have been added to the work-in-progress pseudo-clique (line 8), we add the pseudo-
clique to the output (line 9), then move to the next day (line 1). The greedy choice
(getMaxDensityGain, not depicted in Algorithm 1) picks the review not yet in the
work-in-progress pseudo-clique, whose writer has written the most apps in common
with reviewers already in the pseudo-clique. Figure 4.7 illustrates the output of PCF
for several θ values.
If d is the number of days over which A has received reviews and r is the maximum
number of reviews received in a day, PCF’s complexity is O(dr2(r + d)).
We note that if multiple fraudsters target an app in the same day, PCF may
detect only the most densely connected pseudo-clique, corresponding to the most
prolific fraudster, and miss the lesser dense ones.
CoReG features. CoReG extracts the following features from the output of PCF
(see Table 4.1) (i) the number of cliques whose density equals or exceeds θ, (ii) the
maximum, median and standard deviation of the densities of identified pseudo-cliques,
(iii) the maximum, median and standard deviation of the node count of identified
pseudo-cliques, normalized by n (the app’s review count), and (iv) the total number
of nodes of the co-review graph that belong to at least one pseudo-clique, normalized
by n.
4.4.3 Reviewer Feedback (RF) Module
Reviews written by genuine users of malware and fraudulent apps may describe neg-
ative experiences. The RF module exploits this observation through a two step ap-
proach: (i) detect and filter out fraudulent reviews, then (ii) identify malware and
fraud indicative feedback from the remaining reviews.
71
Notation Definition
ρR The rating of R
L(R) The length of R
pos(R) Percentage of positive statements in R
neg(R) Percentage of negative statements in R
nr(U) The number of reviews written by U
pi(ρR) Percentile of ρR among all reviews of U
ExpU (A) The expertise of U for app A
BU (A) The bias of U for A
Paid(U) The money spent by U to buy apps
Rated(U) Number of apps rated by U
plusOne(U) Number of apps +1’d by U
n.f lwrs(U) Number of followers of U in Google+
Table 4.2: Features used to classify review R written by user U for app A.
Step RF.1: Fraudulent review filter. We posit that certain features can ac-
curately pinpoint genuine and fake reviews. We propose several such features, see
Table 4.2 for a summary, defined for a review R written by user U for an app A.
• Reviewer based features. The expertise of U for app A, defined as the number
of reviews U wrote for apps that are “similar” to A, as listed by Google Play (see
§ 4.2). The bias of U towards A: the number of reviews written by U for other
apps developed by A’s developer. In addition, we extract the total money paid by
U on apps it has reviewed, the number of apps that U has liked, and the number of
Google+ followers of U .
• Text based features. We used the NLTK library [BKL09] and the Naive Bayes clas-
sifier, trained on two datasets: (i) 1, 041 sentences extracted from randomly selected
350 positive and 410 negative Google Play reviews, and (ii) 10, 663 sentences extracted
from 700 positive and 700 negative IMDB movie reviews [PLV02]. 10-fold cross val-
idation of the Naive Bayes classifier over these datasets reveals a false negative rate
of 16.1% and a false positive rate of 19.65%, for an overall accuracy of 81.74%. We
ran a binomial test [McD09] for a given accuracy of p=0.817 over N=1,041 cases
using the binomial distribution binomial(p,N) to assess the 95% confidence interval
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Figure 4.8: Timelines of positive reviews for 2 apps from the fraudulent app dataset.
The first app has multiple spikes while the second one has only one significant spike.
for our result. The deviation of the binomial distribution is 0.011. Thus, we are 95%
confident that the true performance of the classifier is in the interval (79.55, 83.85).
We used the trained Naive Bayes classifier to determine the statements of R that
encode positive and negative sentiments. We then extracted the following features:
(i) the percentage of statements in R that encode positive and negative sentiments
respectively, and (ii) the rating of R and its percentile among the reviews written by
U .
In Section 6.8 we evaluate the review classification accuracy of several supervised
learning algorithms trained on these features and on the gold standard datasets of
fraudulent and genuine reviews introduced in Section 4.3.2.
Step RF.2: Reviewer feedback extraction. We conjecture that (i) since no
app is perfect, a “balanced” review that contains both app positive and negative
sentiments is more likely to be genuine, and (ii) there should exist a relation between
the review’s dominating sentiment and its rating. Thus, after filtering out fraudulent
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reviews, we extract feedback from the remaining reviews. For this, we have used
NLTK to extract 5, 106 verbs, 7, 260 nouns and 13, 128 adjectives from the 97, 071
reviews we collected from the 613 gold standard apps (see § 4.3.2). We removed
non ascii characters and stop words, then applied lemmatization and discarded words
that appear at most once. We have attempted to use stemming, extracting the roots
of words, however, it performed poorly. This is due to the fact that reviews often
contain (i) shorthands, e.g., “ads”, “seeya”, “gotcha”, “inapp”, (ii) misspelled words,
e.g., “pathytic”, “folish”, “gredy”, “dispear” and even (iii) emphasized misspellings,
e.g., “hackkked”, “spammmerrr”, “spooooky”. Thus, we ignored stemming.
We used the resulting words to manually identify lists of words indicative of mal-
ware, fraudulent and benign behaviors. Our malware indicator word list contains 31
words (e.g., risk, hack, corrupt, spam, malware, fake, fraud, blacklist, ads). The fraud
indicator word list contains 112 words (e.g., cheat, hideous, complain, wasted, crash)
and the benign indicator word list contains 105 words.
RF features. We extract 3 features (see Table 4.1), denoting the percentage of
genuine reviews that contain malware, fraud, and benign indicator words respectively.
We also extract the impact of detected fraudulent reviews on the overall rating of the
app: the absolute difference between the app’s average rating and its average rating
when ignoring all the fraudulent reviews.
4.4.4 Inter-Review Relation (IRR) Module
This module leverages temporal relations between reviews, as well as relations between
the review, rating and install counts of apps, to identify suspicious behaviors.
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Figure 4.9: (a) Distribution of total number of permissions requested by malware,
fraudulent and legitimate apps. (b) Distribution of the number of “dangerous” per-
missions requested by malware, fraudulent and benign apps. (c) Dangerous permis-
sion ramp during version updates for a sample app “com.battery.plusfree”. Originally
the app requested no dangerous permissions.
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Figure 4.10: Lower bound on the number of fake reviews that need to be posted by an
adversary to cancel a 1-star review, vs. the app’s current rating (shown with 0.1-star
granularity). At 4 stars, the adversary needs to post 3 5-star reviews to cancel a
1-star review, while at 4.2 stars, 4 5-star reviews are needed.
Temporal relations. In order to compensate for a negative review, an attacker
needs to post a significant number of positive reviews. Specifically,
Claim 1 Let RA denote the average rating of an app A just before receiving a 1 star
review. In order to compensate for the 1 star review, an attacker needs to post at least
RA−1
5−RA
positive reviews.
Proof: Let σ be the sum of all the k reviews received by a before time T . Then,
RA =
σ
k
. Let qr be the number of fraudulent reviews received by A. To compensate for
the 1 star review posted at time T , qr is minimized when all those reviews are 5 star.
We then have that: RA =
σ
k
= σ+1+5qr
k+1+qr
. The numerator of the last fraction denotes
the sum of all the ratings received by A after time T and the denominator is the total
number of reviews. Rewriting the last equality, we obtain that qr =
σ−k
5k−σ
= RA−1
5−RA
.
The last equality follows by dividing both the numerator and denominator by k.
Figure 4.10 plots the lower bound on the number of fake reviews that need to
be posted to cancel a 1-star review, vs. the app’s current rating. It shows that the
number of reviews needed to boost the rating of an app is not constant. Instead, as
a review campaign boosts the rating of the subject app, the number of fake reviews
needed to continue the process, also increases. For instance, a 4 star app needs to
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Figure 4.11: Mosaic plot of install vs. rating count relations of the 87K apps. Larger
cells (rectangles) signify that more apps have the corresponding rating and install
count range; dotted lines mean no apps in a certain install/rating category. The
standardized residuals identify the cells that contribute the most to the χ2 test. The
most significant rating:install ratio is 1:100.
receive 3, 5-star reviews to compensate for a single 1 star review, while a 4.2 star app
needs to receive 4 such reviews. Thus, adversaries who want to increase the rating
of an app, i.e., cancel out previously received negative reviews, will need to post an
increasing, significant number of positive reviews.
Such a “compensatory” behavior is likely to lead to suspiciously high numbers
of positive reviews. We detect such behaviors by identifying outliers in the number
of daily positive reviews received by an app. Figure 4.8 shows the timelines and
suspicious spikes of positive reviews for 2 apps from the fraudulent app dataset (see
Section 4.3.2). We identify days with spikes of positive reviews as those whose number
of positive reviews exceeds the upper outer fence of the box-and-whisker plot built
over the app’s numbers of daily positive reviews.
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Figure 4.12: Mosaic plot showing relationships between the install count and the
average app rating, over the 87K apps. A cell contains the apps that have a certain
install count interval (x axis) and rating interval (y axis). Larger cells contain more
apps. We observe a relationship between install count and rating: apps that receive
more installs also tend to have higher average ratings (i.e., above 3 stars). This may
be due to app popularity relationship to quality which may be further positively
correlated with app rating.
Reviews, ratings and install counts. We used the Pearson’s χ2 test to investigate
relationships between the install count and the rating count, as well as between the
install count and the average app rating of the 87K new apps, at the end of the collec-
tion interval. We grouped the rating count in buckets of the same size as Google Play’s
install count buckets. Figure 4.11 shows the mosaic plot of the relationships between
rating and install counts. p=0.0008924, thus we conclude dependence between the
rating and install counts. The standardized residuals identify the cells (rectangles)
that contribute the most to the χ2 test. The most significant rating:install ratio is
1:100.
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In addition, Figure 4.12 shows the mosaic plot of the app install count vs. the
average app rating. Rectangular cells correspond to apps that have a certain install
count range (x axis) and average rating range (y axis). It shows that few popular
apps, i.e., with more than 1, 000 installs, have below 3 stars, or above 4.5 stars. We
conjecture that fraudster efforts to alter the search rank of an app will not be able
to preserve a natural balance of the features that impact it (e.g., the app’s review,
rating, and install counts), which will easily be learned and detected by supervised
learning algorithms.
IRR features. We extract temporal features (see Table 4.1): the number of days
with detected spikes and the maximum amplitude of a spike. We also extract (i) the
ratio of installs to ratings as two features, I1/Rt1 and I2/Rt2 and (ii) the ratio of
installs to reviews, as I1/Rv1 and I2/Rv2. (I1, I2] denotes the install count interval of
an app, (Rt1, Rt2] its rating interval and (Rv1, Rv2] its (genuine) review interval.
4.4.5 Jekyll-Hyde App Detection (JH) Module
Figure 4.9(a) shows the distribution of the total number of permissions requested
by malware, fraudulent and legitimate apps. Surprisingly, not only malware and
fraudulent apps but also legitimate apps request large numbers of permissions.
In addition, Android’s API level 22 labels 47 permissions as “dangerous”. Fig-
ure 4.9(b) compares the distributions of the number of dangerous permissions re-
quested by the gold standard malware, fraudulent and benign apps. The most pop-
ular dangerous permissions among these apps are “modify or delete the contents of
the USB storage”, “read phone status and identity”, “find accounts on the device”,
and “access precise location”. Only 8% of the legitimate apps request more than
5 dangerous permissions, while 16.5% of the malware apps and 17% of the fraud-
ulent apps request more than 5 permissions. Perhaps surprisingly, most legitimate
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Strategy FPR% FNR% Accuracy%
DT (Decision Tree) 2.46 6.03 95.98
MLP (Multi-layer Perceptron) 1.47 6.67 96.26
RF (Random Forest) 2.46 5.40 96.26
Table 4.3: Review classification results (10-fold cross-validation), of gold standard
fraudulent (positive) and genuine (negative) reviews. MLP achieves the lowest false
positive rate (FPR) of 1.47%.
(69%), malware (76%) and fraudulent apps (61%) request between 1 and 5 dangerous
permissions.
After a recent Google Play policy change [Per14], Google Play organizes app per-
missions into groups of related permissions. Apps can request a group of permissions
and gain implicit access also to dangerous permissions. Upon manual inspection of
several apps, we identified a new type of malicious intent possibly perpetrated by de-
ceptive app developers: apps that seek to attract users with minimal permissions, but
later request dangerous permissions. The user may be unwilling to uninstall the app
“just” to reject a few new permissions. We call these Jekyll-Hyde apps. Figure 4.9(c)
shows the dangerous permissions added during different version updates of one gold
standard malware app.
JH features. We extract the following features (see Table 4.1), (i) the total number
of permissions requested by the app, (ii) its number of dangerous permissions, (iii) the
app’s number of dangerous permission ramps, and (iv) its total number of dangerous
permissions added over all the ramps.
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4.5 Evaluation
4.5.1 Experiment Setup
We have implemented FairPlay using Python to extract data from parsed pages and
compute the features, and the R tool to classify reviews and apps. We have set the
threshold density value θ to 3, to detect even the smaller pseudo cliques.
We have used the Weka data mining suite [Wek] to perform the experiments, with
default settings. We experimented with multiple supervised learning algorithms. Due
to space constraints, we report results for the best performers: MultiLayer Perceptron
(MLP) [Gal90], Decision Trees (DT) (C4.5) and Random Forest (RF) [Bre01], using
10-fold cross-validation [Koh95]. For the backpropagation algorithm of the MLP clas-
sifier, we set the learning rate to 0.3 and the momentum rate to 0.2. We used MySQL
to store collected data and features. We use the term “positive” to denote a fraud-
ulent review, fraudulent or malware app; FPR means false positive rate. Similarly,
“negative” denotes a genuine review or benign app; FNR means false negative rate.
We use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to visually display the
trade-off between the FPR and the FNR. TPR is the true positive rate. The Equal
Error Rate (EER) is the rate at which both positive and negative errors are equal. A
lower EER denotes a more accurate solution.
4.5.2 Review Classification
To evaluate the accuracy of FairPlay’s fraudulent review detection component (RF
module), we used the gold standard datasets of fraudulent and genuine reviews of
§ 4.3.2. We used GPCrawler to collect the data of the writers of these reviews,
including the 203 reviewers of the 406 fraudulent reviews (21, 972 reviews for 2, 284
apps) and the 315 reviewers of the genuine reviews (9, 468 reviews for 7, 116 apps).
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Figure 4.13: ROC plot of 3 classifiers: Decision Tree, Random Forest and Multilayer
Perceptron (MLP). for review classification. RF and MLP are tied for best accuracy,
of 96.26%. The EER of MLP is as low as 0.036.
We observe that the users who post genuine reviews write fewer reviews in total than
those who post fraudulent reviews; however, overall, those users review more apps in
total. We have also collected information about each of these collected apps, e.g., the
identifiers of the app developer.
Table 4.3 shows the results of the 10-fold cross validation of algorithms classi-
fying reviews as genuine or fraudulent (Random Forest, Decision Tree and MLP).
Figure 4.13 shows the ROC plots of these algorithms. To minimize wrongful accu-
sations, we seek to minimize the FPR [CNW+11]. MLP simultaneously achieves the
highest accuracy of 96.26% and the lowest FPR of 1.47% (at 6.67% FNR). The EER
of MLP is 3.6% and its area under the curve, AUC, is 0.98. Thus, in the following
experiments, we use MLP to filter out fraudulent reviews in the RF.1 step.
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Strategy FPR% FNR% Accuracy%
FairPlay/DT 3.01 3.01 96.98
FairPlay/MLP 1.51 3.01 97.74
FairPlay/RF 1.01 3.52 97.74
Table 4.4: FairPlay classification results (10-fold cross validation) of gold standard
fraudulent (positive) and benign apps. RF has lowest FPR, thus desirable [CNW+11].
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Figure 4.14: ROC plot of 3 classifiers: Decision Tree, MLP and Bagging for app
classification (legitimate vs fraudulent). Decision Tree has the highest accuracy, of
98.99%. The EER of MLP is as low as 0.01.
4.5.3 App Classification
To evaluate FairPlay, we have collected all the 97, 071 reviews of the 613 gold standard
malware, fraudulent and benign apps, written by 75, 949 users, as well as the 890, 139
apps rated by these users.
In the following, we evaluate the ability of various supervised learning algorithms
to correctly classify apps as either benign, fraudulent or malware. Specifically, in the
first experiment we train only on fraudulent and benign app data, and test the ability
to accurately classify an app as either fraudulent or benign. In the second experiment,
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Figure 4.15: (a) Clique flagged by PCF for Tiempo - Clima gratis, one of the 201
seed fraud apps (see § 4.3.2). The clique contains 37 accounts (names hidden for
privacy) that reviewed the app. The edge weights are suspiciously high: any two of
the 37 accounts reviewed at least 115 apps and up to 164 apps in common! (b & c)
Statistics over the 372 fraudulent apps out of 1, 600 investigated: (b) Distribution of
per app number of discovered pseudo-cliques. 93.3% of the 372 apps have at least 1
pseudo-clique of θ ≥ 3 (c) Distribution of percentage of app reviewers (nodes) that
belong to the largest pseudo-clique and to any clique. 8% of the 372 apps have more
than 90% of their reviewers involved in a clique!
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Strategy FPR% FNR% Accuracy%
FairPlay/DT 4.02 4.25 95.86
FairPlay/MLP 4.52 4.72 95.37
FairPlay/RF 1.51 6.13 96.11
Sarma et al. [SLG+12]/SVM 65.32 24.47 55.23
Table 4.5: FairPlay classification results (10-fold cross validation) of gold standard
malware (positive) and benign apps, significantly outperform Sarma et al. [SLG+12].
FairPlay’s RF achieves 96.11% accuracy at 1.51% FPR.
we train and test only on malware and benign apps. In the third experiment, we train
a classifier on fraudulent and benign apps, then test its accuracy to classify apps
as either malware or benign. Finally, we study the most impactful features when
classifying fraudulent vs. benign and malware vs. benign apps.
We seek to identify the algorithms that achieve low FPR values, while having a
reasonable FNR [CNW+11, TRC14]. The reason for this is that incorrectly labeling
a benign app (e.g., Facebook’s client) as fraudulent or malware can have a disastrous
effect.
Fraud Detection Accuracy. Table 4.4 shows 10-fold cross validation results of
FairPlay on the gold standard fraudulent and benign apps (see § 4.3.2). All classifiers
achieve an accuracy of around 97%. Random Forest is the best, having the highest
accuracy of 97.74% and the lowest FPR of 1.01%. Its EER is 2.5% and the area under
the ROC curve (AUC) is 0.993 (see Figure 4.14).
Figure 4.15(a) shows the co-review subgraph for one of the seed fraud apps iden-
tified by FairPlay’s PCF. The 37 accounts that reviewed the app form a suspicious
tightly connected clique: any two of those accounts have reviewed at least 115 and
at most 164 apps in common.
Malware Detection Accuracy. We have used Sarma et al. [SLG+12]’s solution
as a baseline to evaluate the ability of FairPlay to accurately detect malware. We
computed Sarma et al. [SLG+12]’s RCP and RPCP indicators using the longitudi-
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Figure 4.16: Scatterplots for the gold standard fraudulent and malware apps. (a)
Each red square represents a fraudulent app, whose y axis value is its number of
nodes (reviews) in the largest pseudo-clique identified, and whose x axis value is its
number of nodes. (b) For each fraudulent app, the density of its largest pseudo-clique
vs. its number of nodes. (c) For each malware app, the size of its largest pseudo-clique
vs. its number of nodes. (d) For each malware app, the density of its largest pseudo-
clique vs. its number of nodes. Fraudulent apps tend to have more reviews. While
some malware apps have relatively large (but loosely connected) pseudo-cliques, their
size and density is significantly smaller than those of fraudulent apps.
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nal app dataset. We used the SVM based variant of Sarma et al. [SLG+12], which
performs best. Table 4.4 shows 10-fold cross validation results over the malware and
benign gold standard sets. FairPlay significantly outperforms Sarma et al. [SLG+12]’s
solution, with an accuracy that consistently exceeds 95%. We note that the perfor-
mance of Sarma et al.’s solution is lower than the one reported in [SLG+12]. This
inconsistency may stem from the small number of malware apps that were used both
in [SLG+12] (121 apps) and in this paper (212 apps).
For FairPlay, Random Forest has the smallest FPR of 1.51% and the highest
accuracy of 96.11%. It also achieves an EER of 4% and has an AUC of 0.986. This is
surprising: most FairPlay features are meant to identify search rank fraud, yet they
also accurately identify malware.
Is Malware Involved in Fraud? We conjectured that the above result is due in
part to malware apps being involved in search rank fraud. To verify this, we have
trained FairPlay on the gold standard benign and fraudulent app datasets, then we
have tested it on the gold standard malware dataset. MLP is the most conservative
algorithm, discovering 60.85% of malware as fraud participants. Random Forest dis-
covers 72.15%, and Decision Tree flags 75.94% of the malware as fraudulent. This
result confirms our conjecture and shows that search rank fraud detection can be an
important addition to mobile malware detection efforts.
Top-most Impactful Features. We further seek to compare the efficacy of Fair-
Play’s features in detections fraudulent apps and malware. Table 4.6 shows the most
impactful features of FairPlay when using the Decision Tree algorithm to classify
fraudulent vs. benign and malware vs. benign apps. It shows that several features are
common : the standard deviation, median and maximum over the sizes of identified
pseudo-cliques (CSSD, CSmed, CSmax), the number of reviews with fraud indicator
words (fraudW ). Surprisingly, even the number of reviews with malware indicator
words (malW ) has an impact in identifying fraudulent apps, yet, as expected, it has
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Rank Fraudulent vs. Benign Malware vs. Benign
1 CSSD nCliques
2 inCliqueCount CSSD
3 spikeCount CSmed
4 CSmax malW
5 ρmax I1/Rv1
6 CSmed CSmax
7 fraudW fraudW
8 malW dangerCount
Table 4.6: Top 8 most important features when classifying fraudulent vs. benign
apps (center column) and malware vs. benign apps (rightmost column). Notations
are described in Table 4.1. While some features are common, some are more efficient
in identifying fraudulent apps than malware apps, and vice versa.
a higher rank when identifying malware apps.
In addition, as expected, features such as the percentage of nodes involved in a
pseudo-clique (inCliqueCount), the number of days with spikes (spikeCount) and
the maximum density of an identified pseudo-clique (ρmax) are more relevant to dif-
ferentiate fraudulent from benign apps. The number of pseudo-cliques with density
larger than 3 (nCliques) the ratio of installs to reviews (I1/Rv1) and the number
of dangerous permissions (dangerCount) are more effective to differentiate malware
from benign apps.
More surprising are the features that do not appear in the top, for either classifier.
Most notably, the Jekyll-Hyde features that measure the ramps in the number of
dangerous permissions. One explanation is that the 212 malware apps in our gold
standard dataset do not have sufficient dangerous permission ramps. Also, we note
that our conjecture that fraudster efforts to alter the search rank of an app will not
be able to preserve a natural balance of the features that impact it (see IRR module)
is only partially validated: solely the I1/Rv1 feature plays a part in differentiating
malware from benign apps.
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Furthermore, we have zoomed in into the distributions of the sizes and densities
of the largest pseudo-cliques, for the gold standard fraudulent and malware apps.
Figure 4.16 shows scatterplots over the gold standard fraudulent and malware apps,
of the sizes and densities of their largest pseudo-cliques, as detected by FairPlay.
Figure 4.16(a) shows that fraudulent apps tend to have very large pseudo-clique and
Figure 4.16(c) shows that malware apps have significantly smaller pseudo-cliques. We
observe however that malware apps have fewer reviews, and some malware apps have
pseudo-cliques that contain almost all their nodes. Since the maximum, median and
standard deviation of the pseudo-clique sizes are computed over values normalized
by the app’s number of reviews, they are impactful in differentiating malware from
benign apps.
Figure 4.16(b) shows that the largest pseudo-cliques of the larger fraudulent apps
tend to have smaller densities. Figure 4.16(d) shows a similar but worse trend for
malware apps, where with a few exceptions, the largest pseudo-cliques of the malware
apps have very small densities.
4.5.4 FairPlay on the Field
We have also evaluated FairPlay on other, non “gold standard” apps. For this, we
have first selected 8 app categories: Arcade, Entertainment, Photography, Simulation,
Racing, Sports, Lifestyle, Casual. We have then selected the 6, 300 apps from the
longitudinal dataset of the 87K apps, that belong to one of these 8 categories, and
that have more than 10 reviews. From these 6, 300 apps, we randomly selected 200
apps per category, for a total of 1, 600 apps. We have then collected the data of all
their 50, 643 reviewers (not unique) including the ids of all the 166, 407 apps they
reviewed.
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Figure 4.17: Scatterplots of the 372 fraudulent apps out of 1, 600 investigated, show-
ing, for each app, (a) the number of nodes (reviews) in the largest clique identified vs.
the app’s number of nodes (b) the density of the largest clique vs. the app’s number
of nodes. While apps with more nodes also tend to have larger cliques, those cliques
tend to have lower densities.
We trained FairPlay with Random Forest (best performing on previous exper-
iments) on all the gold standard benign and fraudulent apps. We have then run
FairPlay on the 1, 600 apps, and identified 372 apps (23%) as fraudulent. The Racing
and Arcade categories have the highest fraud densities: 34% and 36% of their apps
were flagged as fraudulent.
Intuition. We now focus on some of the top most impactful FairPlay features to
offer an intuition for the surprisingly high fraud percentage (23% of 1, 600 apps).
Figure 4.15(b) shows that 93.3% of the 372 apps have at least 1 pseudo-clique of
θ ≥ 3, nearly 71% have at least 3 pseudo-cliques, and a single app can have up
to 23 pseudo-cliques. Figure 4.15(c) shows that the pseudo-cliques are large and
encompass many of the reviews of the apps: 55% of the 372 apps have at least 33%
of their reviewers involved in a pseudo-clique, while nearly 51% of the apps have a
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Figure 4.18: Distribution of the number of malware and fraud indicator words (see
Step RF.2) in the reviews of the 372 identified fraudulent apps (out of 1, 600 apps).
Around 75% of these apps have at least 20 fraud indicator words in their reviews.
single pseudo-clique containing 33% of their reviewers.
Figure 4.17 shows the scatterplots of the number of nodes and densities of the
largest clique in each of the 372 apps. While intuitively apps with more reviews
tend to have larger pseudo-cliques (Figure 4.17(a)), surprisingly, the densities of such
pseudo-cliques are small (Figure 4.17(b)).
Figure 4.18 shows the distribution of the number of malware and fraud indicator
words (see Step RF.2) in the reviews of the identified 372 fraudulent apps. It shows
that around 75% of the 372 fraudulent apps have at least 20 fraud indicator words in
their reviews.
4.5.5 Coercive Review Campaigns
Upon close inspection of apps flagged as fraudulent by FairPlay, we detected apps
perpetrating a new attack type: harass the user to either (i) write a positive review
for the app, or (ii) install and write a positive review for other apps (often of the
same developer). We call these behaviors coercive review campaigns and the resulting
reviews, as coerced reviews. Example coerced reviews include, “I only rated it because
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Figure 4.19: Distribution of the number of coerced reviews received by the 193 coer-
cive apps we uncovered. 5 apps have each received more than 40 reviews indicative
of rating coercion, with one app having close to 80 such reviews!
i didn’t want it to pop up while i am playing”, or “Could not even play one level
before i had to rate it [...] they actually are telling me to rate the app 5 stars”.
In order to find evidence of systematic coercive review campaigns, we have parsed
the 2.9 million reviews of our dataset to identify those whose text contains one of
the root words [“make”, “ask”, “force”] and “rate”. Upon manual inspection of the
results, we have found 1, 024 coerced reviews. The reviews reveal that apps involved in
coercive review campaigns either have bugs (e.g., they ask the user to rate 5 stars even
after the user has rated them), or reward the user by removing ads, providing more
features, unlocking the next game level, boosting the user’s game level or awarding
game points.
The 1, 024 coerced reviews were posted for 193 apps. Figure 4.19 shows the
distribution of the number of coerced reviews per app. While most of the 193 apps
have received less than 20 coerced reviews, 5 apps have each received more than 40
such reviews.
We have observed several duplicates among the coerced reviews. We identify two
possible explanations. First, as we previously mentioned, some apps do not keep
track of the user having reviewed them, thus repeatedly coerce subsequent reviews
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from the same user. A second explanation is that seemingly coerced reviews, can also
be posted as part of a negative search rank fraud campaign. However, both scenarios
describe apps likely to have been subjected to fraudulent behaviors.
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4.7 Summary
We have introduced FairPlay, a system to detect both fraudulent and malware Google
Play apps. Our experiments on a newly contributed longitudinal app dataset, have
shown that a high percentage of malware is involved in search rank fraud; both are
accurately identified by FairPlay. In addition, we showed FairPlay’s ability to discover
hundreds of apps that evade Google Play’s detection technology, including a new type
of coercive fraud attack.
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CHAPTER 5
Real Time Online Fraud Preemption
5.1 Motivation
The social impact of online services built on information posted by their users has
also turned them into a lucrative medium for fraudulently influencing public opin-
ion [RRCC16b, BSLL+16b, LZ16, SWE+13]. The need to aggressively promote dis-
information has created a black market for social network fraud, that includes fake
opinions and reviews, likes, followers and app installs [MML+11, TSM16, RR16, RL16,
AV16, AS16, AR16]. For instance, in § 5.3.1, we show that in fraud markets, a fake
review can cost between $0.5 and $3 and a fake social networking “like” can cost
$2. The profitability of fraud suggests that current solutions that focus on fraud
detection, are unable to control organized fraud.
In this paper we introduce the concept of fraud preemption systems, solutions de-
ployed to defend online systems such as social networks and app markets. Instead
of reacting to fraud posted in the past, fraud preemption systems seek to discour-
age fraudsters from posting fraud in the first place. We propose FraudSys, the first
real-time fraud preemption system that reduces the profitability of fraud from the per-
spective of both crowdsourced fraud workers and the people who hire them. FraudSys
imposes computational penalties: the activity of a user (e.g., review, like) is posted
online only after his device solves a computational puzzle. Puzzles reduce the prof-
itability of fraud by (i) limiting the amount of fraud per time unit that can be posted
for any subject hosted on the online system, and (ii) by consuming the computa-
tional resources of fraudsters. For instance, Figure 5.1 shows the timelines of daily
penalties assigned by FraudSys to two fraudsters detected in Google Play. Based only
on the recorded activities, FraudSys frequently assigned hundreds of hours of daily
computational penalties to a single fraudster.
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of daily penalties (in hours) assigned by FraudSys to the Google
Play activities of two fraudsters we identified in Freelancer.com. FraudSys imposes
daily penalties of up to 1,247 hours to the fraudster at the top and 3,079 hours for the
fraudster at the bottom. As a result, the fraudsters need to consume significant com-
putational resources, while their fraud is significantly delayed. This in turn reduces
the number of payments they would receive, and impacts their profitability.
Challenges. Implementing a fraud preemption system raises several challenges.
First, FraudSys needs to detect fraud in real-time, whenever a user performs an online
system activity. Once assigned, a puzzle cannot be rescinded. This is in contrast to
existing systems (e.g., Yelp) that detect fraud retroactively and can update previous
decisions when new information surfaces. Second, FraudSys needs to impose difficult
puzzles on fraudsters, but minimally impact the experience of honest users. This is
made even more complex by the fact that fraudsters can attempt to bypass detec-
tion and even obscure their true ability to solve puzzles. Third, a stateful FraudSys
service that maintains state for millions of issued and active puzzles is expensive and
vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Our Contributions. Through FraudSys, we introduce several innovative solutions.
To address the first challenge, we exploit observations of fraudulent behaviors gleaned
from crowdsourcing sites and online systems, to propose a real-time graph based
algorithm to infer an activity fraud score, the chance that a user activity is fraudulent
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[§ 5.4.2]. More specifically, we introduce features that group fraudulent activities
according to their human creator: FraudSys identifies densely connected components
in the co-review graph of the subject targeted by the user activity, each presumably
controlled by a different fraudster. It then quantifies the connectivity of the user
account performing the action, to each component, and uses the highest connectivity
as features that may indicate that the user account and the corresponding component
are controlled by the same fraudster. FraudSys then leverages supervised learning
algorithms trained on these features to infer the activity fraud score.
To address the second challenge, we develop adaptive hashrate inference tech-
niques to detect the computational capabilities of even adversarial controlled devices
to solve puzzles [§ 5.4.3], and devise mechanisms to convert fraud scores to appro-
priate temporal penalty and puzzle difficulty values [§ 5.4.3]. The puzzles assigned
by FraudSys do not alter the online experience of users, as they are solved on their
devices, in the background. However, the puzzles (1) significantly delay detected
fraudulent activities, posted only when the device returns the correct puzzle solu-
tions and (2) consume the computational resources of the fraudsters who control the
devices.
To address the third challenge, we propose the notion of stateless computational
puzzles, computational tasks that impose no storage overhead on the fraud preemp-
tion system provider, but enable it to efficiently verify their authenticity and the
correctness of their solutions [§ 5.4.1]. Thus, the fraud preemption system can assign
a puzzle to a device from which an activity was performed on the online system,
without storing any state about this task. The device can return the results of the
puzzle in 5 seconds or 1 day, and the provider can verify that the task is authentic,
and its results are correct. This makes our approach resistant to DoS attacks that
attempt to exhaust the provider’s storage space for assigned puzzles.
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We show that the computational penalty imposed by FraudSys on a fraudulent
activity is a function of the capabilities of the device from which it is performed,
and the probability that the activity is fraudulent. We introduce and prove upper
bounds on the profitability of fraud and the amount of fraud that can be created for
a single subject, per time unit [§ 5.5] . We evaluate FraudSys on 23,028 fraudulent
reviews (posted by 23 fraudsters from 2,664 user accounts they control), and 1,061
honest reviews we collected from Google Play, as well as 274,297 fake and 180,400
honest likes from Facebook. Even with incomplete data, FraudSys imposes temporal
penalties that can be as high as 3,079 hours per day for a single fraudster. We also
show that fraud does not pay off. At today’s fraud payout, a fraudster equipped with
an AntMiner S7 (Bitcoin mining hardware) will earn through fraud less than half the
payout of honest Bitcoin mining.
5.2 Related Work
Computation Based Fraud Preemption. Dwork and Naor [DN92] were the first
to propose the use of computation to prevent fraud, in particular spam, where the
sender of an e-mail needs to include the solution to a “moderately hard function”
computed over a function of the e-mail. Juels and Brainard [JB99] proposed to use
puzzles to prevent denial of service attacks, while Borisov [Bor06] introduced puzzles
that deter Sybils in peer-to-peer networks. In Borisov [Bor06], newly joined peers
need to solve a puzzle to which all the other peers have contributed.
FraudSys not only seeks to adapt computational puzzles to prevent online system
fraud, but also needs to solve the additional challenges of building puzzles whose
difficulty is a function of the probability that an activity is fraudulent, while han-
dling heterogeneous user devices (e.g., ranging from smartphones to machines that
specialize in such puzzles).
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Graph Based Fraud Detection. Graphs have been used extensively to model rela-
tionships and detect fraudulent behaviors in online systems. Ye and Akoglu [YA15a]
quantified the chance of a subject to be a spam campaign target, then clustered
spammers on a 2-hop subgraph induced by the subjects with the highest chance val-
ues. Lu et al. [LZXL13] proposed a belief propagation approach implemented on
a review-to-reviewer graph, that simultaneously detects fake reviews and spammers
(fraudsters).
Mukherjee et al. [MLG12] proposed a suite of features to identify reviewer groups,
as users who review many subjects in common but not much else, post their reviews
within small time windows, and are among the first to review the subject. Hooi et
al. [HSB+16b] have recently shown that fraudsters have evolved to hide their traces,
by adding spurious reviews to popular items. To identify “camouflaged” fraud, Hooi
et al. [HSB+16b] introduced “suspiciousness” metrics that apply to bipartite user-
to-item graphs, and developed a greedy algorithm to find the subgraph with the
highest suspiciousness. Akoglu et al. [ATK15] survey graph based online fraud de-
tection. [FH16] provide a survey of community detection methods, evaluation scores
and techniques for general networks.
Unlike previous work, FraudSys assigns fraud scores to individual user activities
in real time, thus uses only partial information. To achieve this, FraudSys develops
and leverages features that quantify the connectivity of the user activity to other
groups of activities previously performed by other fraudsters on the same subject.
Further, FraudSys also imposes computation and temporal penalties to discourage
fraud creation.
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Figure 5.2: System model. The user performs actions on the online service, from
a device that can range from a smartphone to a Bitcoin miner. The online service
implements and posts the activity only if and after the FraudSys service validates it.
The FraudSys functionality can be implemented by the online service or by a third
party provider.
5.3 System and Adversary Model
Figure 5.2 illustrates the three main components of the system model. First, the
online service (the service) hosts the system functionality, and stores information
about user accounts and featured subjects. Subjects can be apps in stores like Google
Play, or pages for businesses, accounts and stories in social networks like Facebook.
Second, the users: they register with the service, record profile information (e.g.,
name) and receive initial service credentials, including a unique id. Users can access
the online service from a variety of devices. For this, they need to install a client (e.g.,
app) on each device they use. The online service stores and maintains information
about each device that the user has used, e.g., to provide compatibility information
on Google Play apps.
Users are encouraged to act on existing subjects. The activities include posting
reviews, comments, or likes, installing mobile apps, etc. The online service associates
statistics over the activities performed for each supported subject. The statistics have
a significant impact on the popularity and search rank of subjects [Ank13, App16],
thus are targets of manipulation by fraudsters (see § 5.3.1).
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The third component of the system model is the FraudSys service, whose goal
is to validate user activities. For increased flexibility, Figure 5.2 shows FraudSys as
an independent provider. However, FraudSys can also be a component of the online
service.
5.3.1 Adversary Model
We consider two types of adversaries – adversarial owners and crowdsourced fraud
workers.
Adversarial owners. Adversarial behaviors start with the subject owners. Ad-
versarial owners seek to fraudulently promote their subjects (or demote competitor
subjects) in order to bias the popularity and public opinion of specific subjects. For
instance, fraudulent promotions seek to make subjects more profitable [LZ16, AM12],
increase the “reachability” of malware (through more app installs), and boost the
impact of fake news.
Fraud workers (= fraudsters). We assume that adversarial owners crowdsource
this promotion task (also known as search rank fraud) to fraud workers, or fraudsters.
In this paper we focus on two types of fraudulent activities: writing fake reviews in
Google Play and posting fake “Likes” in Facebook. We have studied fraudster re-
cruitment jobs in crowdsourcing sites and fraud posted in Google Play and Facebook.
This has allowed us to collect fraud data (see § 5.6.1) and to identify several fraud
behaviors: (i) more than one fraudster can target the same subject; (ii) user accounts
controlled by a fraudster tend to have a significant history of common activities, i.e.,
performed on the same subjects; and (iii) accounts controlled by different fraudsters
tend to have few common past activities.
Fraud incentives. We assume that fraud workers are rational, motivated by financial
incentives. That is, given an original investment in expertise and equipment, a fraud
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Figure 5.3: Price per review (minimum, average and maximum), for crowdsourcing
sites that focus on app market fraud. The sites offer “fraud packages” and even
discounts for bulk fake review purchases. A fake review costs between $0.5-$3.
worker seeks to maximize his revenue achieved per time unit. Figure 5.3 shows the
minimum, average and maximum cost per fraudulent activity, as advertised by several
crowdsourcing and fraud-as-a-service (FAAS) sites: a fake review for an app is worth
between $0.5-$3, while a fake social networking “like” can cost $2. In contrast, an
adversarial owner may have both financial incentives (e.g., increased market share
for his subject, thus revenue), and external incentives (e.g., malware or fake news
distribution).
5.3.2 Fraud Preemption System Definition
We introduce the concept of fraud preemption systems, that seek to restrict the prof-
itability of fraud for both fraudsters and the people who hire the fraudsters (i.e.,
adversarial owners). Specifically, let Sys = (U ,S,F , P ) be a system that consists of
finite sets of users (U), subjects (S) and fraudsters (F) that interact through a set
of procedures P . In the adversary model of § 5.3.1, we say that Sys is a (p,a)-fraud
preemption system if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Fraudster deterrence: The average payout per time unit of any fraudster in
F does not exceed p.
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2. Adversarial owner deterrence: The average number of fraudulent activities
allowed for any subject in S per time unit does not exceed a.
In addition, a puzzle-based fraud preemption system needs to satisfy the following
requirements:
1. Real-time fraud detection. Detect fraud at the time it is created, with access
to only limited information (i.e., no knowledge of the future).
2. Penalty accuracy. Impose difficult puzzles on fraudsters, but minimally im-
pact the online experience of honest users.
3. Device heterogeneity. Both honest and fraudulent users may register and
use multiple devices to access the online service. Malicious users may obfuscate
the computational capabilities of their devices.
4. Minimize system resource consumption. The high number of issued, ac-
tive puzzles will consume the resources of the FraudSys provider, and open it
to DoS attacks.
5.4 FraudSys
We introduce FraudSys, a real-time fraud preemption system that requires users to
verify commitment through an imposed resource consumption action for each activity
they perform on the online system. Specifically, FraudSys requires the device from
which the activity was issued, to solve a computational puzzle. FraudSys consists of
the modules illustrated in Figure 5.4: The Fraud Detection module takes as input
a user activity and the current state of the subject, and outputs a fraud score. The
Fraud2Penalty module converts the fraud score to a time penalty: the time that the
user’s device will need to spend working on a computational puzzle. The Hashrate
Inference module interacts with the user device in order to learn its puzzle solving
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Figure 5.4: FraudSys architecture. The Fraud Detector module uses supervised learn-
ing to assign a fraud score to user activities. The Fraud2Penalty module converts the
fraud score to a time penalty. The Hashrate Inference module estimates the com-
putational capabilities of the user device. Finally, the Puzzler module generates a
puzzle that the device should take approximately the time penalty to solve.
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capabilities. Finally, the Puzzler module uses the inferred device capabilities to gen-
erate a puzzle that the device will take a time approximately equal to time penalty
to solve.
To address requirement #1, the Fraud Detection module exploits the fraudulent
behaviors described in § 5.3.1. It builds co-activity graphs and extracts features that
model the relationships between the user performing the activity and other users that
have earlier performed similar activities for the same subject.
We address requirement #2 through a two-pronged approach. First, the Fraud
Detection and Fraud2Penalty modules ensure that the difficulty of a FraudSys puzzle
will be a function of the detected probability of fraud: activities believed to be honest
will be assigned trivial puzzles, while increasingly fraudulent activities will be assigned
increasingly difficult puzzles. Second, FraudSys does not change the experience of the
user on the online system: the user writes the review or clicks on the like button, then
continues browsing or quits the app. The assigned puzzle is solved in the background
by the device on which the activity was performed. However, FraudSys delays the
publication of the activity, until the device produces the correct puzzle solution.
To address requirement #3, the Hashrate Inference module estimates the hashrate
of the device performing the activity, and provides the tool to punish devices that
cheat about their puzzle solving capabilities. To solve requirement #4, the Puzzler
module generates puzzles that outsource the storage constraints from the FraudSys
service to the user devices that solve the puzzles. In the following we detail each
FraudSys module, starting with the central puzzle creation module.
5.4.1 The Puzzler Module: Stateless Puzzles
Let U be a user that performs an activity A from a device D, on a subject S hosted
by the online service. Table 5.1 summarizes the notations we use. The FraudSys
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Notation Definition
U , D, S, A user, device, subject, activity
T time of puzzle issue
r activity fraud score
∆ puzzle difficulty
ηD hashrate of device D
Γ puzzle cookie
Π puzzle
target puzzle target value
τ temporal penalty
q number of shares (puzzle solutions)
K secret key of FraudSys
Table 5.1: FraudSys symbol table.
service stores minimal state for each registered user, and serializes his activities,
see Figure 5.5: the devices from which a user performs a sequence of activities on
the online service, are assigned one puzzle per activity, each with its own timeout.
The device needs to return the puzzle solutions before the associated timeout. To
implement this, for each user U , the FraudSys service stores the following entry:
U, [〈Di, ηi〉]i=1..d, timeout,
where, for each of the i = 1..d devices registered by U , Di is the device identifier and
ηi is its hashrate (puzzle solving capabilities measure, see following), and timeout is
the latest time by which one of these devices needs to return puzzle solutions.
FraudSys builds on the computational puzzles of Bitcoin, see [Nak08]. Let H2(M)
denote the double SHA-256 hash of a message M . Then, the FraudSys puzzle issued
to device D consists of a target value and a fixed string F . We detail F shortly. To
solve the puzzle, D needs to randomly choose 32 byte long nonce values until it finds
at least one that satisfies:
H2(nonce||F ) < target (5.1)
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Figure 5.5: Puzzle serialization: a user can perform multiple activities, but each
receives a different puzzle with its own timeout, authenticated through the cookie Γ.
That is, the double hash of the nonce concatenated with F , needs to be smaller
than the target value, another 32 byte long value. A smaller target implies a harder
puzzle. The largest target acceptable by the system is called target 1, or target of
difficulty 1.
Bitcoin has two drawbacks. First, the current difficulty of Bitcoin puzzles requires
computational capabilities that greatly exceed those of devices used to access online
services. Second, Bitcoin requires the network to maintain state about issued puz-
zles. State storage exposes FraudSys to attacks, while not storing state can enable
adversaries to lower the difficulty of their assigned puzzles. To address these problems
we (i) change the target 1 difficulty to allow trivial puzzles, and (ii) introduce puzzle
cookies, special values that authenticate puzzles with minimal FraudSys state, see
following.
Device hashrate and puzzle difficulty. We set the target 1 value to be a 32 byte
long value with one zero at the beginning, e.g., 2255−1. In addition, the hashrate ηD of
a device D is a measure that describes the ability of the device to solve puzzles. Since
the puzzles need to be solved in a brute force approach, the hashrate is measured in
hashes per second. A relevant concept is the notion of difficulty, denoted by ∆, a
measure of how difficult it is to solve a puzzle whose input values hash below a given
target. Its relationship to the above target value is given by:
∆ =
target 1
target
=
2255 − 1
target
(5.2)
Given ηD, we derive the time τ taken by D to solve a puzzle with difficulty ∆, as
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follows. First, the number of hashes smaller than a given target is equal to the
target. For instance, the number of hashes smaller than target 1 is 2255 − 1 . Then,
the probability p of finding an input that hashes to a value smaller than the target
is equal to the target divided by the total number of hashes (2256). Furthermore, the
expected number of hashes, E, before achieving the target is given by 1/p. Thus:
E = ηD × τ =
2256
target
=
2256
target 1
×
target 1
target
≈ 2×∆
and conclude that
τ =
2×∆
ηD
(5.3)
For instance, the lowest puzzle difficulty is 1, which occurs when the target has a
prefix of one zero and the device is expected to generate 2 hashes before solving the
puzzle. Similarly, the maximum difficulty is (2255 − 1), for a target = 1, when the
device is expected to perform 2
255−1
1
× 2 ≈ 2256 hashes.
The FraudSys puzzle and cookies. To minimize the storage imposed on
the FraudSys service (see above), we leverage the cookie concept [Ber96]. Algo-
rithm 2 illustrates the puzzle creation, verification and computation components.
The FraudSys service generates and stores a secret key K (line 2). When a user U
performs an activity A from a device D on a subject S of the online service, the online
service calls the BuildCookie function of the FraudSys service (lines 3-11).
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Algorithm 2 FraudSys puzzle creation, verification and computation components.
1. Object FraudSysService
2. K: key;
3. Function BuildCookie(U , D, S, A, q)
4. ηD := getHashrate(U,D);
5. r := computeFraudScore(U,S,A);
6. τ := fraud2Penalty(r);
7. ∆ := ηD × τ/2q
8. oldT := getTimeout(U);
9. newT := oldT + τ ;
10. Γ := HMAC(K,U,D, S, newT,∆, A);
11. setTimeout(U , newT );
12. return Γ, ∆, newT ;
13. Function VerifyPuzzle(U , D, S, A, timeout, Γ, σ: share[q])
14. if (Γ != HMAC(K,U,D, S,A, timeout,∆) return -1;
15. target := getTarget(∆);
16. for (i := 0; i < q; i++)
17. if (H2(σ[i] || Γ) > target) return -1;
18. waitUntil(timeout); post A;
19. τ ′ := Tc − T ;
20. if ((ηD := 2∆/τ ′) ≥ ηmin)
21. updateHashrate(U , D, ηD);
22. Object UserDevice
23. Function SolvePuzzle(Γ, ∆, timeout, q)
24. target := getTarget(∆);
25. σ := new share[q]; i := 0;
26. while (i < q) do
27. nonce := getRandom();
28. if (H2(nonce || Γ) < target)
29. σ[i] := nonce;
30. i := i+1;
31. return U,D, S,A, timeout,Γ, σ;
BuildCookie retrieves the hashrate of the device D from the record stored by
FraudSys for U (line 4). It then computes the fraud score associated to the activity
(line 5) then converts it to a time penalty τ (line 6). We describe this functionality
in the next subsections. BuildCookie then uses a modified Equation 5.3 to compute
the difficulty ∆ that the puzzle should have (line 7). ∆ is q times smaller than in
Equation 5.3, as the puzzle solution consists of q shares, see SolvePuzzle.
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BuildCookie gets the current timeout oldT of U , and updates it to newT by adding
the penalty τ to it (lines 8-9). It then computes the puzzle cookie Γ,
Γ = HMACK(U,D, S, A, timeout,∆)
as a keyed HMAC [BCK96] over the user and device id, subject, activity, new timeout
and puzzle difficulty (lines 9-10). BuildCookie sets U ’s timeout value to the updated
newT value (line 11), then returns the following puzzle (line 12) to the online service
that forwards it to device D (see Figure 5.2):
Π = Γ,∆, timeout.
The puzzle cookie ensures that an adversary that modifies the puzzle’s difficulty or
timeout, will be detected: the adversary does not know the key K, which is a secret of
the FraudSys service. Puzzle cookies are unique with high probability, due to collision
resistance properties of the HMAC, whose input is non-repeating.
Solving the puzzle. When the device D receives the puzzle, it needs to solve it:
search for q nonce values that satisfy the inequality H2(nonce || Γ) < target, for
a target corresponding to the difficulty ∆. Specifically, D invokes the SolvePuzzle
function (lines 23-31), that needs to identify q shares, i.e., nonce values that satisfy the
puzzle. q is a system parameter. The function first uses Equation 5.2 to retrieve the
target value corresponding to the difficulty ∆ (line 24). Then, it generates random
nonce values until it identifies q values that satisfy the puzzle condition (lines 25-30).
SolvePuzzle returns the identified shares (in the σ array), which are then sent to
the online service and forwarded to the FraudSys server, along with the user, device
and subject ids, activity, timeout and cookie of the received puzzle (see line 12 and
Figure 5.2).
Verification of puzzle correctness. Upon receiving these values, the FraudSys
server invokes the VerifyPuzzle function (lines 13-21), to verify its correctness as
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Figure 5.6: Visualization of the co-review graph of a fraudulent Google Play app.
The nodes represent user accounts; edges connect nodes corresponding to accounts
with common, past review activities. The nodes in each of the 2 clusters correspond
to accounts controlled by the same fraudster.
follows: (1) Reconstruct the puzzle cookie Γ based on the received values and the
secret key K. Verify that this cookie is equal to the received Γ value (line 14). This
ensures that all values, including the timeout have not been altered by an adversary;
and (2) Verify that each of the q shares satisfy the puzzle (lines 15-17). If these
verifications succeed, FraudSys waits until timeout expires to confirm the user action
A, for posting by the online service (line 18). It then uses the time required by the
device to solve the puzzle, to re-evaluate the hashrate of the device (lines 19-20).
It updates the stored hashrate only if the new value is above a minimally accepted
hashrate value (lines 20-21).
5.4.2 The Fraud Detection Module
To assign a fraud score to a user activity in real-time, the fraud detection module can
only rely on the existing history of the user and of the subject on which the activity is
performed. We propose an approach that builds on the co-activity graphs of subjects,
where nodes correspond to user accounts that performed activities on the subject, and
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Figure 5.7: Fraud detection illustration: temporal evolution of the co-activity graph
of a subject. The nodes represent user accounts that have performed an activity
on the subject. Edges connect accounts with common past activities. As a new
user account posts an activity, FraudSys assigns the activity a fraud score (the r1..r4
values), based on its connectivity to previous activities. Yellow nodes are considered
fraudulent (r > 0.5).
edges connect nodes whose user accounts have a history of activities that targeted
the same subjects. Edge weights denote the size of that history. Figure 5.6 shows
the co-review (where activities are reviews) graph of a fraudulent Google Play app,
that received fake reviews from 2 fraud workers. Each cluster is formed by accounts
controlled by one of the workers.
The fraud detection module leverages the adversary model findings (§ 5.3.1) that a
fraudster-controlled user account that performs a new activity on a subject, is likely
to be well connected to the co-activity graph of the subject, or at least one of its
densely connected sub-graphs. Figure 5.7 illustrates this approach: Let U be a user
account that performs an activity A for a subject S at time T . Let G = (V,E) be
the co-activity graph of S before time T . Let GT = (VT , ET ) be the new co-activity
graph of S, that also includes U , i.e., VT = V ∪ U . Given U , S and G, FraudSys
extracts the following features, that model the relationship of U with S:
• Connectivity features. The percentage of nodes in V to whom U is connected.
The average weight of the edges between U and the nodes in V . The average weight
of those edges divided by the average weight of the edges in E. This feature will
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indicate if U increases or decreases the overall connectivity of G. The number of
triangles in GT that have U as a vertex. The average edge weight of those triangles.
• Best fit connectivity features. Since U may be controlled by one of multiple
fraudsters who target S, U may be better connected to the subgraph of G controlled
by that fraudster. Then, use a weighted min-cut algorithm to partition G into com-
ponents G1, .., Gk, such that any node in a component is more densely connected to
the nodes in the same component than to the nodes in any of the other components.
G1, .., Gk may contain user accounts controlled by different fraudsters, see Figure 5.6.
Identify the component Gb, b ∈ {1, ..k} to which U is the most tightly connected (ac-
cording to the above connectivity features). Output the connectivity features between
U and Gb.
• Account based features. The number of activities previously performed by
U . The age of U : the time between U ’s creation and the time when activity A is
performed on S. The expertise of U : the number of actions of U for subjects similar
to S. Similarity depends on the online service, e.g., same category apps in Google
Play, pages with similar topics in Facebook.
The Fraud Detection module trains a probabilistic supervised learning algorithm on
these features and uses the trained model to output the probability that a given
activity is fraudulent. We detail the performance of various algorithms, over data
that we collected from Google Play and Facebook, in § 6.8.
Per-fraudster timeout. We exploit the ability of the fraud detection module to
identify accounts controlled by the same fraudster, to further restrict fraud. Specif-
ically, instead of storing a timeout timestamp for each user account, FraudSys can
store a single timeout per detected fraudster. Thus, FraudSys will accumulate penal-
ties in a single, per-fraudster account. This facilitates Claim 3.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of functions to convert fraud scores (x axis) to time penal-
ties (y axis). The logistic function (red dot-line) exhibits the required exponential
increase.
5.4.3 The Fraud2Penalty Module
Given the fraud score r of an activity of user U (output by the Fraud Detection
module), performed from a device D associated with the account of U (see the model
section), the Puzzler module generates a puzzle whose difficulty is a function of both r
and the computational capability of D. We now describe the Fraud2Penalty module,
that converts r into a time penalty. We have explored several functions to convert
the fraud score r of a user activity to a time penalty. Let minh and maxh, and
minf and maxf , denote the minimum and maximum times imposed on the device
from which an honest, respectively fraudulent activity is performed. Let thr denote
the threshold fraud score above which we start to consider a user activity as being
fraudulent. We propose a conversion function that increases linearly when r < thr,
and exponentially when r > thr. Specifically, we propose a flexible generalization of
113
the logistic function (when r > thr), where the parameter k is the growth rate:


maxh−minh
thr
r +minh 0 ≤ r ≤ thr
maxf
1+(maxf−minf
minf
)e−k(r−thr)
thr ≤ r ≤ 1
(5.4)
We have compared this logistic increase function with other functions, with the same
linear increase in the honest region, but exponential ((maxf −minf) e
r−ethr
e1−ethr
+minf)
and logarithmic ((minf −maxf) logr
log(thr)
+maxf) increase in the fraudulent regions.
Figure 5.8 compares the logistic, exponential and logarithmic functions. It shows
that unlike the exponential and logarithmic functions, the logistic function exhibits
the desired rapid increase for fraud probability values above the threshold value. In
§ 6.8 we detail parameter values for the logistic conversion function,
5.4.4 The Hashrate Inference Module
New device registration. When a user registers a new device, the device sends
its specs to the online service that forwards them to FraudSys. FraudSys leverages
its list of profiled devices (see Table 5.2) to retrieve the hashrate of the profiled
device with the most similar capabilities. FraudSys stores the new device along with
this initial hashrate estimate under the id of the user that registers it (see the Puzzle
module). Given this hashrate and the above time penalty, FraudSys uses Equation 5.3
to compute an initial puzzle difficulty.
Hashrate correction. The initial hashrate estimate of FraudSys may be incorrect.
In addition, as discussed in the System Model, the user may be adversarial, thus
attempt to provide an inaccurate view of the puzzle solving capabilities of his device.
To address these problems, FraudSys employs an adaptive hashrate correction pro-
cess. Specifically, an adversary with a more capable device than advertised (see e.g.,
Table 5.2) will solve the assigned puzzle faster. The incentive for this is a shorter wait
time for his activity to post on the online service. If this occurs, FraudSys increases
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its device hashrate estimate to reflect the observed shorter time required by the device
to solve the puzzle (see Algorithm 2, lines 19-20).
5.5 FraudSys Properties
Claim 2 A fraudster that performs a fraudulent activity with fraud score r from a
device with hashrate η, is expected to compute η×maxf
1+(maxf−minf
minf
)e−k(r−thr)
double hashes.
Proof. According to Equation 5.4, the time penalty assigned to a fraudulent activity
with score r is τ = maxf
1+(maxf−minf
minf
)e−k(r−thr)
. Then, Equation 5.3 ensures that the number
of expected hashes that the device needs to perform to solve the puzzle of Equation 5.1
is η × τ , which concludes the proof.
Let f be the number of fraud workers in the system (i.e., f = |F|), τ be the
average temporal penalty assigned by FraudSys to a fraudulent activity, and let p be
the expected payout for a single fraudulent activity. We introduce then the following
claim:
Claim 3 FraudSys is a (p/τ, f/τ)-fraud preemption
system.
Proof. The best fit connectivity features of the Fraud Detection module (see § 5.4.2)
enable FraudSys to detect activities performed from accounts controlled by the same
fraudster. This, coupled with an extension of the timeout concept applied at the
fraudster level (see § 5.4.2) ensures a serialization of fraudster activities. Then, the
average number of fraudulent activities that a fraudster can post per time unit in
FraudSys is 1/τ . This implies that, per time unit, the expected payout of a fraudster
is p/τ , and a subject can be the target of at most f/τ fraudulent activities. This,
according to the definition of § 5.3.2, completes the proof.
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5.5.1 Security Discussion and Limitations
The FraudSys puzzle not only ties the penalty computation to the user activity, but
also addresses pre-computation, replay and guessing attacks: the adversary cannot
predict the cookie value of its actions, thus cannot pre-compute puzzles and cannot
reuse old cookies. It also oﬄoads significant work from the FraudSys service, which
no longer needs to keep track of puzzle assignments.
Device deception. An adversary with a specialized puzzle solving device (e.g.,
AntMiner) will be assigned puzzles with large difficulty values (see, e.g., Table 5.2),
thus consume the same amount of time as when using a resource constrained device
(e.g., a smartphone). The adversary can exploit this observation to avoid the im-
plications of Claim 2: register a resource constrained device, but rely on a powerful
back-end device to solve the assigned puzzles faster. The adversary has two options.
First, report the solutions as soon as the back-end device retrieves them. In this
case however, the adversary leaks his true capabilities, as FraudSys will update the
adversary hashrate (Algorithm 2, line 20). Thus, subsequently, his assigned puzzles
will have a significantly higher difficulty value. In a second strategy, the adversary
estimates the time that his front-end device would take to complete the puzzle, then
waits the remaining penalty time. In this case, the adversary incurs two penalties,
the long wait time and the underutilized back-end device investment.
Adversary strategies: new user accounts. To avoid the implications of Claim 3,
the adversary registers new user accounts. While new accounts are cheap, their
freshness and lack of history will enable the account based features of the Fraud
Detection module to label them as being likely fraudulent. As the adversary reuses
such accounts, the connectivity features start to play a more important role in labeling
their activities as fraudulent. Thus, the adversary has a small usable window of small
penalties for new accounts.
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While new honest accounts may also be assigned larger penalties for their first few
activities, they will not affect the user experience: the user can continue her online
activities, while her device solves the assigned puzzle in the background.
5.6 Empirical Evaluation
5.6.1 Datasets
We have collected the following datasets of fraudulent and honest behaviors from
Google Play and Facebook.
Google Play: fraud behavior data. We have identified 23 workers in Freelancer,
Fiverr and Upwork, with proven expertise on performing fraud on Google Play apps.
We have contacted these workers and collected the ids of 2,664 Google Play accounts
controlled by them. We have also collected 640 apps heavily reviewed from those
accounts, with between 7 and 3,889 reviews, of which between 2% and 100% (median
of 50%) were written from accounts controlled by the workers. These apps form
our gold standard fraud app dataset. We have also collected the 23,028 fake reviews
written from the 2,664 fraudster controlled accounts for the 640 apps. Figure 5.6
shows the co-review graph of one of these apps, that received fake reviews from 2 of
the identified 23 workers.
Google Play: honest behavior data. We have selected 925 candidate apps that
have been developed by Google designated “top developers”. We have removed the
apps whose apks (executables) were flagged as malware by VirusTotal. We have
manually investigated 601 of the remaining apps, and selected a set of 200 apps that
(i) have more than 10 reviews and (ii) were developed by reputable media outlets
(e.g., NBC, PBS) or have an associated business model (e.g., fitness trackers). We
call these the gold standard benign app dataset.
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Figure 5.9: Stats over the Google Play data when maxf = 24h, minh = 2s, maxh =
minf = 5min. (a) Evolution of average, 1st and 3rd quartile of the penalty imposed
on the i-th fraud activity of a fraudster for the same subject. It shows a steep increase:
the average penalty of the first three fraud activities for a subject sums to 15.34h,
while the average penalty of the 12th activity exceeds 24h. (b) Distribution of per-
fraudster daily penalties, over data from 23 fraudsters: in 1,812 days out of 2,708
days, the penalty assigned to a single fraudster exceeds 24 hours. (c) Distribution of
penalties assigned to an honest review. Only 14 out of 4,600 honest review instances
received a penalty exceeding 5 minutes, but still below 1 hour.
118
Device Hashrate Diff (5s) (12hr) (7 day)
Nexus 4 6.53 KH/s 16.32K 141.04M 1.97G
Nexus 5 13.26 KH/s 33.15K 286.41M 4.00G
LG Leon LTE 10.1 KH/s 25.25K 218.16M 3.05G
NVS 295 1.7MH/s 4.25M 36.72G 514.08G
Server 80 MH/s 200M 1.72T 24.19T
AntMiner 4.72 TH/s 11.8T 101.95P 1427P
Table 5.2: Hashrate profiling table for various device types (smartphone, tablet, PC
and Bitcoin miner), along with difficulty values for penalty times of 5s, 12 hours and
7 days.
We have identified 600 reviewers of these 200 benign apps and 140 reviewers of
the 640 fraud apps (see above), such that each has reviewed at least 10 paid apps,
i.e., paid to install the app, then reviewed it, and had at least 5 posts on their
associated Google Plus (social network) accounts. These 740 user accounts form our
gold standard honest user dataset. We have then retrieved and manually vetted 854
reviews written by the 600 honest reviewers for the 200 benign apps, and 207 reviews
written by the 140 honest reviewers of the 640 fraud apps. Each selected review is
informative, containing both positive and negative sentiment statements. We call the
resulting dataset, the honest review dataset, with 1,061 reviews.
Facebook Like dataset. We have used a subset of the dataset from [BSLL+16b],
consisting of 15,694 Facebook pages, that each has received at least 30 likes. The
pages were liked from 13,147 user accounts, of which 6,895 are fraudster controlled,
and 6,252 are honest. In total, these fraudsters have posted 274,297 fake likes, and
the honest accounts have posted 180,400 honest likes.
5.6.2 Device Hashrate Profile
We have profiled the hashrate of several devices, ranging from smartphones to a
Bitcoin mining hardware (AntMiner S7: ARMv7 CPU, 254 Mb of RAM, 135 BM1385
chips @ 700MHz). Since Bitcoin mining requires capabilities far exceeding those of
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Strategy FPR% FNR% Accuracy%
k-NN 1.41 4.45 97.92
SVM 5.8 11.3 92.40
Random Forest 3.44 6.46 95.69
Table 5.3: 10-fold cross validation results of supervised learning algorithms in fraud
vs. honest Google Play review classification. k-NN achieves the lowest FPR and
FNR.
smartphones, we have implemented an Android app to evaluate the hashrate of several
Android devices. Table 5.2 shows the hashrate values for the profiled devices, along
with the corresponding difficulty (∆) values for puzzles required to impose 5 second,
12 hour and 7 day time penalties on such devices. We observe the significant gap
between the hashrate of a smartphone (10-15 KH/s) and a specialized device (4.72
TH/s). This motivates the need for the puzzles issued by FraudSys to have different
∆ values for various user devices. FraudSys maintains a similar table in order to be
able to build appropriate puzzles for newly registered devices.
5.6.3 Fraud Penalty Evaluation: Google Play
Supervised learning algorithm choice. We first used 10 fold cross-validation to
evaluate the ability of the Fraud Detection module to correctly classify the 23,028
fraudulent vs. 1,061 honest reviews of the Google Play dataset previously described.
Table 5.3 shows the false positive (FPR) and negative (FNR) rates, as well as the
accuracy achieved by the top 3 performing supervised algorithms. k-NN has the
lowest FPR and FNR, for an accuracy of 97.92%. Thus, in the following experiments
we use only k-NN.
Parameter evaluation. We have used the fraud and honest review datasets de-
scribed earlier, to compute the temporal penalties imposed by FraudSys on fraudsters
and honest users. We have performed the following experiments. In each experiment,
120
1620
1553
2371
2133
3434
4098
6917
6638
5487
8485
9401
10375
11345
11378
12357
14399
13458
12559
16674
19954
10333
10969
22739
89739
0 − 1
1 − 2
2 − 3
3 − 4
4 − 5
5 − 6
6 − 7
7 − 8
8 − 9
9 − 10
10 − 11
11 − 12
12 − 13
13 − 14
14 − 15
15 − 16
16 − 17
17 − 18
18 − 19
19 − 20
20 − 21
21 − 22
22 − 23
23 − 24
0 25000 50000 75000 100000
Instance Count
Pe
n
a
lty
(H
ou
r)
(a)
149732
15324
5457
3564
2538
2589
1164
32
0−5
6−10
11−20
20−30
30−40
40−50
50−60
60−70
0 50000 100000 150000
Instance Count
Pe
n
a
lty
(M
inu
te
)
(b)
1.56
1.61
3.67
GPlay
review
fraud
Facebook
like
fraud
Bitcoin
mining
0 1 2 3 4
Daily payout ($)
St
ra
te
gy
(c)
Figure 5.10: (a) Penalty distribution for the fake Facebook likes. 84% of the likes
received a penalty that exceeds 12 hours, and the average fake like penalty is 19.32
hours. (b) Penalty distribution for the honest Facebook likes. 82.97% of the honest
likes are assigned a penalty of under 5 min. The maximum penalty assigned to
an honest like is 70 minutes. (c) Comparison of daily payouts provided by Bitcoin
mining, writing fake reviews in Google Play and posting fake likes in Facebook, under
FraudSys. Fraud does not pay off under FraudSys: the fraud payout is less than half
the Bitcoin mining payout.
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we use the data of 22 fraud workers and 200 randomly chosen honest reviews (out of
1,061) to train the supervised learning algorithm (k-NN) then test the model on the
data of the remaining fraud worker and on the remaining 861 honest reviews. Thus,
we have performed 23 experiments, one for each worker.
We set the maxf parameter such that the average daily payout of a fraudster
is below the average Bitcoin mining payout with a last generation AntMiner device.
Thus, this ensures that even such a powerful adversary has more incentive to do Bit-
coin mining instead of search rank fraud. Specifically, the above AntMiner’s current
(Jan. 2017) average daily payout is 0.0037 BTC. At the current BTC to USD rate,
this means $3.67 per day 1. In addition, we have experimented with maxf values
ranging from 12 to 48 hours. The average penalty assigned by FraudSys to a fraudu-
lent review is 8.01 hours when maxf=12h, 15.34h when maxf=24h, and 29.33h when
maxf=48h. Figure 5.9(a) shows the median, first and third quartiles for the time
penalty (in hours) imposed on the i-th fraudulent activity performed by a fraudster
for a subject, when maxf= 24h: the 12th fake activity receives a median penalty of
24h.
Thus, we set maxf=24h, which is sufficient for Google Play reviews: A fraudster
would be able to post on average less than 2 fake reviews per day, thus, even with a
reward of $2 per fraud activity (see Figure 5.3), achieve a payout of around $3.15 per
day, below the Bitcoin mining payout. In addition, we have set minh = 2s. Figure 5.1
shows the penalty timelines of two workers when minh = 2s, maxh = minf = 5 min,
maxf = 24 hours, thr = 0.5, and k = 30 (for a steep increase of time penalty with
fraud score). We note that a maxh = 5 min is not excessive: this penalty is not
imposed on the user, but on his device. The user experience remains the same in the
online service.
1Historically speaking, the BTC to USD rate is increasing. The next generation
AntMiner coming up this year is expected to be 3 times more capable.
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Each vertical bar shows the daily temporal penalty assigned to a single worker,
over reviews posted from multiple accounts. The maximum daily penalty of the two
workers is 1,247 hours and 3,079 hours respectively. We observe that each worker has
many days with a daily penalty exceeding 24 hours.
Figure 5.9(b) shows for maxh = minf = 5min, the overall distribution of daily
penalties assigned by FraudSys, over all the 23 fraud workers, in the above exper-
iment. It shows that during most of the active days, fraud workers are assigned a
daily penalty exceeding 24 hours. Figure 5.9(c) (also for maxh = minf = 5min)
shows the distribution of per-review penalty assigned by FraudSys to honest reviews,
shown over 4,600 (23 × 200) honest reviews. Irrespective of the maxh value, only 14
honest reviews were classified as fraudulent, but assigned a penalty below 1 hour. We
observed minimal changes in the distribution of penalties of fraudulent reviews when
maxh = minf ranges from 5 to 15 minutes.
5.6.4 Fraud Penalty Evaluation: Facebook
We have performed a similar parameter analysis using the Facebook “like” dataset.
Since this dataset lacks information about the fraudsters who control the accounts
that posted fake likes, we focus on the penalties assigned by FraudSys to fake and
honest likes.
Figure 5.10(a) shows the distribution of penalties assigned to fake likes and Fig-
ure 5.10(b) shows the distribution of the honest likes. Compared to the results over
the Google Play data, we observe a higher FPR, i.e., more honest likes with fraud
level penalties. We posit that this is due to the fewer features that we can extract
for the Facebook likes, as, unlike for Google Play reviews, we lack the time of the
activity. Specifically, absence of like sequence information enables us to only extract
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features based on the last “snapshot” of the page, and not the current page snapshot
when the like was posted.
However, 82.97% of the honest likes receive a penalty of under 5 mins and the
maximum penalty assigned to an honest review is 70 mins. In addition, 84% of the
fake likes receive a penalty that exceeds 12 hours, and the average penalty for a
fake like is 19.32 hours. Figure 5.10(c) compares the daily payouts received by an
AntMiner equipped fraudster who writes fake reviews in Google Play (at $1 per fake
review), posts fake likes (at $2 per fake like), or honestly uses his device to mine
Bitcoins. It shows that under FraudSys, fraud doesn’t pay off: the Bitcoin mining
payout is more than double the fraud payout for either fake reviews or likes.
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5.8 Summary
We have introduced the concept of real-time fraud preemption systems, named as the
FraudSys, that seek to restrict the profitability and impact of fraud in online systems.
We propose and develop stateless, verifiable computational puzzles, that impose min-
imal overheads, but enable their efficient verification. We have developed a graph
based, real-time algorithm to assign fraud scores to user activities and mechanisms to
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convert scores to puzzle difficulty values. We used data collected from Google Play
and Facebook to show that our solutions impose significant penalties on fraudsters,
and make fraud less productive than Bitcoin mining.
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CHAPTER 6
Search Rank Fraud De-Anonymization in Online Systems
6.1 Motivation
The developers of top ranking products in peer-review sites like Google Play, Amazon,
or Yelp receive higher rewards, that include direct payments and ad-based revenues.
Statistics maintained by peer-review sites concerning user activities for a product
(e.g., reviews, ratings, likes, followers, app install counts) are known to play an es-
sential part in the product’s ranking [Pos12, Luc11, Ank13]. This has created a
black market for search rank fraud, mediated by an abundance of crowdsourcing
sites, e.g., [Fiv, Upw, Fre, Zee, Peo]. Specifically, crowdsourcing fraudsters create or
purchase hundreds of user accounts in the peer-review site, then post activities for
the products of developers who hire them, from the accounts they control.
Discouraging search rank fraud is essential to ensure trust in peer-review sites
and the products that they host. Previous work in this area has focused on fraud
detection [CHZY17, RRCC16b, MLG12, WGF17, FML+13b, MKL+13b, LFW+17b,
HSB+16a, BSLL+16c, ACF13a, HSB+16c, RA15a, ACF13b]. Most peer-review sites
filter out detected fraudulent activities [Cip16, Per16, MVLG13]. However, a study
with 58 fraudsters that we recruited from 6 crowdsourcing sites revealed that workers
with years of search rank fraud expertise are actively contributing to such jobs, and
are able to post hundreds of reviews for a single product at prices ranging from a few
cents to $10 per review. This suggests that fraud detection alone is unable to prevent
large scale search rank fraud.
In this paper we propose a new approach to discourage search rank fraud. We
introduce the fraud de-anonymization problem, that aims to attribute detected search
rank fraud in a peer-review site, to the crowdsourcing site fraudsters who posted it.
Further, to understand and model search rank fraud behaviors, we have developed
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a questionnaire and used it to survey 58 fraudsters recruited from 6 crowdsourcing
sites. We have collected data from search rank fraud jobs and worker accounts in Up-
work. We have collected a gold standard dataset of 956 user accounts in Google Play,
attributed to 23 crowdsourced workers. We have developed a guilt-by-association
process to expand this dataset with another 1,308 user accounts, for a total of 2,664
fraudster-attributed accounts. We analyze the activities performed from these ac-
counts in the wild. We observe and report several adversary traits, including the
existence of an expert core of fraudsters, who can control hundreds of user accounts
and post tens of daily reviews for a single product, can change their behaviors to
avoid detection (e.g., to throttle their daily review activities and dilute them over
long time intervals), can be rehired to promote the same product at later times, and
that products can be fraudulently promoted by multiple fraudsters.
We leverage the identified traits to introduce Dolos1 a system that cracks down
fraud by unmasking the human masterminds responsible for posting significant fraud.
Dolos integrates search rank fraud detection with fraud attribution to reveal the
lurking organized activities that power the fraud, and pinpoint their human com-
mand centers. Dolos detects then attributes fraudulent user accounts in the online
service, to the crowdsourcing site accounts of the workers who control them. We
devise MCDense, a min-cut dense component detection algorithm that analyzes com-
mon activity relationships between user accounts to uncover groups of accounts, each
group controlled by a different search rank fraudster. We further leverage stylometry
and supervised learning to attribute MCDense detected groups to the crowdsourcing
fraudsters who control them.
Dolos correctly attributed 95% of the reviews of 640 apps (that received sig-
nificant, ground truth search rank fraud) to their authors. For 97.5% of the apps,
Dolos correctly de-anonymized at least one of the fraudsters who authored their fake
1
Dolos is a concrete block used to protect harbor walls from erosive ocean waves.
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reviews. Dolos achieved 90% precision and 89% recall when attributing the above
2,664 fraudulent accounts to the fraudsters who control them. Further, MCDense
significantly outperformed an adapted densest subgraph solution.
We have evaluated Dolos on 13,087 Google Play apps (and their 820,760 reviews)
that we monitored over more than 6 months. Dolos discovered that 1,056 of these
apps have suspicious reviewer groups. Upon close inspection we found that (1) 29.9%
of their reviews were duplicates and (2) 73% of the apps that had at least one MCDense
discovered clique, received reviews from the expert core fraudsters that we mentioned
above. We also report cases of fraud re-posters, accounts who re-post their reviews,
hours to days after Google Play filters them out (up to 37 times in one case).
To evaluate MCDense, we introduce two coverage scores, p-coverage and p-SCC,
that measure the quality of detected community partitions. We adapt dense subgraph
detection [Tso15] and loopy believe propagation [ACF13a] solutions to the fraud de-
anonymization problem. We show that MCDense consistently and significantly out-
performs DSG on both coverage scores. While LBP can be used to accurately detect
fraud, it cannot determine if all the accounts detected as fraudulent are controlled by
a single or multiple workers.
In summary, we introduce the following contributions:
• Fraud de-anonymization problem formulation. Introduce a new approach
to combat and discourage search rank fraud in peer-review sites.
• Study and model search rank fraud. Survey 58 fraudsters from 6 crowd-
sourcing websites on fraud posting capabilities and behaviors. Collect search
rank fraud jobs posted on Upwork and analyze common bidding and winning
behaviors between fraud workers. Collect gold standard fraudster-attributed
Google Play user accounts and study their behaviors in the real world. Extract
and present fraudster behaviors traits.
• Dolos. Exploit extracted insights to develop the first fraud de-anonymization
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Figure 6.1: System and adversary model. Developers upload products, on which
users post activities, e.g., reviews, likes. Adversarial developers crowdsource search
rank fraud. Unlike fraud detection solutions, Dolos unmasks the human fraudsters
responsible for posting search rank fraud.
system. Devise MCDense, a min-cut dense component detection algorithm to
identify accounts controlled by the same fraudster. Use stylometry to attribute
detected components to the profiles of known crowdsourcing workers.
• Evaluation. Evaluate Dolos extensively on Google Play data. Identify or-
thogonal evidence of fraud from detected suspicious products. Develop novel
community coverage scores. Show that MCDense significantly outperforms
adapted dense subgraph and loopy believe propagation solutions, on the de-
veloped scores.
• Open source. The Dolos and MCDense code is available for download on-
line [Dol].
6.2 System and Adversary Model
We consider an ecosystem that consists of peer-review sites and crowdsourcing sites.
Peer-review sites host accounts for developers, products and users, see Figure 6.1.
Developers use their accounts to upload products. Users post activities for products,
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Figure 6.2: Statistics over 44 fraudsters (targeting Google Play apps) recruited from
5 crowdsourcing sites: minimum, average and maximum for (a) number of reviews
that a fraudster can write for an app, (b) price demanded per review, (c) years of
experience, (d) number of apps reviewed in the past 7 days. Fraudsters report to be
able to write hundreds of reviews for a single app, have years of experience and are
currently active. Prices range from 56 cents to $10 per review.
e.g., reviews, ratings, likes, installs. Product accounts display these activities and
statistics, while user accounts list the products on which users posted activities.
Users register mobile devices to their accounts, then install apps on them. Users
can only review apps that they have previously installed. Reviews have a star rating
(1-5) and a text component.
The survival of mobile apps in Google Play is contingent on their search rank.
Higher ranked apps are installed more frequently and generate more revenue, either
through ads or direct payments. While Google keeps their ranking algorithm secret,
popular belief (e.g., [Ank13]) holds that large numbers of positive reviews help new
apps achieve higher search rank.
Crowdsourcing sites host accounts for workers and employers. Worker accounts
have unique identifiers and bank account numbers used to deposit the money that
they earn. Employers post jobs, while workers bid on jobs, and, following negotiation
steps, are assigned or win the jobs.
We consider product developers who hire workers from crowdsourcing sites, to
perform search rank fraud. In this paper we focus on workers who control multiple
user accounts in the online system, which they use to post fake activities, e.g., review,
rate, install. We study such workers in Section 6.7.
130
6.3 The Fraud De-Anonymization Problem
Let W = {W1, ..,Wn} be the set of crowdsourcing worker accounts. Let U =
{U1, .., Um} be the set of user accounts and let A = {A1, .., Aa} be the set of prod-
ucts hosted by the online service, respectively. We define the fraud de-anonymization
problem as follows:
Fraud De-Anonymization Problem. Given a product A ∈ A, return the subset
of fraudsters in W who control user accounts in U that posted activities for A.
Unlike standard de-anonymization, which refers to the adversarial process of iden-
tifying users from data where their Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has been
removed, the fraud de-anonymization problem seeks to attribute detected search rank
fraud to the humans who posted it.
A solution to this problem will enable peer-review sites to (1) put a face to the
humans who post fraud for the products that they host, i.e., identify their banking in-
formation and use it to pursue fraudsters, and (2) provide proof of fraud to customers,
e.g., through links to the crowdsourcing accounts responsible for fraud posted on
products they browse. Thus, fraud de-anonymization may provide counter-incentives
both for the crowdsourcing workers who participate in fraud jobs, and for the product
developers who recruit fraudsters.
6.4 A Study of Search Rank Fraud
In this section we describe our efforts to understand and model search rank fraud
workers. Succinctly, we have (1) performed a user study with fraud workers recruited
from several crowdsourcing sites, (2) collected and analyzed search rank fraud data
from Upwork, (3) collected a gold standard set of user accounts, attributed to a
fraudster identified from a crowdsourcing site and (4) analyzed the behaviors exhibited
by these user accounts. We have developed our protocols to interact with participants
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and collect data in an IRB-approved manner (Approval #: IRB-15-0219@FIU and
IRB-18-0077@FIU).
In the following we describe each contribution. We use the terms worker, fraudster
and fraud worker, interchangeably.
6.4.1 Motivation: Fraudster Capabilities
To evaluate the magnitude of the problem, we have first contacted 44 workers from
several crowdsourcing sites including Zeerk (12), Peopleperhour (9), Freelancer (8),
Upwork (6) and Facebook groups (9), who advertised search rank fraud capabilities
for app markets. We asked them (1) how many reviews they can write for one app,
(2) how much they charge for one review, (3) how many apps they reviewed in the
past 7 days, and (4) for how long they been active in promoting apps.
Figure 6.2 shows statistics over the answers, organized by crowdsourcing site. It
suggests significant profits for fraudsters, who claim to be able to write hundreds of
reviews per app (e.g., an average of 250 reviews by Freelancer workers) and charge
from a few cents ($0.56 on average from Zeerk.com workers) to $10 per review (Free-
lancer.com). Fraudsters have varied degrees of expertise in terms of years of ex-
perience and recent participation in fraud jobs. For instance, in recently emerged
Facebook groups, that either directly sell reviews or exchange reviews, fraudsters
have less than 2.5 years experience, but are very active, with more than 7 jobs in the
past 7 days on average, and are economical ($1.3 on average per review). Further,
fraudsters from Peopleperhour and Upwork have more than 2.5 years experience and
more than 3 recent jobs on average.
Subsequently, we have developed a more detailed questionnaire to better under-
stand search rank fraud behaviors and delivered it to 14 fraud freelancers that we
recruited from Fiverr. We paid each participant $10, for a job that takes approx. 10
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minutes. The IPs from which the questionnaire was accessed revealed that the par-
ticipants were from Bangladesh (5 participants), USA (2), Egypt (2), Netherlands,
UK, Pakistan, India and Germany (1). The participants declared to be male, 18 - 28
years old, with diverse education levels: less than high school (1 participant), high
school (2), associate degree (3), in college (5), bachelor degree or more (3).
The participants admitted an array of fraud expertise (fake reviews and ratings
in Google Play, iTunes, Amazon, Facebook and Twitter, fake installs in Google Play
and iTunes, fake likes and followers in Facebook and Instagram, influential tweets in
Twitter). With a focus on search rank fraud targeting Google Play apps, we found a
mix of (1) inexperienced and experienced fraudsters: 4 out of 14 had been active less
than 2 months and 6 fraudsters had been active for more than 1 year, and (2) active
and inactive fraudsters: 4 had not worked in the past month, 9 had worked on 1-5
fraud jobs in the past month, and 1 worked on more than 10 jobs; 8 fraudsters were
currently active on 1-5 fraud jobs, and 1 on more than 5.
Further, we observed varying search rank fraud capabilities when it comes to the
magnitude of the fraud on a per-app level. For instance, 1 fraudster wrote at most
1 review per app, 2 wrote 2-5 reviews, 7 fraudsters said that they wrote between 5
to 50 reviews per app, while 1 wrote 51 to 100 reviews. 1 fraudster performed less
than 10 installs per job, 3 had 11 to 100 installs, 3 had 101 to 1,000 installs per job,
while 1 fraudster said that he performed more than 1,000 installs for a single app. 8
fraudsters said that they have access to more than 10 mobile devices, with 1 having
more than 50 devices.
Of the 14 fraudsters surveyed, 3 admitted to working in teams that had more
than 10 members, and to sharing the user accounts that they control, with others. 10
fraudsters said that they control more than 5 Google Play accounts and 1 fraudster
had more than 100 accounts. Later in this section we show that this is realistic, as
other 23 fraudsters we recruited, were able to reveal between 22 and 86 Google Play
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of winning workers for search rank fraud jobs: developers
hire multiple workers. More jobs are assigned to 2 or more workers than to 1. This
reveals the need for Dolos to detect fraudulent communities and attribute them to
different fraud workers.
accounts that they control. Further, 4 fraudsters said that they never abandon an
account, 5 said that they use each account until they are unable to login, and 4 said
that they use it for at most 1 year. This is confirmed by our empirical observation of
the persistence of fraud (see end of section 6.4.3).
6.4.2 A Study of Search Rank Fraud Jobs
We identified and collected data from 161 search rank fraud jobs in Upwork that
request workers to post reviews on, or install Google Play and iTunes apps. We have
collected the 533 workers who have bid on these jobs. We call the bidding workers
that are awarded a job, winners. To achieve this, we have developed a Python crawler
to collect data both from crowdsourcing sites and from Google Play.
Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of the number of winners per search rank fraud
job. One job of the 161, was awarded to 12 workers; more jobs were awarded to 2
workers than to only 1. This indicates that hiring multiple workers is considered bene-
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.4: (a) Worker co-bid graph: Nodes are Upwork workers. An edge connects
two workers who co-bid on search rank fraud jobs. We see a tight co-bid community
of workers; some co-bid on 37 jobs. (b) Worker Co-win graph with an expert core of 8
workers (red), each winning 8−15 jobs. Edges connect workers who won at least one
job together. Any two workers collaborated infrequently, up to 4 jobs. Dolos exploits
these observations to detect fraudulent account communities controlled by different
fraudsters.
ficial by adversarial developers, and suggests the need to attribute detected organized
fraud activities to human masterminds (see next section).
In order to understand the extent to which crowdsourced workers participate in
common on search rank fraud jobs, we introduce the concepts of co-bid and co-win
graphs. In the co-bid graph, nodes are workers who bid on fraud jobs; edges connect
workers who bid together on at least one job. The edge weights denote the number
of jobs on which the endpoint workers have bid together. In the co-win graph, the
weight of an edge is the number of fraud jobs won by both endpoint workers.
Out of the 56 workers who won the 161 jobs, only 40 had won a job along with
another bidder. Figure 6.4(a) shows the co-bid graph of these 40 winners, who form a
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Figure 6.5: Attributed, fraudster-controlled accounts. The numbers of Google Play
accounts revealed by the detected fraudsters are shown in red. Each of the 23 fraud-
sters has revealed between 22 to 86 accounts. Guilt-by-association accounts are shown
in orange. We have collected a total of 2,664 accounts (red + orange). One fraudster
controls (at least) 217 accounts.
tight community. Figure 6.4(b) plots the co-win graph of the 40 winners. We observe
an “expert core” of 8 workers who each won between 8 to 15 jobs. Further, we observe
infrequent collaborations between any pair of workers: any two workers collaborated
on at most 4 jobs.
6.4.3 Fraudster Profile Collection (FPC)
We have collected a first gold standard dataset of attributed, fraudster controlled
accounts in Google Play. For this, we have identified and contacted 100 Upwork,
Fiverr and Freelancer workers with significant bidding activity on search rank fraud
jobs targeting Google Play apps. Figure 6.5 shows the number of accounts (bottom,
red segments) revealed by each of 23 most responsive of these workers: between 22
and 86 Google Play accounts revealed per worker, for a total of 956 user accounts.
Fraud app dataset. To expand this data, we collected first a subset of 640 apps
that received the highest ratio of reviews from accounts controlled by the above 23
expert core workers to the total number of reviews. We have monitored the apps over
a 6 months interval, collecting their new reviews once every 2 days. The 640 apps
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Algorithm Precision Recall F-measure
RF 95.5% 91.6% 93.5%
SVM 98.5% 98.3% 98.5%
k-NN 97.1% 96.4% 96.7%
MLP 98.6% 98.1% 98.4%
Table 6.1: Account attribution performance on gold standard fraudster-controlled
dataset, with several supervised learning algorithms (parameters d = 300, t = 100,
γ = 80, and w = 5 set through a grid search). SVM performed best.
had between 7 to 3,889 reviews. Half of these apps had at least 51% of their reviews
written from accounts controlled by the 23 fraudsters. In the following we refer to
these, as the fraud apps.
Union fraud graph. We have collected the account data of the 38,123 unique
reviewers (956 of which are the seed accounts revealed by the 23 fraudsters) of the
fraud apps, enabling us to build their union fraud graph: a node corresponds to an
account that reviewed one of these apps (including fraudster controlled and honest
ones), and the weight of an edge denotes the number of apps reviewed in common
by the accounts that correspond to the end nodes. We have removed duplicates:
an account that reviewed multiple fraud apps has only one node in the graph. The
union fraud graph has 19,375,550 edges and 162 disconnected components, of which
the largest has 37,566 nodes.
Guilt-by-association. We have labeled each node of the union fraud graph with the
ID of the fraudster controlling it or with “unknown” if no such information exists. For
each unknown labeled node U , we decide if U is controlled by one of the fraudsters,
based on how well U is associated with accounts controlled by the fraudster. However,
U may be connected to the accounts of multiple fraudsters (Trait 3, see Section 6.4.5).
To address this problem, we leveraged Trait 4 (see Section 6.4.5) to observe that
random walks that start from nodes controlled by the same fraudsters are likely
to share significant context, likely different from the context of nodes controlled by
other fraudsters, or that are honest. We have pre-processed the union fraud graph
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to convert it into a non-weighted graph: replace an edge between nodes ui and uj
with weight wij, by wij non-weighted edges between ui and uj. We then used the
DeepWalk algorithm [PARS14] to perform γ random walks starting from each node
v in this graph, where a walk samples uniformly from the neighbors of the last vertex
visited until it reaches the maximum walk length (t). The pre-processing of the union
graph ensures that the probability of DeepWalk at node ui to choose node uj as
next hop, is proportional to wij. DeepWalk also takes as input a window size w, the
number of neighbors used as the context in each iteration of its SkipGram component.
Deepwalk returns a d-dimensional representation in Rd for each of the nodes. We then
used this representation as predictor features for the “ownership” of the account U -
the fraudster who controls it.
Table 6.1 highlights precision, recall, and F-measure achieved by different super-
vised learning algorithms. We observe that SVM reaches 98.5% F-measure which
suggests DeepWalk’s ability to provide useful features and assist in our guilt-by-
association process. We then applied the trained model to the remaining and un-
labeled accounts in the union fraud graph obtaining new guilt-by-association ac-
counts for each of the 23 workers. Figure 6.5 shows the number of seed and guilt-by-
association accounts uncovered for each of the 23 fraudsters. We have collected 1, 708
additional accounts across workers for a total of 2,664 accounts.
Persistence of fraud. After more than 1 year following the collection of the 2,664
fraudster-controlled accounts, we have re-accessed the accounts. We found that 67
accounts had been deleted and 529 accounts were inactive, i.e., all information about
apps installed, reviewed, +1’d was removed. 2,068 accounts were active. This is
consistent with the findings from our fraudster survey, where 4 out of 14 surveyed
fraudsters said that they never abandon an account, 5 said that they use each account
until they are unable to login, and 4 said that they use it for at most 1 year. This
suggests the limited ability of Google Play to block fraudster-controlled accounts.
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Figure 6.6: (a) Per-fraudster distribution of active intervals. Each point represents the
length of the active interval of the corresponding fraudster for a Google Play app that
he has targeted. The boxes show the first and third quartiles of each fraudster, along
with the median. The red dots correspond to a Google Play app, while the blue dots
correspond to another app. Each of these apps was targeted by 4 of the 23 workers.
These workers have the longest active interval for these apps. (b) Distributions of
number of daily reviews posted by each worker per app. Several fraudsters stand out:
fraudsters 2, 12, 43 and 18 provide an average of 38 to 78 daily reviews per each app
they have targeted. Both plots were built on 2,835 apps which received more than 10
reviews from the 23 fraudsters.
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6.4.4 Analysis of Fraud Behaviors
We study the activities performed from the accounts controlled by the above 23 fraud
workers, in Google Play. For this, we have selected the 2,835 apps that have received
at least 10 reviews from the 2,664 accounts controlled by the 23 fraudsters. We
perform our analysis on these apps.
Active intervals. First, we study the active interval length of a worker for an app:
the time interval between the first and last reviews posted from accounts controlled by
the worker, for the app. Figure 6.6(a) shows the per-fraudster distribution of active
interval durations, for the above 2,835 apps. We observe several apps (e.g., shown
with red and blue circles) that were targeted by each of several fraudsters, over long
time intervals (e.g., 1-2 years). We posit that workers may be rehired several times
over the years, to perform search rank fraud. We revisit this hypothesis shortly.
Daily review capabilities. Second, we study the number of reviews that a worker
has been able to post in a single day for a single app, from all the user accounts it
controls. Figure 6.6(b) shows the distribution of the number of daily reviews posted
by each of 23 fraudsters, per each app they target. It shows that several workers had
days when they were able to post more than 38 reviews per day for one app. The
second worker posted 78 reviews in a day for one app! These results corroborate the
findings of our fraud worker survey described in Section 6.4.1.
Active intervals vs. reviews per active day. Figure 6.7 plots 3,369 data points,
each representing an (app, fraudster) pair: the x axis value shows the fraudster’s
active interval for the app, and the y axis shows the average number of reviews
that the fraudster has posted for that app, per active day. The number of points
(3,369) is larger than the number of apps (2,835) since some apps were targeted by
multiple fraudsters thus contribute multiple points. To improve visibility, we grouped
the points into hexagonal-shaped bins, where the color of a bin is a function of the
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Figure 6.7: Scatterplot of the active interval length (x axis) vs. the average number
of reviews per active day (y axis). Each point represents an (app, fraudster) pair:
the x axis value shows fraudster’s active interval for the app and the y axis shows the
average number of reviews that the fraudster has posted for that app, per active day.
Search rank fraud workers often prefer to “dilute” their reviews over a large number
of days, instead of posting large number of reviews over a few days.
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number of points it contains.
The scatterplot shows that the fraudsters who post a high number of reviews on
average per active day (e.g., 18-34), tend to target apps only for a short time span
(small active interval length), i.e., over 1-2 days. However, these points account for
only 1.6% of the data. 75% of the data points plotted correspond to active intervals
of up to 250 days. 64% of these points correspond to (app, fraudster) pairs where
the fraudster wrote an average of 1 - 3 reviews per active day, 18% to 4 - 7 reviews
per day and 18% to 18-34 reviews per day. 25% (858) of the data points correspond
to active intervals of between 250 and 887 days. 72.12% of the points correspond to
(app, fraudster) pairs where the fraudster wrote an average of 1 - 3 reviews per active
day.
We observe that search rank fraud workers often “dilute” their reviews over a
large number of days, instead of posting large number of reviews over only a few
days. We believe that this is due to job requirements, which have evolved to avoid
obvious defenses employed by peer-review systems, e.g., through detection of review
spikes.
6.4.5 Empirical Adversary Traits
We summarize now several search rank fraudster traits suggested by our studies:
• Trait 1: Fraudsters control multiple user accounts which they use to perpetrate
search rank fraud.
• Trait 2: While fraudsters have diverse search rank fraud capabilities, crowd-
sourcing sites have an “expert core” of successful search rank fraud workers.
Many fraudsters are willing to contribute, but few have the expertise or repu-
tation to win such jobs.
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• Trait 3: Search rank fraud jobs often recruit multiple workers. Thus, targeted
products may receive fake reviews from multiple fraudsters. This suggests that
in addition to identifying fraudulent reviews, we need to further attribute them
to their authors.
• Trait 4: Any two fraudsters collaborate infrequently, when compared to the
number of search rank fraud jobs on which they have participated, see Fig-
ure 6.4(b).
• Trait 5: Fraudsters and the people who hire them evolve to avoid detection.
For instance, search rank fraud workers are able to “dilute” their reviews over
a large number of days, instead of posting large number of reviews over only a
few days.
• Trait 6: Fraudsters may be rehired by the same product developer to promote
the same product, several times over the years.
• Trait 7: Fraudsters, including experts, are willing to share information about
their behaviors, perhaps to convince prospective employers of their expertise.
Dolos exploits these traits to detect and attribute groups of fraudulent user accounts
to the fraudsters who control them. While we do not claim that the sample data from
which the traits are extracted is representative, in the evaluation section we show that
Dolos can accurately de-anonymize fraudsters.
6.5 Fraud De-Anonymization System
6.5.1 Solution Overview
We introduce Dolos, the first fraud de-anonymization system that integrates activ-
ities on both crowdsourcing sites and online services. As illustrated in Figure 6.8,
Dolos (1) proactively identifies new fraudsters and builds their profiles in crowd-
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Figure 6.8: Dolos system architecture: The Fraud Component Detection (FCD) mod-
ule partitions the co-activity graphs of apps into loosely inter-connected, dense com-
ponents. The Component Attribution (CA) module attributes FCD detected compo-
nents to fraudster profiles collected by the Fraudster Profile Collector (FPC).
sourcing sites, then (2) processes product and user accounts in online systems to
attribute detected fraud to these profiles. The gold standard fraudster profile col-
lection (FPC) module described in the previous section performs task (1). In the
following, we focus on task (2), which we break into two sub-problems:
• Fraud-Component Detection Problem. Given a product A ∈ A, return a
set of components CA = {C1, .., Ck}, where any Cj=1..k consists of a subset of
the user accounts who posted an activity for A, s.t., those accounts are either
controlled by a single worker in W, or are honest.
• Component Attribution Problem. Given W and a component C ∈ CA,
return the identity of the worker in W who controls all the accounts in the
component, or ⊥ if the accounts are not controlled by a worker.
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Algorithm 3 MCDense: Min-Cut
based Dense component detection. We
set η to 5 and tau to 0.5.
Input: G = (U , Ew): input graph
n := |U|
Output: C := ∅: set of node components
1. MCDense(G){
2. if (nodeCount(G) < η) return;
3. (G1, G2) := weightMinCut(G);
4. if ((ρ(G1) > ρ(G) & ρ(G2) > ρ(G))
& (ρ(G) < τ)){
5. MCDense(G1); MCDense(G2);
6. else
7. C := C ∪ G;
8. return;
9. end if
Dolos’s FCD and CA modules respectively, provide solutions to these sub-problems.
In the following, we detail the FCD and CA modules.
6.5.2 Fraud Component Detection (FCD) Module
In order to identify communities, each controlled by a different fraudster, we leverage
the adversary Trait 4, that the accounts controlled by one fraudster are likely to have
reviewed significantly more products in common than with the accounts controlled
by another fraudster. We introduce MCDense, an algorithm that takes as input the
co-activity graph of a product A, and outputs its fraud components, sets of user
accounts, each potentially controlled by a different worker. We define the co-activity
graph of a product A as G = (U , Ew), with a node for each user account that posted
an activity for A (see Figure 6.9 for an illustration). Two nodes ui, uj ∈ U are
connected by a weighted edge e(ui, uj, wij) ∈ E
w, where the weight wij is the number
of products on which ui and uj posted activities in common.
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MCDense, see Algorithm 3, detects densely connected subgraphs, each subgraph
being minimally connected to the other subgraphs. Given a graph G = (U , Ew), its
triangle density is ρ(G) = t(V )
(|V |3 )
, where t(V ) is the number of triangles formed by the
edges in Ew. This definition differs from the one used by Tsourakakis [Tso15] in the
DSG algorithm (see § 6.8.4). Thus, unlike ρD that can be larger than 1, ρ ∈ [0, 1].
MCDense recursively divides the co-activity graph into two minimally connected
subgraphs: the sum of the weights of the edges crossing the two subgraphs, is min-
imized. If both subgraphs are more densely connected than the initial graph (line
4) and the density of the initial graph is below a threshold τ , MCDense treats each
subgraph as being controlled by different workers: it calls itself recursively for each
subgraph (lines 5,6). Otherwise, MCDense considers the undivided graph to be con-
trolled by a single worker, and adds it to the set of identified components (line 8).
We have used the gold standard set of accounts controlled by the 23 fraudsters
detailed in the previous section, to empirically set the τ threshold to 0.5, as the lowest
density of the 23 groups of accounts revealed by the fraudsters was just above 0.5.
MCDense converges and has O(|Ew||U|
3) complexity. To see that this is the
case, we observe that at each step, MCDense either stops or, at the worst, “shaves”
one node from G. The complexity follows then based on Karger’s min-cut algorithm
complexity [Kar93].
6.5.3 Component Attribution (CA) Module
Given a set of fraud worker profiles FW and a set of fraud components returned by the
FCD module for a product A, the component attribution module identifies the workers
likely to control the accounts in each component. To achieve this, Dolos leverages
the unique writing style of human fraudsters to fuse elements from computational
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Figure 6.9: Co-review graph of user accounts reviewing a popular horoscope app in
Google Play (name hidden for privacy). Nodes are accounts. 4 Upwork workers each
revealed to control the accounts of the same color. Two accounts are connected if they
post reviews for the same apps. Node sizes are a function of the account connectivity.
(b) For the same app, Dolos found these 4 tightly connected groups of accounts,
and correctly attributed 3 groups to the fraudsters controlling them.
linguistics, e.g., [OCCH11, LLK+11], and author de-anonymization, e.g., [OG16].
Specifically, we propose the following 2-step component attribution process:
CA Training. Identify the products reviewed by the accounts controlled by each
fraudster W ∈ FW. For each such product, create a review instance that consist of
all the reviews written by the accounts controlled by W for A. Thus, each review
instance contains only (but all) the reviews written from the accounts controlled by
a single fraudster, for a single product. Extract stylometry features from each review
instance of each fraudster, including character count, average number of characters
per word, and frequencies of letters, uppercase letters, special characters, punctuation
marks, digits, numbers, top letter digrams, trigrams, part of speech (POS) tags, POS
digrams, POS trigrams, word digrams, word trigrams and of misspelled words. Train
a supervised learning algorithm on these features, that associates the feature values
of each review instance to the fraudster who created it.
Attribution. Let C denote the set of components returned by MCDense for a product
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Algorithm 4 Dolos pseudocode. Given a set of crowdsourcing
sites and peer-review site products, identify prolific fraudsters, ac-
counts they control and targeted search rank fraud apps.
Input: Prod[ ] Products : monitored products
site[ ] crowdSites : monitored sites
int φ : threshold account number signal expertise
Output: < F, Acc >[ ] fraudsters : detected fraud
Prod[ ] fraudProd : detected fraud products
1. Dolos (){
2. while (true) do
3. 〈 F, Acc 〉[ ] fraud := FPC.getSeeds(crowdSites);
4. candidates.add(fraud); CA.train(candidates);
5. for each prod in Products do
6. C := MCDense.getComponents(prod);
7. if (C.size 6= 0) then fraudProd.add(prod);
8. for each c in C do
9. F f := CA.attribute(c, candidates);
10. UserAcc a := candidates.getAccounts(f);
11. a.add(c.accounts);
12. for each 〈 f, a 〉 in candidates do
13. if (a.size ≥ φ) then
14. fraudsters.add(〈 f, a 〉);
15. candidates.remove(〈 f, a 〉); }
A. For each component C ∈ C, group all the reviews written by the accounts in C
for product A, into a review instance, r. Extract r’s stylometry features and use
the trained classifier to determine the probability that r was authored by each of the
fraudsters in FW. Output the identity of the fraudster with the highest probability
of having authored r.
6.5.4 Putting It All Together
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode of Dolos. Dolos takes as input a list of crowd-
sourcing sites and a list of products, and generates a list of identified prolific fraudsters
and accounts that they are suspected to control in the online service, along with a
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list of the products on which they have performed search rank fraud.
Dolos uses FPC (see Section 6.4.3) to identify a fresh set of seed fraud from
crowdsourcing sites, that consists of a new set of crowdsourcing site workers F, along
with a set of user accounts Acc that each worker controls in the peer-review site
(Algorithm 4, line 3). It then adds this seed information to the set of candidate fraud
workers and uses it to re-train the component attribution (CA) module (line 4).
For each product received in its input (line 5), Dolos uses MCDense to find the
densely connected components of its co-review graph (line 6). If it finds at least one
such component, it adds the product to the list of products targeted by search rank
fraud (line 7), then, for each component, it uses the trained CA module to attribute
the accounts in the component (line 9), and adds the accounts to the list of accounts
controlled by the identified fraud worker (lines 10-11). At the end of this process,
Dolos plucks the expert fraud workers (i.e., who now control more than the threshold
φ user accounts) and adds them to the list of fraudsters that it outputs (lines 12-15).
Dolos repeats the above steps each time FPC identifies more seed ground truth
data (line 2).
6.6 Fraud De-Anonymization Oracles
We leverage the observation that fraud workers know the user accounts that they
control, to introduce a novel approach to validate fraud de-anonymization solutions.
The protocol consists of 2 main interaction steps. In the first step, we ask each
participant, i.e., recruited human fraud worker, to reveal m user accounts that they
control in Google Play, by sending their Google e-mail addresses associated with these
accounts. We then use a depth-2 breath first search approach to collect (1) all the
apps reviewed by the m accounts and (2) all the reviewers of these apps. We apply
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Figure 6.10: Anonymized screenshots of 3 questionnaire pages, for accounts (left)
revealed in step 1 to be controlled by the participant, (center) known not to be
controlled, and (right) suspected by our fraud detection module to be controlled by
the participant.
a fraud de-anonymization solution to identify n new, candidate accounts, i.e., other
Google Play accounts suspected to be controlled by the same participant.
For the second interaction step, we have designed a questionnaire that asks the
participant to confirm if they control each of these n candidate accounts, see Fig-
ure 6.10. Specifically, for each account, we show the account’s profile photo and
name, and ask the participant if they control the account. We provide 3 options,
“Yes”, “No” and “I don’t remember”.
Participant validation. We have developed the following tests to validate partici-
pant attention and honesty:
• Attention check. In addition to the n candidate accounts, we add to the
questionnaire q other test accounts, for which we know the answer: (1) accounts
that we know that the participant controls, i.e., picked randomly from among the m
accounts revealed in the first step, and (2) accounts that we know that the participant
does not control, i.e., accounts that have at least 20 followers and significant other
activities in Google Plus (posting photos, videos). We present the questions for the
n+ q candidate and test accounts, in randomized order.
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Figure 6.11: Results of data validated by 16 human fraud worker participants. We
achieved an overall precision of 91%.
• E-mail knowledge. Each Google Play account A has an associated e-mail
address E. Given E, one can easily retrieve the account A. However, E is not public,
and, given only knowledge of A, one cannot find E. We leverage this observation
to ask each participant to reveal the e-mail address E of each Google Play account
A that they claim to control. We use E to find the corresponding account A′. The
participant fails this test if A′ does not exist or A′ 6= A.
• E-mail based validation. To verify ownership of claimed accounts, we send
the questionnaire to one of the m e-mail addresses revealed in the first step (randomly
chosen).
• Token and e-mail based validation. To verify ownership of accounts con-
firmed in the questionnaire, we choose randomly one of the n accounts confirmed, and
send to its corresponding e-mail address, a random, 6 character token. The accounts
verify iff. the participant can reproduce the token.
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6.7 User Study
We have recruited 16 fraud workers from India (4), Bangladesh (4), UK (2), Egypt
(2), USA (1), Pakistan (1), Indonesia (1), and Morocco (1), 12 male and 4 female,
who claimed to control between 40 to 500 accounts (M=211, SD=166). We have
used these participants to evaluate the performance of our algorithm. We have set
m=10, n=5 and q=5, thus each participant reveals 10 accounts controlled in Google
Play, then further confirms or denies control of 5 other detected accounts, and 5 test
accounts. We have used the 10 accounts revealed by each participant in the first step,
to collect (via BFS) 718 apps, 265,724 reviewers and 341,993 reviews in total. We
collected up to 175 apps, 37,056 reviews and 22,848 reviewers from a single worker.
The participation incentive was set to $10 for each participant.
Ethical considerations. We have developed IRB-approved protocols to ethically
interact with participants and collect data. We have not asked the participants to
post any fraud on the online service. We restricted the volatile handling of emails
and photos of accounts revealed by participants, to the validation process. We have
immediately discarded them after validation. We believe that this information cannot
be used to personally identify fraudsters: recruited fraudsters control between 40-500
accounts each (M=211, SD=166) thus any such account is unlikely to contain PII.
Further, since we do not preserve these emails and photos, their handling does not
fall within the PII definition of NIST SP 800-122. Under GDPR, the use of emails
and photos without context, e.g., name or personal identification number, is not
considered to be “personal information”.
6.7.1 Results
Figure 6.11 shows that 15 of the 16 participants have provided correct responses to all
5 test accounts. The remaining participant answered “I don’t remember” for a single
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test account, known not to be controlled by the participant. We have thus decided to
keep the data from all participants. Further, for participants 2 and 4, we found less
than 5 suspected accounts (i.e., 4 and 3 respectively).
We observe that 10 out of 16 participants have confirmed control (and passed
our verification) of all proposed accounts. 5 participants confirmed control of 4 out
of 5 recommended accounts and 1 participant confirmed control of only 3 accounts
out of 5 recommended accounts. Our algorithm’s precision ( TP
TP+FP
, where TP is
the number of true positives and FP is the number of false positives) is thus 91%,
i.e., 7 unconfirmed accounts among 77 predicted. We note that for 3 out of the 7
unconfirmed accounts, the participants did not remember if they control them or not.
6.8 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we compare the results ofDolos on fraud and honest apps, evaluate its
de-anonymization accuracy, and present its results on 13,087 apps. Further, we com-
pare MCDense with adapted dense sub-graph detection and loopy belief propagation
solutions.
6.8.1 Fraud vs. Honest Apps
We evaluate the ability ofDolos to discern differences between fraudulent and honest
apps. For this, we have first selected 925 candidate apps from the longitudinal app set,
that have been developed by Google designated “top developers”. We have filtered
the apps flagged by VirusTotal. We have manually investigated the remaining apps,
and selected a set of 219 apps that (i) have more than 10 reviews and (ii) were
developed by reputable media outlets (e.g., Google, PBS, Yahoo, Expedia, NBC) or
have an associated business model (e.g., fitness trackers). We have collected 38,224
reviews and their associate user accounts from these apps.
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Figure 6.12: MCDense: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) over 640 fraud, 219
honest, and 1,056 suspicious “wild” apps, of per-app (a) number of components of
at least 5 accounts, (b) maximum density of an identified component and (c) size of
densest component. (a) MCDense found at least 1 dense component in all the fraud
apps. 70% of the honest apps had no component. (b) 94.4% of the fraud apps have a
component with density exceeding 75%. Only 30% of the honest apps have a cluster
with density larger than 0. 231 (21.87%) of the suspicious wild apps have at least 1
component with density 1. (c) 80% of the fraud apps vs. only 7% of the honest apps,
have a densest component with more than 10 nodes. The largest densest component
of a fraud app had 220 accounts, of a wild app had 90 accounts, and of an honest app
had 21 accounts. We observe significant differences between fraud and honest apps.
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Figure 6.12(a) compares the CDF of the number of components (of at least 5
accounts) found by MCDense per each of the 640 fraud apps vs. the 219 honest
apps. MCDense found that all the fraud apps had at least 1 component, however,
70% of the honest apps had no component. The maximum number of components
found for fraud apps is 19 vs. 4 for honest apps. Figure 6.12(b) compares the CDF of
the maximum edge density (ratio of number of edges to maximum number of edges
possible) of a component identified by MCDense per fraud vs. honest apps. 94.4%
of fraud apps have density more than 75% while only 30% of the honest apps have a
cluster with density larger than 0. The increase is slow, with 90% of the honest apps
having clusters with density of 60% or below. Figure 6.12(c) compares the CDF of
the size of the per-app densest component found for fraud vs. honest apps. 80% of
the fraud apps vs. only 7% of the honest apps, have a densest component with more
than 10 nodes. The largest, densest component has 220 accounts for a fraud app,
and 21 accounts for an honest app. We have manually analyzed the largest, densest
components found by MCDense for the honest apps and found that they occur for
users who review popular apps such as the Google, Yahoo or Facebook clients, and
users who share interests in, e.g., social apps or games.
6.8.2 De-Anonymization Performance
We have implemented the CA module using a combination of JStylo [JSt] and su-
pervised learning algorithms. We have collected the 111,714 reviews posted from
the 2,664 attributed, fraudster controlled user accounts of § 6.4.3. The reviews were
posted for 2,175 apps. We have grouped these reviews into instances, and we have fil-
tered out those with less than 5 reviews. The remaining total is 6,046 instances, 40 to
1,664 per fraudster. Figure 6.13(a) shows their distribution among the 23 fraudsters
who authored them.
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Algo Top 1 (TPR) Top 3 Top 5
k-NN (IBK) 1608 (95.0%) 1645 1646
RF (Random Forest) 1487 (87.9%) 1625 1673
DT (Decision Tree) 1126 (66.5%) 1391 1455
SVM 1101 65% 1195 1214
NB (Naive Bayes) 569 36.5% 874 1067
SMO 1117 68.3% 1434 1548
Table 6.2: Dolos attribution performance for the 1,690 instances of the 640 fraud
apps. k-NN achieved the best performance: It correctly identifies the workers respon-
sible for 95% (1608) of the instances. The Random Forest (RF) classifier however
identifies the correct worker among the top 5 most likely authors, in 98.9% of the
instances.
We have evaluated the performance of Dolos (MCDense + CA) using a leave-
one-out cross validation process over the 640 fraud apps (and their 1,690 review
instances). Specifically, for each app A, CA trains a supervised learning algorithm
on all the review instances minus the instances that were written for A. Dolos then
converts each fraud component returned by MCDense for A into a review instance,
that contains the reviews written by its accounts for A. It then extracts stylometric
features of this instance with JStylo [JSt], then uses the trained CA to determine the
workers most likely to have authored it. Thus, Dolos trains a different classifier for
each test app.
We have used several supervised learning algorithms, including k-nearest neigh-
bors (k-NN), Random Forest (RF), Decision Trees (DT), Naive Bayes (NB), Support
Vector Machine (SVM), and Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO).
Instance level performance. Table 6.2 shows the number of instances correctly
attributed by Dolos (out of the 1,690 instances of the 640 fraud apps) and cor-
responding true positive rate, as well as the number of instances where the correct
worker is among Dolos’ top 3 and top 5 options. k-NN achieved the best perfor-
mance, correctly identifying the workers responsible for posting 95% of the instances.
We observe that k-NN correctly predicts the authors of 95% of the instances. Fig-
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Figure 6.13: (a) Number of review instances collected from each of the 23 fraudster.
Each review instance has at least 5 reviews, written by the accounts controlled by
a single fraudster, for a single app. (b) Dolos per-worker attribution precision and
recall, over the 1,690 review instances of 640 fraud apps, exceed 87% for 21 out of the
23 fraudsters.
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Algo 1 worker 50%-recall 70%-recall 90%-recall
RF 624 622 537 465
SVM 574 517 325 284
k-NN 625 625 585 557
DT 554 510 315 264
NB 379 256 128 125
SMO 533 492 318 265
Table 6.3: Dolos app level recall: the number of apps for which Dolos has a recall
value of at least 50%, 70% and 90%. k-NN identifies at least one worker for 97.5% of
the 640 fraud apps, and 90% of the workers of each of 557 (87%) of the apps.
Algo 50%-prec 70%-prec 90%-prec
RF 573 434 359
SVM 460 249 209
k-NN 578 483 444
DT 446 260 208
NB 217 100 99
SMO 436 264 212
Table 6.4: App level precision: the number of apps where its precision is at least 50%,
70% and 90%. The precision of Dolos when using k-NN exceeds 90% for 69% of the
fraud apps.
ure 6.13(b) zooms into per-fraudster precision and recall, showing the ability ofDolos
to identify the instances and only the instances of each of the 23 workers. For 21 out
of 23 workers, the Dolos precision and recall both exceed 87%.
App level performance. Table 6.3 shows that when using k-NN, Dolos correctly
identified at least 1 worker per app, for 97.5% of the fraud apps, and identified at
least 90% of the workers in each of 87% of the fraud apps. Table 6.4 shows that the
precision of Dolos in identifying an app’s workers exceeds 90% for 69% of the apps.
Developer tailored search rank fraud. Upon closer inspection of the Dolos
identified clusters, we found numerous cases of clusters consisting of user accounts
who reviewed almost exclusively apps created by a single developer. We conjecture
that those user accounts were created with the specific goal to review the apps of the
developer, e.g., by the developer or their employees.
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6.8.3 Dolos in the Wild
To understand how Dolos will perform in real life, we have randomly selected 13,087
apps from Google Play, developed by 9,430 distinct developers. We monitored these
apps over more than 6 months, and recorded their changes once every 2 days. This
enabled us to collect up to 7,688 reviews per app, exceeding Google’s one shot limit of
4,000 reviews. We collected the data of the 586,381 distinct reviewers of these apps,
and built their co-activity graphs.
MCDense found at least 1 dense component of at least 5 accounts in 1,056 of the
13,087 apps (8%). Figure 6.12 compares the results of MCDense on the 1,056 apps,
with those for the fraud and honest apps. The CDF of the number of components
found by MCDense for these “wild” apps is closer to that of the fraud apps than
to the honest apps: up to 19 components per app, see Figure 6.12(a). The CDF of
the maximum density of per app components reveals that 231 of the 1,056 apps (or
21.87%) had at least 1 component with edge density 1 (complete sub-graphs). The
CDF of the size of the densest components (Figure 6.12(c)) found per each of the
wild apps shows that similar to the 640 fraud apps, few of these apps have only 0 size
densest components. The largest component found by MCDense for these apps has
90 accounts.
Validation of fraud suspicions. Upon close inspection of the 231 apps that had
at least 1 component with edge density of 1 (i.e., clique), we found the following
further evidence of suspicious fraud being perpetrated. (1) Targeted by known
fraudsters: 169 of the 231 apps had received reviews from the 23 known fraudsters
(§ 6.4.3). One app had received reviews from 10 of the fraudsters. (2) Review
duplicates: 223 out of the 231 apps have received 10,563 duplicate reviews (that
replicate the text of reviews posted for the same app, from a different account), or
25.55% of their total 41,339 reviews. One app alone has 1,274 duplicate reviews, out
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Algorithm 5 DSG: Densest Sub-Graph algorithm.
Input: G = (V, E): input graph
n := |V |
Output: SG: optimum subgraph
1. Graph H := G;
2. double r := ρD(H); # holds max density
3. Graph SG := G
4. for i := 2 to n do
5. v := least connected node of H ;
6. H := H - {v}
7. if (ρD(H) > r) then
8. SG := H;
9. r := ρD(H);
10. end if
11. end for
12. return SG;
of a total of 4,251 reviews. (3) Fraud re-posters: our longitudinal monitoring of
apps enabled us to detect fraud re-posters, accounts who re-post their reviews, hours
to days after Google Play filters them out. One of the 231 apps received 37 fraud
re-posts, from the same user account.
6.8.4 MCDense Evaluation
MCDense Competitors
We adapt two existing solutions to the fraud-component detection problem and com-
pare them against MCDense.
DSG: Adapted Densest SubGraph approach. We first compare MCDense
against DSG, a densest subgraph approach that we adapt based on [Tso15]. DSG,
whose pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 5, iteratively identifies multiple dense sub-
graphs of an app’s co-activity graph G = (U,E), each suspected to belong to a
different worker. DSG peels off nodes of G until it runs out of nodes (lines 4-11).
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During each “peeling” step, it removes the node that is least connected to the other
nodes (lines 5-6). After removing the node, the algorithm computes and saves the
density of the resulting subgraph (lines 7-10). The algorithm returns the subgraph
with the highest density. We use the triangle density definition proposed in [Tso15],
ρD =
t(U)
|U |
, where t(U) is the number of triangles formed by the vertices in U . DSG
uses this greedy strategy iteratively: once it finds the densest subgraph D of G, DSG
repeats the process, to find the densest subgraph in G−D. The nodes in each iden-
tified densest subgraph are well connected among themselves, but not well connected
to the nodes in the previously identified subgraphs.
LBP: Adapted Loopy Belief Propagation approach. We adapt a Loopy Belief
Propagation approach [ACF13a] to formulate the problem of detecting fraudulent
user accounts as a network classification task on G. The resulting algorithm, LBP,
assigns labels to the user account nodes of the co-activity graph. Specifically, the
graph is modeled as a pairwise Markov Random Field (MRF) [YFW03], where each
user account node has a random variable Yi that can take values from the user class
domain L = {honest, fraud} (i.e., the label space), encoding the belief that the node
is fraudulent.
In MRFs, the memoryless Markov property implies that in the undirected network,
the label of a node only depends on its neighbors. Then, the overall joint probability
distribution is written as the normalized product of factors associated with the nodes
and edges [KF09]: P(y) = 1
Z
∏
Yi∈U
φi(yi)
∏
(Yi,Yj ,wij)∈Ew
ψwij(yi, yj), where y represents
an assignment of labels to each of the nodes in U , and Z is the normalization constant.
φ : L → R+ represents the “prior probability” for each node, and ψw : L × L → R+
are the “compatibility potentials”.
We adapt the priors φi and compatibility potentials ψij to capture the behavioral
dynamics of the users in the Google Play review ecosystem. We have experimented
with two types of priors. First, the priors are all 1/2, modeling the lack of knowledge
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Figure 6.14: Illustration of p-coverage and p-SCC scores that measure the quality
of detected community partitions (shown as ovals). (a)Graph with two workers:
one controls the square nodes and one the round nodes. The partition provides
(50%,100%)-coverage and (50%,100%)-SCC. (b) Graph with a single worker (circles).
p-coverage 6= p-SCC: the partition provides (100%,80%)-coverage but only (0%,80%)-
SCC.
on the status of nodes/accounts. Second, we chose the prior of a user node ui having
label honest to be inversely proportional to the average weight of ui’s edges, i.e.,
φi(honest) =
|N(ui)|∑
j∈N(ui)
wij
; φi(fraud) = 1 − φi(honest). The results shown are over
the latter approach, which proved to be more effective.
Further, the compatibility potentials ψij(yi, yj), capture the likelihood of a node ui
with assigned label yi to be neighbor of a node uj with label yj, when ui and uj have
a link of weight w between them. We defined ψij(yi, yj) as follows. If ui is honest,
ψij(yi, yj) is independent of wij . However, when ui is “fraud” ψij(yi, yj) depends on
wij: ψij(yi = “fraud
′′, yj = “honest
′′) = δlogwij decreases exponentially with wij,
while ψij(yi = “fraud
′′, yj = “fraud
′′) = 1− δlogwij increases, where δ in (0, 1).
Evaluation Scores
To evaluate MCDense, we introduce two coverage scores. LetRA(A) = {a1, .., ak} de-
note the set of user accounts who reviewed product A. Given the set S = {W1, ..,Ww}
of workers who wrote fake reviews for A, let Wi = {ai1 , .., aij} denote the accounts
in RA(A) that are controlled by worker Wi, i = [w]. Then, a partition of RA(A)
is a set of sets {P1, .., Pp}, such that each account ai ∈ RA(A), i = [k], belongs to
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Figure 6.15: Comparison of MCDense and DSG distribution of coverage score and
distribution of SCC score over 640 fraud apps. The y axis shows the p1 value, and the
x axis shows the number of apps for which MCDense and DSG achieve that p1 value,
when (a,b) p2 = 50%, (c,d) p2 = 80%, and (e,f) p2 = 90%. MCDense consistently
outperforms DSG as it provides (a) (90%+, 50%)-coverage for 537 (83%) of the apps
vs. DSG’s 506 apps, and (b) (90%+, 50%)-SCC for 490 (75%) of the apps, vs DSG’s
only 383 apps, and (e) (90%+, 90%)-coverage for 415 (65%) of the apps vs. DSG’s
245 apps, and (f) (90%+, 90%)-SCC for 381 of the apps, vs. DSG’s 188 apps, which
is half of MCDense.
exactly one of these sets. Let H = RA(A) \∪i=[w]Wi, be A’s “honest” reviewers, i.e.,
accounts not known to be controlled by a worker. The set {W1, ..,Ww, H}, forms a
partition of RA(A).
Let C = {C1, .., Cc, HC} be the partition of RA(A) of the user accounts who
reviewed an app A, returned by a fraud-component detection algorithm: ∀ai, aj ∈ Cl,
are considered to be controlled by the same worker, and HC is the set of accounts
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considered to be honest. To quantify how well the partition C has detected the worker
accounts W1, ..,Ww who targeted A, we propose the coverage measure of worker Wi ∈
S as follows:
Definition 6.8.1 (Coverage) The coverage of worker Wi ∈ S by a partition C is
covi(C) =
|Wi∩(C1∪..∪Cc)|
|Wi|
. Given p ∈ [0, 1], we say that Wi is “p-covered” by C if
covi(C) ≥ p. Then, we say that partition C provides a (p1, p2)-coverage of the worker
set S, if p1 percent of the workers in S are p2-covered by C.
Further, we introduce the single component coverage (SCC) of a worker Wi ∈ S by a
partition C:
Definition 6.8.2 (Single Component Coverage - SCC) The single component cover-
age of a worker Wi ∈ S by a partition C = {C1, .., Cc} is SCCi(C) = maxj=[c]
|Wi∩Cj |
|Wi|
.
Given p ∈ [0, 1], we say that Wi is “p-single component covered” (or p-SCC) by C if
SCCi(C) ≥ p. We say that partition C provides a (p1, p2)-SCC of the worker set S,
if p1 percent of the workers in S are p2-SCC by C.
p-SCC is about precision: a worker is p-single component covered by Alg only if
at least p percent of its accounts belong to a single component discovered by Alg. In
contrast, a worker is p-covered if p percent of its accounts belong to any component
returned by Alg. As such, p-SCC will always be at most equal to p-coverage. Fig-
ure 6.14 illustrates the p-coverage and p-SCC measures on the co-activity graphs of
two apps.
MCDense vs. DSG
Figure 6.15 compares MCDense and DSG in terms of their distributions of the p-
coverage and p-SCC scores, over the 640 fraud apps. MCDense consistently outper-
forms DSG. For instance, Figure 6.15(a) shows that 537 apps are at least (90%+,
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50%)-covered by MCDense, while only 507 apps achieve the same coverage for DSG.
The difference is even higher for the p-SCC score: Figure 6.15(b) shows that 490
apps (75%) are at least (90%+, 50%)-SCC by MCDense, that is, at least 50% of
the accounts controlled by 90% of the workers belong to only one of the components
returned by MCDense. In contrast, only 383 apps are at least (90%+, 50%)-SCC by
DSG.
The difference between MCDense and DSG becomes more pronounced as p2 in-
creases to 80% and 90%. For instance, Figure 6.15(c) shows that 438 apps are at
least (90%+, 80%)-covered by MCDense, while only 359 apps achieve the same cov-
erage for DSG. Figure 6.15(d) compares the p-SCC score: 409 apps (63%) are at
least (90%+, 80%)-SCC by MCDense compared to only 225 apps that are at least
(90%+, 80%)-SCC by DSG. Figure 6.15(e) shows that 415 apps are at least (90%+,
90%)-covered by MCDense, while only 245 apps achieve the same coverage for DSG.
Figure 6.15(f) shows the p-SCC score: 381 apps (59%) are at least (90%+, 90%)-SCC
by MCDense, but only less than half (188 apps) are at least (90%+, 90%)-SCC by
DSG.
LBP Performance
Since LBP has no information (in the form of priors) about the accounts controlled
by workers, we use it to determine which accounts are suspected of being controlled
by a worker, as those whose final fraud belief exceeds 0.5. Figure 6.16 shows the box
and whiskers plot of the precision and recall values of LBP, when δ ranges from 0.1
to 0.9. We observe that recall in this case is equivalent to our p-coverage score. In
addition to precision and recall, we also use the notion of “prevalence”: the ratio
of the number of fraud labeled accounts to the total number of the app’s accounts.
This enables us to determine when LBP labels all the accounts as fraudulent. LBP
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Figure 6.16: LBP identification of fraudulent accounts: precision, recall and preva-
lence, when δ = [0.1..0.9]. LBP achieves best performance when δ = 0.7, with a
median precision of 69% and recall of 98%; the median prevalence of 82% shows that
these values are not achieved by labeling all the accounts as fraudulent.
achieves the best performance when δ = 0.7, with an average per-app recall exceeding
95%.
Thus, while LBP can be used to detect fake reviews, it cannot determine if all
accounts detected as fraudulent are controlled by a single or multiple workers.
6.9 Research Contributions Acknowledgment
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the contributions of my co-authors; Nestor Hernandez,
Dr. Duen Horng Chau and my supervisor Dr. Bogdan Carbunar for their roles in the
teamwork. Thanks to Nestor for adapting and evaluating loopy believe propagation
it on our ground truth data to the fraud de-anonymization problem. My special
gratitude goes to Dr. Carbunar and Dr. Chau for providing critical feedback to
shape the research, analysis, and manuscript.
166
6.10 Summary
We introduced the fraud de-anonymization problem for search rank fraud in online
services. We have collected fraud data from crowdsourcing sites and the Google Play
store, and we have performed user studies with crowdsourcing fraudsters. We have
proposed Dolos, a fraud de-anonymization system. Dolos correctly attributed 95%
of the fraud detected for 640 Google Play apps, and identified at least 90% of the
workers who promoted each of 87% of these apps. Dolos identified 1,056 out of
13,087 monitored Google Play apps, to have suspicious reviewer groups, and revealed
a suite of observed fraud behaviors. Dolos significantly outperforms adapted dense
subgraph detection and loopy belief propagation competitors, in two coverage scores
that we have developed.
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CHAPTER 7
A Study of Crowdsourced Review Fraud
7.1 Introduction
Popular online services that provide millions of users with access to products, news,
social relationships and peer-opinions, are besieged by cyberfraudsters, who skew
public opinion and bias product reputation and popularity. In search rank fraud
campaigns, cyberfraudsters leverage user accounts that they control on the online
service, to fraudulently promote products e.g., through fake reviews, installs, and
likes. Cyberfraudsters often act as guns-for-hire, i.e., connect with product developers
through specialized [TSM16, RL16, AV16, AS16, AR16] or general crowdsourcing
sites [Fiv, Upw, Fre].
Commercial sites employ proprietary solutions to detect and filter fraud [Cip16,
Per16, MVLG13]. Similarly, a substantial body of academic research has focused on
the detection aspect of the fraud problem. This work is built on assumptions about
the adversarial behaviors and capabilities of search rank fraud workers, which are
based on intuition, extracted from small datasets of fraud, or revealed by collabora-
tors within commercial sites. This scarcity of ground truth knowledge of search rank
fraud adversaries stems in part from the ethical and terms-of-service concerns associ-
ated with requiring recruited participants to post fraudulent information on existing
products hosted on peer-opinion sites, e.g., [DCFJ+14, SWE+13, GHP+12, OCCH11].
In this paper we study the search rank fraud ecosystem that targets peer-opinion
sites, in particular, Google Play. The diversity, responsiveness and revealed prof-
itability of this ecosystem, suggest an inaccurate and incomplete understanding of
the capabilities, behaviors and strategies of fraud workers, including their strategies
to avoid detection.
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Figure 7.1: Photo taken by fraud worker who participated in our study, with the
premises and (anonymized) employees of his business. Photo reproduced with per-
mission from the participant.
The goal of this paper is to determine which existing assumptions still hold,
whether fraudsters have developed fraud detection strategies to avoid being iden-
tified by the peer-opinion site, to determine the capabilities, behaviors and strategies
employed by fraudsters, and identify weakness that can be exploited by online systems
and researchers, to identify and prevent fraud.
We survey adversarial assumptions made in academic research and introduce new
hypotheses on capabilities, behaviors and strategies employed by search rank fraud
adversaries. We develop questions that seek to evaluate the capabilities of search
rank fraud workers and to confirm each of the previously identified assumptions,
concerning e.g., fraud account life-cycle (e.g., creation, maintenance, closure), review
creation and posting.
We first surveyed more than 80 top-tier research papers that study fraud and
abuse in online systems and extracted key assumptions made when designing detec-
tion algorithms. We organize the resulting assumptions based on several categories:
fraudster capabilities, review burstiness, review plagiarism, camouflage strategies,
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collaboration, lockstep behaviors, and automation. Further, based on pilot studies
(see below) and questions raised during interviews with fraudsters, we introduce sev-
eral new high-level assumptions that concern credential and device usage, rehiring,
account blending, and self-promotion.
We have developed a questionnaire that consists of more than 100 open ended
questions, designed to investigate each of the existing and newly proposed assump-
tions. We have recruited 18 fraud workers from several sites (Facebook, Upwork,
Fiverr, Zeerk and Peopleperhour) and conducted semi-structured interviews to collect
answers to our questions. Figure 7.1 shows an anonymized snapshot of the employees
of one of the recruited participants.
7.2 Background and Model
We consider an ecosystem that consists of the Google Play app market, and crowd-
sourcing sites. The app market hosts accounts for apps, developers and users. Devel-
opers use their accounts to host apps on the market, and upload information about
them.
User accounts and validation: User accounts enable app market users to es-
tablish an online identity. Sites like Google increasingly pressure users into validating
their accounts, e.g., by providing the calling number of a phone that they control.
User then need to prove control of the device, e.g., by retrieving a code sent through
SMS to that number.
App reviews. Users search for and install apps. Subsequently, they can post
reviews for these apps, from any of her registered devices. A review consists of a
star rating (1-5) and text, and also includes the profile photo and name of the user
account from which it was posted. Users can log in multiple Google accounts from
any one device. Users are then able to post reviews for an app, from all the accounts
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logged in on the device where the app was installed, since the Google Play Store
application allows them to switch back and forth between accounts. Therefore, a
user can download an application once and review it as many times as the number of
accounts she has logged in on the device.
In Google Play, some reviews are posted under “A Google User” while others
under the account’s name. Our experiments have shown that “A Google User” is
someone who has a user id but has not activated his Google Plus account. Once the
person activates her Google Plus profile, “A Google User” changes to the account’s
username the person used for her gmail account.
Search rank fraud and crowdsourcing. The search rank of Google Play apps
has significant impact on the returns made by their developers. While the algorithm
for computing the search rank of an app is kept secret, it is well known (e.g., [Ank13])
that it heavily depends on features such as the product’s number of reviews and
average rating. This knowledge has enabled a black market for search rank fraud.
Specialized fraud workers (also referred to as fraudsters) connect with app developers
to artificially boost the rank of their apps, by installing their apps, then posting fake
reviews.
Fraudulent developers have incentives to maximize their subject’s visibility via
review manipulation for which they hire fraudsters. Thus, we also refer to developers
as employers. Developers and fraudsters connect through a variety of sites, that
range from general-purpose crowdsourcing sites [Fiv, Upw, Fre] and specialized fraud
sites [TSM16, RL16, AV16, AS16, AR16], to social networks (e.g., Facebook groups).
Developers either post app search optimization (ASO) jobs on which fraud workers
can bid, or they recruit directly fraudsters who advertise on such sites.
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7.3 Fraudster Assumptions
We first survey the fraudster assumptions made in more than 80 research papers.
Second, we introduce several new high-level assumptions based on prior experience
and pilot studies.
7.3.1 Survey of Previous Assumptions
We surveyed more than 80 top-tier research papers that study fraud and abuse in
online systems and extracted key “previous assumptions” (PA) made when designing
detection algorithms.
PA.1. Fraud Expertise, Organic Fraud: Crowdsourcing sites host workers who
are search rank fraud experts, e.g. who control hundreds of user accounts, participate
in many search rank fraud jobs, and are very active [YA15b, BXG+13, MKL+13a,
SLK15, XZLW16, LCNK17, MLG12, XZ14, LFW+17a, FLCS15]. Conversely, prod-
uct developers may also hire organic fraud workers, i.e., real, non-Sybil user account
owners, via specialized crowdsourcing websites such as Microworkers or RapidWork-
ers [KCS18]. They may also hire “leader” workers who organize many such organic
fraud workers to participate in the search rank fraud campaign [ZXL+18].
PA.2. Review Burstiness: Crowdsourced reviews are posted in a bursty fashion.
Genuine reviews are likely to be posted over a reasonable long timeframe, whereas
fake reviews are posted within a very short burst [FML+13a, HTS16, LFW+17a,
HSB+15, BSLL+16a, XZLW16, Xu13, GGF14, BXG+13, KCA17, LNJ+10, MVLG13,
MKL+13a, KCS18, LCNK17, YKA16, FLCS15, DCFJ+14, XWLY12].
PA.3. Lockstep Behaviors: Fraudsters synchronize the activities of their accounts:
They use their accounts to target the same product, at the same time, and in
the same order [SMJ+15, TZX+15, YKA16, XZ15b, JCB+14, SLK15, XZ14, XZ15a,
LFW+17a].
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PA.4. Fraud Time Points: Product developers have specific points where they
recruit fraudsters:
• PA.4.1. Early Bird Fraud: Fraudsters are hired early in the lifetime of a
product, in order to be among its first reviewers and control its sentiment [FML+13a,
YKA16, LNJ+10, MKL+13a, MLG12, Xu13, KM16].
• PA.4.2. Proactive Fraud: Developers hire fraudsters to proactively inject
deceptive reviews and maintain a threshold average rating or popularity, or to
reduce the impact of truthful feedback [KM16].
PA.5. Camouflage Strategies: Fraudsters employ a range of methods to avoid
detection [ACF13a, HSB+16b, RA15b, PCWF07, RA15b, DCFJ+14]:
• PA.5.1. Noisy Reviews: Fraudsters also write genuine reviews, for products
for which they have not been hired [ACF13a, FML+13a, WXLY11, KCS18,
RA15b, DCFJ+14].
• PA.5.2. IP Rotation: Fraudsters change IP addresses frequently when post-
ing reviews to thwart the review filter system of the online service [LCM+15,
TMG+13].
• PA.5.3. Emulators: Fraudsters prefer to use mobile device emulators running
on PCs instead of actual mobile devices, to post fake reviews [Xu13, LCM+15,
SMJ+15].
• PA.5.4. Hijacked Accounts: Some fraudsters use hijacked accounts from
honest users, and then the camouflage is indeed organic and they have realistic
patterns of camouflage essentially similar to that of honest users [WXLY11,
HSB+16b].
• PA.5.5. Upvoting: Fraud and accomplice: Fraudsters create two types
of accounts, “fraud” and “accomplice”. Fraud accounts are used to post the
actual fraud, while the accomplice accounts boost the fraud’s feedback rat-
ing [PCWF07].
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PA.6. Review Writing: Previous work makes several assumptions about review
writing strategies and techniques:
• PA.6.1. Review plagiarism: Fraudsters tend to reuse common linguistic pat-
terns and copy reviews across similar products since they are not familiar with
the item and crafting new reviews is time consuming [MKL+13a, FML+13a,
Xu13, HTS16, LNJ+10, SE15, MVLG13, XZ15b, KCS18, LCNK17, RA15b,
YA15b, MLG12, KCA17].
• PA.6.2. Short Reviews:
Fake reviews are short [KCA17, MVLG13, JL07, KCS18, FML+13a, LCNK17].
• PA.6.3. 1st person pronouns: Crowdsourcing workers try to convey the
impression that they have actually used the product by writing reviews in first
person [KCA17, RA15b, KCLS17].
PA.7. Ratings: Previous work has made two assumptions about the ratings of fake
reviews.
• PA.7.1. Extreme Ratings: Fraudsters are likely to give extreme ratings
either to promote or demote a product (1 star or 5 star) [MKL+13a, ACF13a,
KCA17, MVLG13, KCS18, RA15b, MLG12, XZ14, XZ15a].
• PA.7.2. Rating Deviation: Ratings by spammers often deviate from the
average ratings given by other reviewers [MKL+13a, FML+13a, LCM+15,
Xu13, WXLY11, HTS16, FFSG15, LNJ+10, MVLG13, WXLY12, XZ15b, XZ14,
ZXGC13, RA15b, MLG12, XZ15a, KCS18].
PA.8. Collaboration: A fraudster may work with different sets of other fraudsters
on multiple spamming tasks, causing groups sharing some common members [XZ15b,
Xu13, DCFJ+14].
PA.9. Review Bots: Fraudsters use autonomous programs to manage multiple
accounts at once [SMJ+15, DCFJ+14, YVC+17, DCFJ+14].
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PA.10. Account Name Variability: Fraudsters employ limited variability in
naming patterns for the accounts that they control [TMG+13].
PA.11. Singleton Accounts: Targeted products receive many fake reviews posted
by singleton accounts, i.e., who only reviewed that product [MKL+13a, YKA16,
RA15b, SE15, XWLY12].
7.3.2 New Assumptions
Based on pilot studies and questions raised during interviews with fraudsters, we
introduce several new high-level assumptions that we list below.
NA.1. Fraud Team Organization: Fraudsters work in teams and organize to
distribute tasks.
NA.2. User Account Validation: Fraud workers have developed techniques to
validate their user accounts with only a few phone numbers.
NA.3. Mobile Device Types: To save money, fraudsters tend to have cheap,
low-end devices.
NA.4. Devices vs. accounts: The number of devices used for a job is linear in
the number of accounts controlled.
NA.5. Credential Reuse: Memorability affects fraudster choice of user account
names and passwords.
NA.6. Account Blending: Fraudsters use a blend of older, previously used ac-
counts with newly created accounts, in their jobs. This enables them to replenish or
increase their base of accounts controlled, build the reputation of older accounts, and
reduce chances of detection of lockstep behaviors and singleton use.
NA.7. Retention Installs: Fraud workers keep apps that they target, installed on
their devices for a longer time interval, and do not delete them immediately after the
job completion.
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NA.8. Developer-based reviews: Review text can be provided by the developer.
NA.9. Self-promotion: Sybil accounts tend to upvote each other’s reviews on the
online system.
NA.10. Work Verification: Developers verify that recruited fraud workers satisfy
the terms of the job.
NA.11. Fraudster Re-Hires: Developers re-hire successful fraudsters at later
times, e.g., when search rank decreases.
7.4 Fraudster Survey
We have recruited 18 fraud workers from Facebook(9), Upwork(3), Fiverr(3), Zeerk(2),
Peopleperhour(1). We launched the first survey in August 2018, and adopted an incre-
mental payment strategy that consists in paying workers 5 USD for every 15 minutes
of their time. Given the nature of our questions, we conjectured that a cooperating
participant will easily take 45 minutes, and this payment structure is an incentive for
cooperation
We advertised the survey as “Understanding Search Rank Optimization”. We
organized each interview to take place over Skype, to asses the fraudster diligence
to the task and discourage would-be cheaters by increasing the effort to provide a
legitimate response [OK14]. We have audio recorded the interviews and referred to
them later for further analysis.
We converted the assumptions of Section 7.3 into open-ended questions. We do
this because we do not want to influence the participants, the universe of possible
answers is unknown, or there may be more possible answers than we can easily display,
and also to measure qualitative aspects of a fraudster experience in ASO jobs [OK14,
SBN96].
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Considering the sensitivity of the topic in question, we have formulated several
questions in third person to reduce social-desirability bias. For instance, we prefer “Do
you know any developers/employers who ask freelancers to post reviews for recently
launched apps?” to “Have you had a job requesting reviews for recently launched
apps?”. To avoid context switching, we grouped related questions so that participants
can more easily and quickly retrieve related information from memory. Further, to
minimize the effects of leading questions, we formulate them in a fully neutral way
without examples or additional information [OK14]. We list our survey questions
in Appendix 7.8. We have developed our protocols to interact with participants and
collect data in an IRB-approved manner (Approval #: IRB-15-0219@FIU and IRB-
18-0077@FIU).
Ethical considerations. The ability to massively link individual user accounts with
the device types used to post reviews is a sensitive privacy breach. As a consequence,
we have carefully handled all data collected according to GDPR and other privacy
recommendations and good practices. Specifically, we have only used the link between
the user account and the posted review to identify target reviews. With a list of
fraudulent reviews, we have collected the device types used and never link them back
to the user accounts that originated them. Once data was collected, we have deleted
the link between the device types used and reviews and generated statistics that
allowed us to validate our assumptions. We also note that we have not collected any
other information about devices used to post reviews, expect their type.
7.5 Assumption Validation
In the following, we use the interview results and the validation data to evaluate the
fraud assumptions and conjectures from § 7.3.
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Figure 7.2: Venn diagrams showing multiple labels of the participants.
7.5.1 Fraud Types and Organizations
All the 18 participants claimed to be part of organizations dedicated to posting fraud,
for a variety of peer-opinion services, including Google Play. We classify the self-
reported teams into several categories, based on their location (i.e., physical, online),
organization type (hierarchical vs. flat), and the type of fraud (organic vs. inorganic).
Figure 7.2 shows the Venn diagram of the 18 participants grouped according to several
of these categories.
Co-located vs. online. 6 participants claimed to be part of physically co-located
teams, with 5 of them claiming to have brick and mortar offices. 10 participants were
part of strictly online teams, which communicate through messaging apps such as
Facebook and Whatsapp. 2 participants claimed to be part of hybrid teams, both
with co-located and online team members.
Organization structure. The participants described diverse organizational struc-
tures:
• Hierarchical organization. 12 participants claimed a hierarchical structure of
their organizations. 9 participants (P3, P4, P5, P6, P8, P9, P10, P12, P14, P17)
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described specific roles in their organizations, that include job managers, who
interface with the developers and manage work from the marketplace, and team
admins, each organizing multiple review posters. Some of these organizations are
hybrids. For instance, P14 is part of a team of 4 physically co-located members
(no hierarchy), and they manage 30 online team members. P11 has his own
devices and accounts, and also a “friends and family” (FnF) organization. For
instance, P5 has a team of 12 and also a Facebook group with organic users.
P7 has a team of 50 people but also runs ad-hoc campaigns to recruit more
reviewers. Facebook group.
• Organic fraud. 6 participants (P4, P5, P6, P12, P17, P18) claimed to also orga-
nize or be part of online teams of “organic” users, i.e., fraudsters who use their
personal accounts to post fraud. The hierarchy is implicit: the participants is
the team lead, who gets jobs from employers, distributes them to his teams, then
shares the profit. They recruit, organize and sync with organic users through
social media, e.g., dedicated Facebook and Whatsapp groups, and microworker
crowdsourcing sites) .
• Flat organization. 2 participants (P13, P15) claimed to work in teams where
each member controls their own accounts and collaborate on jobs, but have no
hierarchy.
Finding 1: PA.1 (Fraud types) is correct in that all the fraudster types assumed, are
reported among our participants. However, our study also revealed the dangers of
only considering one type of adversary. Since adversaries may be hubrid (e.g., both
fraud posting experts and in control of an army of organic fraudsters), focusing on a
single adversary type risks missing the other fraud.
Finding 2: C.1 (Fraud Organization) also validates, but our survey exceeds expec-
tations in terms of variations in team organizations.
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PA.3. Outside collaborations. Only 5 of the participants admitted to their teams
collaborating with external fraudster teams. P2 said that his company collaborates
with 4-5 other companies when developers request more reviews than they can post,
and share the profit. 2 participants said that they only tried to collaborate once, with
1 claiming unpleasant results.
Profit sharing. Of the 9 participants who claimed profit sharing, 1 claimed to pay
team members a monthly salary, 1 claimed an even split among members, 3 mentioned
preferential cuts for the job manager (10-25%) and team lead (10-50%) and equal split
of the rest among the actual review posters. 2 participants claimed a flat rate for the
review posters ($0.40 per review).
7.5.2 Fraudster Capabilities
Figure 7.3 shows the claimed team sizes by each participant. 5 participants (P6, P11,
P12, P17, P18) claimed to work individually but to also control online groups (e.g.,
on Whatsapp)
13 participants claimed to have a team with more than 10 members. Notably, P4
claimed to run a big company with around 150 people in their team, who organize
15,000 organic fraudsters through virtual (WhatsApp, Facebook) groups.
Accounts controlled. Figure 7.3 shows the number of user accounts claimed to be
controlled by or accessible to each of the 18 participants. Most participants control a
few hundred accounts, however, a few control or have access to several thousand user
accounts. One participant, part of a team of 13 workers, claimed to control 80,000
user accounts, of which 47,000 were purchased.
Duration and scale of expertise. Participants claimed to have between 1 and 6
years of experience in ASO jobs (M = 3.03, SD = 1.53). They also claimed to have
worked on between 150 and 4,000 apps in total, and between 6 and 50-60 apps in the
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Figure 7.3: Participants profiles. Number of team members, number of accounts,
number of devices. (top) Number of team members of organizations claimed by the
18 participants. 13 participants mentioned a team with more than 10 members.
(middle) Number of accounts claimed to be controlled by participating fraudsters,
including organic and inorganic. (bottom) Number of devices claimed to be controlled
by fraudsters.
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past month (M = 34.11, SD = 18.37). They claimed to charge between $0.5 and up
to $6 per posted review (M = 2.16, SD = 1.86).
7 participants, who claimed to control thousands of accounts, also claimed to be
able to write an “unlimited” number of reviews for a single app, i.e., more reviews
than the developer can ask or afford. The other 12 participants with up to 3,000
accounts claimed to be able to write a number of reviews that was consistent (smaller
or equal) to the number of accounts that they previously claimed to control.
Finding 3: PA.1 (Fraud types) is correct in that the expert fraudsters have many
accounts and participate in many jobs.
7.5.3 Fraudster Capabilities: Devices
All the participants claimed to own or have access to multiple, real, mobile devices.
Figure 7.3(bottom) shows the number of devices claimed to be controlled by each of
the 18 participants. 3 participants (P5, P10 and P13) claimed to also use virtual
devices (i.e., mobile device emulators running on laptops). For instance, P13 claims
to have 13 laptops and use the Bluestacks emulator to install and review apps, and
also 13 smartphones.
Device types. Several participants (P4, P5, P6, P8, P9, P11, P12, P14, P17, P18)
have access to organic communities of users, thus to a diverse set of devices. 4
participants (P1, P10, P11, P13) claimed to own only low-end, cheap devices. Others
(P7, P15, P16) claimed to own a mix of low, medium and high-end devices, dominated
by low-end devices. For instance, P7 claimed that most of his 1,000+ devices are low-
end Xiaomi, Micromax, Lenovo. However, a few devices are high-end (e.g., Samsung),
which are needed in order to review virtual/augmented reality apps.
Device source. Most participants claimed to purchase their devices on the regular
market. However, P11 claimed to have purchased his 45 devices, cheaply, on the black
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market, and P18 claimed to run a mobile device repair shop, and use the devices he
is supposed to repair (around 30 at any time) to write reviews.
Device storage. 6 participants claimed to store the devices on a table, easily ac-
cessible. P1 claimed to store the devices in a separate room. P7, claimed that their
more than 1,000 devices are stored on a different floor, where the “install and review”
team is located. However, they keep their high-end devices safe in a locker after use.
We also asked P7 about how they manage to charge 1,000 devices. P7 claimed
that they have a dedicated team to manage all the devices, and charge a device every
2-3 days. Further, he claimed that they keep the devices on during office time, and
switch them off after 11pm-midnight.
App-device compatibility issues. When asked what do they do when they need
to promote an app that is not compatible with their devices, 9 participants (P5, P6,
P8, P10, P11, P13, P14, P16, P17) said that it never happened. However, P7 said
that he runs campaigns to recruit fraudsters who own compatible devices, or even
purchase such devices. P9 and P15 said that they provide as many reviews as they
can from their compatible devices, and contact the developer to explain the problem.
P12 skips the job.
Finding 4: Not all participants claim to have only cheap low-end devices. Some
participants claimed to have also medium and high-end devices. Others report ways
around device cost limitations, e.g., to outsource jobs when they need device types
that they do not have.
7.5.4 PA.4: Lockstep Behaviors
9 participants claimed to work on multiple apps at the same time, at least 4-5 (P6)
and up to 10-15 (P13).
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Several participants claimed to maintain a spreadsheet of accounts and devices
used for each job, and use it to select the accounts and devices for the current job.
5 participants (P5, P7, P10, P13, P18) claimed to select the devices for a job, in a
sequential, round-robin manner. 6 participants (P5, P7, P13, P15, P16, P18) claimed
to select the accounts from which they write the reviews, in a sequential manner.
For instance, P7 chooses both accounts and devices that were least recently used, by
using the same account to write a second review only after using all his other 3,000
accounts. P15 said that they choose the least used accounts, to balance account usage
and ensure that no accounts are left unused.
P16 said that they monitor their accounts in terms of number of their reviews
filtered by Google, and choose accounts based on their filtering performance.
3 participants (P6, P8, P9) said that since they send the jobs down the hierarchy,
the choice of device and account is made by their remote online employees.
Accounts Per Device. Several participants said that they login into multiple user
accounts from the same device. Some participants claim that they do not post more
than one review from the same device to an app, while others do not report this
constraint.
P5 uses a fixed set of 2-3 accounts to login on one device at a time, then uses those
accounts to review multiple apps. However, he also claims that he does not provide
more than one review from one account for an app. P6 said that he instructs his
remote workers to login on at most 2 accounts from any device (at a time), however,
they can review the target app from both accounts. P7 mostly use 2-3 accounts from
a device for safety. P8 claims to login to 5 accounts on his device, and his Whatsapp
group members login to 3-5 accounts per device. P9 claims that he has logged into 4
accounts in a device, but he does not allow his workers to post more than one review
from any device. P15 and P16 and their teams, keep track of which accounts they
use to login on any device. Once they log out from an account, they log back in 7-10
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days. P10, P11, P13, P18 said that they only login into one account at a time, on
any device that they control. P11 motivated this choice
“If we provide multiple reviews from one device, Google will keep only one review
for that device (sic)”.
P10 said that before logging in to an account on a device, his physically co-located
team flushes the virtual device and changes its MAC address. After using the account
and virtual device pair for a few days to install and review several apps, the team logs
out and repeats the process. They then leave this account unused for 1-1.5 months.
The reason cited for this behavior is that after that interval, Google does not check
that the new login is from the same MAC address as the previous one. P13 and his
team also stay logged in on the user account for 3 days, then they reset the device
(also using cccleaner) before logging in to the next account. P18 has one device for
each account that he controls, and a 1-to-1 mapping between accounts and devices.
Strategies. Participants also reported unexpected strategies:
• Layered jobs: In addition to his own workers, P7 also organizes fully automated
CPI (Cost-Per-Install) campaigns to provide incentive to other workers to install the
target app, and CPA (Cost-Per-Action) campaigns to provide additional incentive for
using the app. P12 employs a different strategy depending on the number of reviews
required by the job. For up to 50 reviews, he uses specialized review-exchanging
Facebook groups (§ 7.2). For 50-100 reviews, he also outsources the job to individual
Facebook group workers. For more than 100 reviews, he also hires microworkers [mic,
rap]. Similarly, P18 can provide up to 30 reviews. If more are needed, he shares the
target app link with his Facebook group.
• The device repair shop ploy. P18 claims to run a mobile device repair shop and
to use the mobile devices that he is supposed to repair, to post reviews.
• Outsourced review slots: P14 controls the time when each online team member
is supposed to write the review for a target app. P17 posts the link to the target app,
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to the 20 Whatsapp groups he controls, sequentially, and stops posting when enough
reviews have been posted. P18 also claims to impose a 2 hour gap between reviews
provided by remote Facebook group workers.
Finding. We found that some workers are still hard-core lockstep even reusing the
accounts in the same order for the apps they review, whereas other workers show
a more random behavior perhaps due to the organic nature of the fraud, i.e., fraud
arriving from hybrid accounts: real users that eventually engage in opinion spamming.
7.5.5 PA.5 & C.2. The Art of Evasion
Awareness of Fraud Detection. Most participants said that it is very infrequent
for their accounts to be deleted. P2 reported that “Sometime the email might be
desabled, in that case the review will be shown as ”a Google user”.”
All participants reported that Google has deleted some of their reviews. Most
report deletion as a small or negligible percentage (under 5%) of all reviews posted.
However, P5, P9, P10, P14 reported 10-20% of their reviews being deleted. P3 stated
that ”I have to ensure the buyer that after 24 hours they will have the required amount
after deletion. For that I have to check and provide some review again if some are
deleted.” P7 provide guarantees of reviews sticking for 5-7 days and refill deleted ones
for free. Surprisingly, only P6 reported the review deletion percentage to depend on
the app, ranging from 2% on some, to 30% on others.
Perceived Reasons for Deletion. Participants reported diverse reasons for dele-
tion:
• Device re-use. P5 and P10 blame it on using the same device to write multiple
reviews for an app: “One of the main reason to erase the reviews is using the same
device. I always track the screenshot that my workers provide me for their work proof.
If I see two or more reviews from one worker have been deleted, I am pretty sure that
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they have used the same device for those reviews, I’ll warn him for that, and next
time I’ll not assign him any job (sic).
• Improper VPN use. P10 blamed it on the use of VPN: “ VPN is one of the
main problems. One safe way is, login from normal IP, then write review from VPN.
If you login using VPN, Google will detect this as fraud.”
• Improper app use. P12 said that Google deletes reviews if the users “do not care
to use the app and keep it installed for more days.” More details in § 7.5.6.
• Extended account use. P3, P9, P18 report that using the same account to write
many reviews in a short time, may trigger Google’s alarms. To avoid this, they claim
to stop using an account for several months (1-3) after using it to post 10-12 reviews.
This is consistent with earlier participant claims of limited account use, see § 7.5.4.
• Misfires of Google fraud detection. P6 blames it on Google: “Sometimes gen-
uine reviews get deleted and sometimes multiple reviews from same devices don’t get
deleted. It varies from app to app, as well as the mood of Google.”.
PA.5.1. Noisy Reviews. 8 participants (P2, P3, P5, P7, P10, P13, P15, P16) said
that they do not review other apps to avoid detection. Of the physically co-located
teams, only P1 said that they review products for which they have not been hired,
which they pick at random. 7 participants with online and organic team members
(P4, P6, P8, P11, P14, P17, P18) admitted that their online team members review
other apps for which they have not been hired, which they normally use in their real
life. P4 said “That’s why we are using real/organic users account. We don’t need to
follow any strategy. The real users’ behaviors serve the purpose of authenticity. We
always instruct them to use other popular apps from their accounts.”
PA.5.2. VPN Use. 10 participants (P4, P6, P7, P8, P10, P11, P12, P14, P17, P18)
claimed not to use VPNs. 5 participants (P1, P3, P5, P13, P15) admitted to using
VPNs. P3 claimed to use VPNs or proxies occasionally, based on job specifications:
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“We use VPN or proxy only when it is required in the job specification. For
example, if I need to install from USA, we have to use USA proxy server.(sic)”
PA.5.3. Emulators: 2 of the 18 participants (P10 and P13) said that their teams
use virtual devices running in laptops. The others use mobile devices or have access
to real users equipped with mobile devices.
PA.5.4. Upvoting: Fraud and accomplice. 6 of the 18 participants (P5, P7,
P10, P14, P15, P16) said that they upvote reviews written by their team from other
accounts. P7 said “We upvote the reviews put by our team and also other reviews
which are positive.”
Downvote Negative Reviews. P10 said that his team downvote negative reviews
of the apps they target, in order to trigger Google’s filtering mechanism, thus remove
those reviews. P7 said “We provide upvote and downvote services to make positive
reviews on top and negative in bottom.”
C.6. Account Blending: 7 participants (P1, P2, P7, P10, P11, P13, P15 ) said that
they worked on jobs where they only used fresh accounts. P10 said that “We do it
because Google always keeps the reviews received from new accounts.”. 5 participants
(P1, P2, P7, P16, P18) said that they use a mix of old and new accounts. P1 claimed
to use a 50%-50% split of old vs. new accounts in a job, if the developer does not
make a specific request. P2 claimed that it depends on the job requirements, but
they use a 60%-40% split. P7 claimed to use mostly old accounts. P16 claimed to
use a random mix of new and old accounts, on all their jobs. P18 said that “When I
create new accounts I always use them with old accounts.” 12 participants had seen
jobs that required only the use of old accounts, with P4 claiming 6-8 such jobs in the
past month.
C.2.2. User Account Validation. P2 and P3 said that they prefer to use e-mail
addresses to validate user accounts. However, P3 mentioned that Google may force
them to use phone numbers for validation. All other participants use phone numbers
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to validate accounts. Only P16 claimed that “we use virtual numbers and Google
accepts them. All other participants said that they need to use real phone numbers.
Real phone numbers require access to SIM cards, which can be expensive. How-
ever, participants revealed ingenious solutions to bypass this limitation to be able to
validate hundreds of users accounts using only a few working phone numbers. P1 said
that “it is possible to verify many accounts with 1 phone number.” P3, P10, P11 and
P17 claim to use friends and family: P3 said that “We use our friends and family
phone numbers. For example, I meet a friend on the road, I ask him to check the
message and I use his phone number to verify an account.” P10 further said that “In
Bangladesh one person can buy as many as 20 SIM cards using his credentials. [..]
For example, for my 450 Gmail accounts I have used at least 200 phone numbers.”
P5 mentioned that he borrowed SIM cards from friends. P7 and P15 refer to a phone
number verification service: P7 said that “we pay other people to get a one-time code
from their mobile SMS to verify those accounts”, while P15 said “we use a person
who has lots of phone numbers and provides a service to verify Gmail accounts with
phone number.”
P13 said that they purchase user accounts that are already validated.
Some participants reported limitations on the reuse of phone numbers. For in-
stance, P3 and P8 said that one number could be used for 3 - 5 accounts but not
immediately, while P1 said that between two verification using the same number, we
have to wait at least 3 months.”
7.5.6 C.7. App Installation and Use
C.7.1 and C.7.2. Delayed Review, App Open and Usage. 14 participants
claimed to wait, open or use the app before reviewing it. P5 and P9 wait a few hours
before reviewing the installed app. P9 also claimed to use it for 5-10 minutes. P6 and
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P8 claimed to open the app 1-2 times before reviewing. P7 claimed to use the app
as a normal user. P10, P13 and P16 claimed to keep the app open for 7-10 minutes,
3-4 minutes and 10-15 minutes respectively, before writing the review. P12, P14, P17
and P18 claimed to recommend to their online and organic teams to open the app
for a few minutes and even use it before reviewing. P4 said “We try to navigate all
the pages of the app before writing the reviews.”
C.7.3. App Retention: All participants admited to perform retention installs. In
fact, P10 said that this is required to prevent review filtering: “Google takes 72 hours
to verify the review. If you delete this app in this period, Google will drop the review.”
P1, P5 and P15 said that they keep the app for 1 day after reviewing it. P5
said however that he charges extra when developers ask them to keep the app for 2-3
days. P2 claimed to keep the app between 7 days and up to 2 months. However, most
participants said that they keep the app for a few days, ranging from 2-3 days (P4,
P8, P10, P13, P14) to 1-2 weeks (P17). Consistent with previous claims, P10 said
that “We keep the app 3 days in the virtual devices. After that we flash the virtual
devices and change the MAC address and use it for the next reviews.” P4 said that
his workers keep the app installed until they need the space.
Review Without Install. When asked, 4 participants (P5, P10, P13 and P18) said
that one can review an app without prior installation of the app from a device on
which the account is logged in: “Click on install then stop installing immediately.
The app would not be installed but it will allow us to write reviews.”
Findings. While several participants reported the ability to bypass Google’s sanity
check of preventing reviews without prior app instalation, all the participants suggest
not only installing but also keeping the app installed for days after the review.
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7.5.7 PA.2. Fraud Time Points
PA.2.1. Early Bird Fraud. 14 participants said that they have seen and have
worked on apps that were recently launched. They said that either the hiring devel-
oper mentions that the app was recently launched, or that they infer this information
based on the app status when posting their first review. Only P1 and P11 said that
they have seen only 1-2 such jobs in the past month, while 3 participants (P9, P10,
P13) claimed to have worked on 20 or more (up to 40) such jobs in the past month.
P7 claimed that “We even work on apps which are going to be launched soon. A
few of our clients rely on our agency from pre-launch to launch and then post-launch
(sic)”.
PA.2.2. Proactive Fraud: 15 of the 18 survey participants said that they were hired
to proactively inject fraud to maintain a desired average rating of an app. However,
participants said that they have seen very few such jobs, and worked on even fewer. 6
participants had worked on 1 such job in the past month, 3 participants worked on 2,
and 3 worked on 3-4 such jobs last month. One participant had worked on only 10-12
such jobs in total. This is even the case for participants who offer such packages. For
instance, P7 said “Yes, we provide ASO maintenance services and subscription-based
services for installs and reviews in which you can select packages, and you receive a
fixed number of reviews and installs each month”, yet they only worked on 3 such
jobs in the past month.
7.5.8 PA.3. Review Burst Assumption
16 participants claimed to have seen jobs that specify how many reviews per day
the workers should post. 2 participants claimed to have seen 40-45 such jobs in the
past month, the others ranged between 1-30. P5 stated that most developers want a
slow posting rate, e.g., 2-3 reviews per day, and to maintain this rate, the developers
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provide the text of the reviews to be posted each day. P6 said that “some developers
with money don’t care whether reviews stay or not. They just need the number of
reviews in their apps, quality doesn’t matter to them. They just want short-time
business.” P10 said that “Experienced buyers always know how many reviews are
good each day. They mention like 2-3 reviews each day. We also agree on that.”
P1, P3 and P5 reported that they suggest to the hiring developers, the rate of
posting reviews. P5 said “If the developer asks for 30 reviews each day, I have to
warn him that it’s harmful to his app as Google may detect this as fake. Then I’ll
suggest to him that I will take 10 days to provide 30 reviews.”. Most participants
suggest 2-3 reviews per day, but some (e.g., P11, P14, P17, P18) recommend higher
numbers, up to 30-40 reviews per day (P14).
Review Rate Crescendo. Several participants suggested that the number of rec-
ommended daily reviews is a function of the app’s existing review count. P6 said that
“for new apps with less installs, it is better not to provide many reviews each day.
But for popular apps, 20-50 reviews each day would be acceptable.” P7 said that “if
your app has very fewer reviews, you should go with 3-5 reviews daily so that Google
should not become suspicious. If someone has a large number of reviews, they can get
20-25 reviews daily.”
P10 revealed a different strategy: “We provide a slow rate at the beginning. Like
per day 1 review. Like 5 reviews in 6-7 days. After 10 reviews we start posting 2
reviews each day. After 150 reviews we can provide 3-4 reviews each day.”
7.5.9 C.3. Review Campaign Duration
All the participants except P4 said that they have seen ASO job posts that specify
the required duration of the review posting campaign. P6 and P15 said that it is rare
for developers to specify the duration of the campaign or the number of daily reviews,
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and that developers are more concerned about the total number of reviews. However,
P2 said almost all the jobs he has seen in the past month, mention the campaign
length. In in the past month, 5 participants have seen 3-5 such jobs, 4 have seen
6-10 jobs, and 5 have seen 11-35 such jobs. The longest required interval reported by
the participants for a campaign is 18 months. 12 participants reported longest seen
required campaigns of 1-6 months, and 6 participants reported campaigns of 7-18
months.
Finding: Our survey suggests a strategy shift, driven both by a subset of developers
and workers, who are aware that substantial review bursts may be more easily flagged.
Specifically, some developers and fraud workers prefer to spread out reviews over
longer campaigns. Such a strategy prevents the peer-review site from flagging review
bursts and also ensures a consistent positive review campaign over a longer interval.
7.5.10 PA.6. Review Writing
Review Text Source. 2 participants (P3, P4) said that they always write their
own reviews. The other participants said that they both receive or request the review
text from the developer, and they also write their own reviews. P2 said that they
receive instructions about the reviews from the developer. P11 reported developers
who provide review samples, from which they are supposed to generate variations. 3
participants (P7, P8, P15) said that they either prefer or even ask the developer to
provide the review text. P3 and P13 said that they study the app before writing the
review. P13 claimed to ask the developer to provide the app’s main features, which
he uses to fabricate reviews.
PA.6.1. Review plagiarism: 8 participants (P1, P3, P5, P12, P13, P14, P15, P18)
denied using plagiarism or self-plagiarism. Several participants (P2, P4, P6, P9, P11,
P17) admitted to some form of plagiarism. For instance, P2 only does it when the
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developer mentions the source, e.g., to copy reviews from other peer-opinion sites. P4
admitted that their reviews are sometimes similar, as they are short. P16 claimed to
have a set of ready-made reviews which his team changes slightly for different apps.
P9 said that “Not exact copy-paste. But sometime we copy and modify reviews from
other apps that are similar to this app. (sic)”
PA.6.2. Review Length: One participant claimed to write reviews that have at
least 10 words. Two participants claimed to write reviews that are 15-30 words long.
Several participants admited that their reviews are short: “We don’t use many words
or big sentences because Google may match the pattern. We always use short message
like “Good app”, “Awesome”, “Fantastic”. These are very common but easy to write
and Google may not complain”.
Review Posting Process. The participants had a mixed strategy of typing the
reviews directly on the device, vs. cut-and-pasting them from a separate source. 11
participants said that they type the reviews directly from their devices. P5 said that
they cut-and-paste reviews if provided by the hiring developer, otherwise they type
their own (short reviews). Several participants organize teams of remote fraudsters,
thus cannot verify their actions. However, P7 noted that most devices do not allow
cut-and-paste.
7.5.11 PA.7. Ratings
PA.7.1. Extreme Ratings. All participants admitted writing mostly 4 or 5-star
reviews unless they receive special instructions from the developers. 8 participants
(P3, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P14, P18) said that they receive instructions on the
ratio of review ratings from the developers. P12 said that these instructions can also
include ratings lower than 4 stars: “Developers request us to write a few 4, 3 and
even few 1 star reviews.”
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When there are no instructions on the rating distribution, several participants
claimed to maintain their own ratio. For instance, P5, P16, P17 claimed to post a
10%-90% ratio of 4 to 5 star reviews, P2, P10, P18 have a 20%-80% ration, P1, P9
have a 30%-70% ratio and P13 has a 40%-60% ratio. 3 participants (P6, P11, P14)
said that they do not maintain any specific ratio, while P4 and P12 post only 5-star
reviews.
3 participants claimed strategies to also post lower ratings. For instance, P6
mentioned that: “If the average rating goes up to 4.3 or 4.4, I also write a few 3-star
reviews along with 4 and 5-star reviews.” P7 said that “When posting more than 200
reviews, we suggest to the client to have at least 5 to 6 reviews with 3 star ratings.”
P15 claimed to post a 10%-30%-70% ratio of 3, 4, 5-star reviews.
Findings. While fraudsters claim to and post mostly 4 or 5-star reviews, several also
report evasion strategies, where they post also a few neutral and negative ratings.
7.5.12 PA.8. Review Bots
5 participants (P1, P11, P13, P15, P16) said they access their accounts regularly. 12
participants said that they access them manually. However, 3 participants (P13, P15,
P16) said they use scripts and automatic login systems to periodically access their
accounts, keep them alive, and report if any are inaccessible. All the participants
who organize organic users said that organic users access their accounts regularly for
their regular use.
All of the participants said that they write their reviews manually, and do not use
any script for this purpose.
Several participants said that they use specialized programs to help with installs,
and manage jobs accros multiple team members. For instance, P6 said that they
use install bots if the client agrees. P7 said that they have special apps (names not
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provided due to privacy concerns) that they use to push jobs to their workers, and
manage the jobs and pay for the work. P9 uses an “admin panel” app to contact
his team admins who respond with the number of reviews that their sub-teams can
provide.
Finding. While 6 of the 18 participants claimed to use tools to keep alive their
accounts or install apps, none used tools to automatically post reviews.
7.5.13 Account Life Cycle
New Account Creation vs. Purchase. 6 participants (P1, P3, P7, P10, P13,
P16) claimed to create new accounts periodically, ranging from once a day (P10) to
once a month (P16). P2 and P9 claimed to create new accounts when they don’t have
enough accounts for a job, especially when the job requests accounts from a specific
geographic region. P5 and P18 create new accounts when Google deletes some of their
accounts. P15 create new accounts when the job requests more reviews than they can
provide. Only 5 participants (P1, P5, P13, P17) admitted to purchase new accounts.
P1 claimed to have purchased more than 10,000 accounts, while P13 claimed to have
purchased 47,000 accounts. Two participants (P1 and P3) volunteered the fact that
they age their new accounts (1-2 months) before using them to post reviews.
PA.9. Account Name Variation. 13 participants mentioned they use fake name
generators, e.g., [FNG], to get random names for their accounts. Some of them
create account names to correspond to specific geographic regions, as sometimes also
requested by developers. P2 even claimed to send the chosen names of to the employer
for feedback. P11 claimed to use random names from Google search and P7 said that
they have their own name database. P4, P7 and P14 said that their use of organic
fraudsters ensure that they use real user names.
196
7 participants mentioned that they add profile pictures, which they retrieve from
different sources, e.g., Google search, Google Plus, pixabay.com, to make the account
look more authentic. P9 said “After we use fake name generator to create the account
name, we search the name in Google Plus and choose a profile, then we choose a
random person from the list of followers and use his image for the account profile.”
P10 however said that they do not use any profile picture as pictures define the
demographics of the profile, and developers do not want to reveal this information.
PA.10. Singleton Accounts. 6 participants (P1, P2, P7, P10, P13, P15 admited to
having worked on jobs that required them to create accounts just to post one review
and then to abandon them. P1 and P2 said that the cost for posting such a review
is higher than usual, $8 and $10 respectively. The reason for this is due to the effort
to create an account, which will not be amortized over multiple fake review posting
activities. The reason given by the participants for being requested to do this is that
Google does not filter reviews posted by singleton accounts, since its fraud detection
module needs more information to build a reputation for the account.
Account Abandonment. With the exception of the above singleton account jobs,
9 participants said they have never abandoned an account. 6 participants claimed
that they abandon their account only if Google blocked that account for suspicious
activities. P17 and P18 said that they abandon an account only if its reviews are con-
tinuously deleted by Google. P2 said that “I remember I used some accounts for many
different jobs, like YouTube review, Google Place review, app review and other ser-
vices. Google disabled those account for misuse. After that, we dedicated accounts for
app reviews.” Consistent with statements about their account use strategies (§ 7.5.4),
P3 and P9 said that they never abandon accounts, but only stop using them for a
few months after using them a few times.
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7.5.14 C.9: Proof of Work
12 participants said that they use screenshots as a proof of work. 5 participants said
that they send the usernames of accounts that they used to post reviews. P6 claimed
to send permalinks to their reviews: “Normally I check my reviews for 2-3 days and
then send the permalinks that are direct links of the review I post, or names I used to
post the reviews.”
Work verifications can take place at the team level. For instance, P3 said that
“[..] we ask everyone to post reviews in the team. Then I track how many reviews we
provide and they also send me the screenshot. If the buyer requires the screenshots
I send him those too.” He also said that “Sometimes, the developer keeps track of
the reviews we post, and gives us 24 hours to show that the reviews are alive. If any
review is deleted during this time, we have to re-post the reviews.”
P6 said that “If we get a report that any review is being deleted then we check that
user’s mobile and ask him to provide screenshot of the app installed immediately. If
he fails to provide that, I flag him as a bad user and we consider him less for the next
tasks.”
P9 verify that their team members do not post multiple reviews from the same
device: “ I always check the screenshots and see if they are taken from the same
device. One clue is, if the status bar of the phones of two screenshots from the same
admin are similar, I consider those reviews to be from the same device. We believe
that each device status bar is different as different people run different services in the
background.”
Findings. Some developers require and verify that fraudster reviews are not filtered
for days after they are posted. The distributed nature of developers and fraudster
teams imposes interactive work verifications. Teams also verify the work claims of
their members, and punish cheaters.
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7.6 Recommendations
We discuss several defenses that the findings in this paper could enable, to help
peer-opinion sites identify and even prevent fraud, or at least increase its cost.
Keep Account Owners Busy. Peer-opinion sites could impose small account man-
agement tasks at random times (e.g., change password every 3 months). This will
require fraudsters who own many accounts to update their password files ...
Account Verification. Several fraudsters mentioned using the same SIM card to
validate multiple accounts, albeit after waiting for a few months. Peer-opinion sites
could ask users to re-validate their accounts at later, random login times, especially
if the SIM cards used to validate them have been used also for other accounts.
Organic vs. Inorganic Reviews. To distinguish between fraud workers who pro-
vide inorganic from those who provide organic reviews, we can use the diversity of
the device types used to post those reviews. This is because organic workers organize
real users who user their personal user accounts and devices to post reviews, thus
have more diversity than inorganic workers who control fewer devices than accounts,
often of the same brand.
App Use. Most fraudsters suggest that it is better to use the apps before reviewing
them, to mimic genuine behaviors. They claim to open the app, interact with it for
a few minutes or hours and then post the review. We believe that the time between
installing the app and reviewing it must be substantially different when reviews are
posted from honest and fraudulent accounts. This is one feature that Google’s anti-
abuse techniques can adapt to help detect fraudulent reviews and accounts. Similarly,
features such as the number of times the app has been opened before the review and
the length of each session can aid in this purpose.
Review Process. Most fraudsters mentioned that they keep the app installed for
at most two weeks after they reviewed it. This behavior can also be exploited by
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Google’s techniques to detect abuse as we argue that the natural flow of the review
process should be more linear: a user first install the app, then review it, after he
has used it for some time. It is suspicious if an app receives a review soon after
was downloaded and even more if it is uninstalled right after a positive feedback.
We could design a system that keeps the review posted and detect whether the user
uninstall the app soon after it was reviewed positively. If so, this review is likely to
be fake.
Delayed Removal of Fraud. Some fraudsters claimed that reviews written from
the same device are likely to be deleted by Google and that they avoid doing it. In
addition, some fraudsters mentioned that reviews via VPN are blocked by Google
and that account activity is important to blend in as honest users. In other words,
some immediate countermeasures may serve as an oracle of what actions Google can
detect as abusive. The fraud workers can then use this oracle to test and adapt their
strategies to learn and bypass these countermeasures in a short period of time. We
propose to postpone the removal of fraudulent content so that it is hard for fraudsters
to reverse engineer Google’s engine. This approach proved to be hard to notice by
fraudsters in Instagram using only one-day delay removal.
Mislead Fraudulent Accounts. Similar to the previous recommendation, we sug-
gest to mislead fraudulent accounts by showing both fake and honest actions to fraud-
ulent users, but only genuine content to honest accounts. In this sense, we propose to
select different content to fraudulent accounts in order to mislead them into believing
that their actions are being effective. This will make it harder for them to reverse
engineer Google’s efforts.
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7.7 Conclusion
We survey the assumptions made by the fraud detection research community on the
capabilities and behaviors of fraudsters and study their relevance to app search opti-
mization fraud conducted for Google Play apps. For this, we designed and conducted
in-depth interviews with expert fraudsters recruited from several freelancing sites. In
addition, we have validated these interviews results with direct empirical data col-
lected from the social networking site, establishing ground truth for future research.
Furthermore, we have identified novel assumptions that seem critical to the detec-
tion and de-anonymization of the fraudulent communities studied. We have similarly
analyzed and validated these new assumptions which provide novel insight into the
techniques and methods used by fraudsters in the wild.
7.8 Survey Questions
Screening Questions.
1. How many user accounts do you control in Google Play?
2. For how long have you been active doing App Store Optimization for Google
Play?
3. How many jobs have you worked on Google Play review approximately?
4. How much do you charge for a review? How much do you charge for an app
install?
5. Can you tell me what types of ASO services do you provide in Google Play? If
the participant is confused, suggest Ratings, Reviews, and App Installs.
Work’s Requirement.
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1. Have you seen jobs that tell you for how long to post reviews, that is, for how
many days?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many such jobs have you seen in the past month?
(b) What is the longest such time interval that you have seen in a job?
2. What do you think is the largest number of reviews that a freelancer could write
for a single app?
3. Have you seen jobs that ask you to post a certain number of reviews per day?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many such jobs have you seen in the past month?
(b) What is the average number of reviews that you think is better to post in
a day for a single app?
(c) Do you post them all at the same time, or at different times during the
day?
4. Do you know any developers/employers who ask freelancers to post reviews for
recently launched apps?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many such apps have you seen in freelancing sites in the past month?
5. Were you ever re-hired by the same developer to review the same app at a later
time? For instance, 2 weeks or 6 months after the first job?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many times?
(b) Were you ever hired by a developer to review more than one app?
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6. Do you provide services that ensure that the rating of the app will stay above a
threshold, for instance, above 3.5 or 4 stars? How much do you charge for this
service?
7. Have you done any job for which you have not received any payment?
Device Usage.
1. What devices do you use frequently?
If they mention laptop:
(a) Do you ever/do you prefer to use a browser to write reviews? or do you
use emulator? What about virtual machines?
(b) What about scripts?
If they mention mobile:
(a) How many mobile devices do you have?
User Accounts.
1. Some people think it is important to create new user accounts when they start
a new job. How many new accounts would you create on average per job?
If they don’t give a good answer then ask:
(a) Can you give me one recent example?
2. Is there any effective way to pick a good name for a user account?
(a) Are the names that you choose very different from each other?
(b) Do you ever use a random name generator?
3. One participant mentioned that they have purchased user accounts from a third
party. Have you ever done that?
If the answer is yes:
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(a) Do you purchase such accounts when you start a new job?
(b) Do you purchase such accounts at random times?
(c) How many new accounts do you think you have purchased in total?
(d) Have you noticed if any of the accounts that you purchased, had been used
already, for instance, to review other apps?
(e) Do you purchase authentic user accounts which were used for good purpose
before?
4. Do you ever need to verify newly created Google Play accounts?
(a) What is the preferred way to verify those accounts? Email or Phone?
If phone:
(a) Do you buy and use virtual phone numbers, like Twilio or Google Voice?
5. Do you access your Google Play accounts regularly? How do you do that?
(a) Do you access them manually?
(b) Do you use any script to access and maintain their accounts?
(c) Is it necessary to use proxy or VPN services to access accounts?
6. Since freelancers have so many user accounts in Google Play, what are common
strategies to remember passwords for these accounts?
(a) Do you write the passwords down?
(b) Do you use the same password for multiple accounts?
(c) Do you use passwords that are easy to remember?
7. For how long do you usually use a Google Play account on average? Do you
ever abandon a user account that you use in Google Play?
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8. Do you ever create an account just to post one review and then you abandon
the account?
Camouflage Strategies.
1. Did you ever have a Google Play account that was deleted by Google?
(a) How many times did this happen to you in the past two weeks?
2. Has Google Play ever erased reviews that you posted?
(a) Do you remember how many times this happened in the past 2 weeks?
(b) From your experience, how long does it take for other people to see your
reviews?
3. Do you know any strategy that people use to convince Google Play not to block
their accounts?
If the answer is yes:
(a) Can you describe any strategies that people follow?
(b) Do you write reviews for apps that you were not hired to review?
If the answer is yes:
(c) How do you select those apps?
If not making progress (make a note of it), and ask:
(d) Do you write reviews for apps that you personally like?
(e) Do you write reviews for apps that you pick at random?
4. Do you ever use only new accounts to post reviews for an app in a job?
5. Do you use a mix of old and new accounts to post reviews for an app in a job?
(a) How often did you do this in your past 5 jobs?
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6. Have you seen jobs that explicitly request to use only old accounts that have a
good reputation?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many such jobs did you noticed in the past month?
If none:
(b) What about the past 3 months, etc?
7. How much do you charge for a review written from a new vs old account?, is
there any difference?
8. Do you write the text of the reviews yourself?
9. Do you ever get the review text from the developer?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How many times in the past 2-3 weeks?
10. Have you ever seen jobs that ask you how long the review text should be? Do
you remember that value?
11. Have you seen people copy parts of reviews that they posted for other apps?
12. Have you seen people copy parts of reviews written by others?
13. Give us some example of review text that you write usually?
14. How long is an average review that you write, in terms of the number of words
or characters?
15. Did you ever post 3 star reviews? How many of your reviews are 3 star reviews?
Half of them, a quarter, ten percent, less than 10 percent?
16. Were you ever hired to write bad reviews, with 1 or 2 star ratings? Do you
remember how many such jobs you did?
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17. What percentage of your reviews had 4 or 5 stars?
18. Do you ever go back and change a review that you wrote in a job?
If the answer is yes:
(a) Can you tell me why?
(b) Did you ever increase the start rating?
(c) Did you ever decrease the rating?
(d) Did you leave the rating the same but just change the text of the review?
19. Do you ask someone else to post the reviews that you wrote?
20. Do you ever use a script to post the reviews?
21. Do you know how to post a review for an app without installing the app?
22. How long do you keep the app installed after posting the review?
Collaboration.
1. What do you do when the number of reviews requested is higher than the
number of accounts you have? Do you outsource the rest ?
2. Do you work individually or are you a part of a team or business?
If the answer is yes:
(a) If part of a team, how large is your team or business?
(b) How do people in the team communicate?
(c) How do they distribute the profit?
3. Do you maintain any work hierarchical levels in your team? For example, catch-
ing the clients, writing reviews, creating accounts?
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4. Have you seen jobs where developers ask freelancers to collaborate with other
freelancers?
If the answer is yes:
(a) How do you communicate with them?
5. Do you know freelancers who communicate with each other to post reviews for
the same job? Do you know if freelancers communicate among them the times
when they will post their reviews?
6. Do you know freelancers who hire others to help them with the jobs they get -
like a subcontract?
7. Do you share Google Play accounts with other freelancers to help with App
Store Optimization(ASO) jobs?
General Questions.
1. What’s your age?
(a) less than 18
(b) 18 to 28
(c) 28 to 38
(d) 38 to 48
(e) 48 to 58
(f) 58 to 68
(g) older than 68
2. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?
3. Do you have another job besides freelancing? Can you tell me what it is?
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
Online services that assemble and leverage public opinion on hosted products are
central to numerous aspects of peoples online and physical activities. Every day,
people rely on online information to make decisions on purchases, services, software
and opinions. People often assume the popularity of featured products is generated
by purchases, downloads and reviews of real patrons, who are sharing their honest
opinions about what they have experienced. Reviews, opinions, and software are
sometimes fake, produced and controlled by fraudsters. Some of them collude to
artificially boost the reputation of mediocre services, products, and venues, some
game the system to improve rankings in search results and some entice unsuspecting
users to download malicious software.
The developers of top ranking products in peer-review sites like Google Play,
Amazon, or Yelp receive higher rewards, that include direct payments and ad-based
revenues. Statistics maintained by peer-review sites concerning user activities for
a product (e.g., reviews, ratings, likes, followers, app install counts) are known to
play an essential part in the product’s ranking. This has created a black market for
search rank fraud, mediated by an abundance of crowdsourcing sites. Specifically,
crowdsourcing fraudsters create or purchase hundreds of user accounts in the peer-
review site, then post activities for the products of developers who hire them, from
the accounts they control. Discouraging search rank fraud is essential to ensure trust
in peer-review sites and the products that they host. Previous work in this area has
focused on fraud detection.
In chapter 3, we studied temporal patterns in Google Play, an influential app
market. We use data we collected from more than 160,000 apps daily over a six month
period, to examine market trends, application characteristics and developer behavior
in real-world market settings. Our work provides insights into the impact of developer
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levers (e.g., price, permissions requested, update frequency) on app popularity. We
proposed future directions for integrating analytics insights into developer and user
experiences. We introduced novel attack vectors on app markets and discussed future
detection directions.
In chapter 4, we have introduced FairPlay, a system to detect both fraudulent and
malware Google Play apps. Our experiments on a newly contributed longitudinal
app dataset, have shown that a high percentage of malware is involved in search rank
fraud; both are accurately identified by FairPlay. In addition, we showed FairPlay’s
ability to discover hundreds of apps that evade Google Play’s detection technology,
including a new type of coercive fraud attack.
In chapter 5, We have introduced the concept of real-time fraud preemption sys-
tems, named as the FraudSys, that seek to restrict the profitability and impact of
fraud in online systems. We propose and develop stateless, verifiable computational
puzzles, that impose minimal overheads, but enable their efficient verification. We
have developed a graph based, real-time algorithm to assign fraud scores to user ac-
tivities and mechanisms to convert scores to puzzle difficulty values. We used data
collected from Google Play and Facebook to show that our solutions impose significant
penalties on fraudsters, and make fraud less productive than Bitcoin mining.
In chapter 6, We introduced the fraud de-anonymization problem for search rank
fraud in online services. We have collected fraud data from crowdsourcing sites and
the Google Play store, and we have performed user studies with crowdsourcing fraud-
sters. We have proposed Dolos, a fraud de-anonymization system. Doloscorrectly
attributed 95% of the fraud detected for 640 Google Play apps, and identified at
least 90% of the workers who promoted each of 87% of these apps. Dolos identified
1,056 out of 13,087 monitored Google Play apps, to have suspicious reviewer groups,
and revealed a suite of observed fraud behaviors. Dolos significantly outperforms
adapted dense subgraph detection and loopy belief propagation competitors, in two
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coverage scores that we have developed.
In Chapter 7 we survey the assumptions made by the fraud detection research
community on the capabilities and behaviors of fraudsters and study their relevance
to app search optimization fraud conducted for Google Play apps. For this, we
designed and conducted in-depth interviews with expert fraudsters recruited from
several freelancing sites. In addition, we have validated these interviews results with
direct empirical data collected from the social networking site, establishing ground
truth for future research. Furthermore, we have identified novel assumptions that
seem critical to the detection and de-anonymization of the fraudulent communities
studied. We have similarly analyzed and validated these new assumptions which
provide novel insight into the techniques and methods used by fraudsters in the wild.
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